Update to OpenSSL 1.0.2.o

CHANGES

@@ -2,6 +2,110 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ This is a high-level summary of the most important changes.
+ For a full list of changes, see the git commit log; for example,
+ https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
+ release branch.
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2n and 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018]
+
+  *) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack
+
+     Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found
+     in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
+     excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There
+     are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources
+     so this is considered safe.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz
+     project.
+     (CVE-2018-0739)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2m and 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017]
+
+  *) Read/write after SSL object in error state
+
+     OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
+     mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake
+     then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if
+     you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the
+     explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and
+     SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if
+     SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
+     handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function
+     call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application
+     for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without
+     being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer.
+
+     In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present
+     that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having
+     already received a fatal error.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google).
+     (CVE-2017-3737)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64
+
+     There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
+     used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
+     Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this
+     defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely.
+     Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the
+     work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed
+     offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be
+     significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server
+     would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is
+     no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701.
+
+     This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
+     like Intel Haswell (4th generation).
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue
+     was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project.
+     (CVE-2017-3738)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2l and 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017]
+
+  *) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64
+
+     There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+     procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+     against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+     perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+     feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+     deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+     of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+     likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+     additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+     private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+     key that is shared between multiple clients.
+
+     This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions
+     like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+     (CVE-2017-3736)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read
+
+     If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension,
+     OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result
+     would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+     (CVE-2017-3735)
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2k and 1.0.2l [25 May 2017]
+
+  *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target
+     platform rather than 'mingw'.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
  Changes between 1.0.2j and 1.0.2k [26 Jan 2017]
 
   *) Truncated packet could crash via OOB read
@@ -1923,8 +2027,11 @@
      to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined.
      [Steve Henson]
 
-  *) Add SRP support.
-     [Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
+  *) A long standing patch to add support for SRP from EdelWeb (Peter
+     Sylvester and Christophe Renou) was integrated.
+     [Christophe Renou <christophe.renou@edelweb.fr>, Peter Sylvester
+     <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>, Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu>, and
+     Ben Laurie]
 
   *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id.
      [Steve Henson]