Import OpenSSL 1.0.2p

This commit is contained in:
Steve Dower
2018-08-14 08:51:39 -07:00
parent 4933cd8231
commit 4b1c388f4d
157 changed files with 2471 additions and 1482 deletions

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@@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@ int SMIME_text(BIO *in, BIO *out);
* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
*/
void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
/* Error codes for the ASN1 functions. */
@@ -1264,7 +1265,10 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
# define ASN1_F_D2I_X509 156
# define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF 157
# define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY 159
# define ASN1_F_DO_BUF 221
# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM 211
# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BOOLEAN 223
# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT 222
# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_SET 188
# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_TIME 160
# define ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY 161
@@ -1414,7 +1418,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
# define ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG 168
# define ASN1_R_WRONG_TYPE 169
#ifdef __cplusplus
# ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
# endif
#endif

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@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -375,25 +375,76 @@ int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b);
* on the size of the number */
/*
* number of Miller-Rabin iterations for an error rate of less than 2^-80 for
* random 'b'-bit input, b >= 100 (taken from table 4.4 in the Handbook of
* Applied Cryptography [Menezes, van Oorschot, Vanstone; CRC Press 1996];
* original paper: Damgaard, Landrock, Pomerance: Average case error
* estimates for the strong probable prime test. -- Math. Comp. 61 (1993)
* 177-194)
* BN_prime_checks_for_size() returns the number of Miller-Rabin iterations
* that will be done for checking that a random number is probably prime. The
* error rate for accepting a composite number as prime depends on the size of
* the prime |b|. The error rates used are for calculating an RSA key with 2 primes,
* and so the level is what you would expect for a key of double the size of the
* prime.
*
* This table is generated using the algorithm of FIPS PUB 186-4
* Digital Signature Standard (DSS), section F.1, page 117.
* (https://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4)
*
* The following magma script was used to generate the output:
* securitybits:=125;
* k:=1024;
* for t:=1 to 65 do
* for M:=3 to Floor(2*Sqrt(k-1)-1) do
* S:=0;
* // Sum over m
* for m:=3 to M do
* s:=0;
* // Sum over j
* for j:=2 to m do
* s+:=(RealField(32)!2)^-(j+(k-1)/j);
* end for;
* S+:=2^(m-(m-1)*t)*s;
* end for;
* A:=2^(k-2-M*t);
* B:=8*(Pi(RealField(32))^2-6)/3*2^(k-2)*S;
* pkt:=2.00743*Log(2)*k*2^-k*(A+B);
* seclevel:=Floor(-Log(2,pkt));
* if seclevel ge securitybits then
* printf "k: %5o, security: %o bits (t: %o, M: %o)\n",k,seclevel,t,M;
* break;
* end if;
* end for;
* if seclevel ge securitybits then break; end if;
* end for;
*
* It can be run online at:
* http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/calc
*
* And will output:
* k: 1024, security: 129 bits (t: 6, M: 23)
*
* k is the number of bits of the prime, securitybits is the level we want to
* reach.
*
* prime length | RSA key size | # MR tests | security level
* -------------+--------------|------------+---------------
* (b) >= 6394 | >= 12788 | 3 | 256 bit
* (b) >= 3747 | >= 7494 | 3 | 192 bit
* (b) >= 1345 | >= 2690 | 4 | 128 bit
* (b) >= 1080 | >= 2160 | 5 | 128 bit
* (b) >= 852 | >= 1704 | 5 | 112 bit
* (b) >= 476 | >= 952 | 5 | 80 bit
* (b) >= 400 | >= 800 | 6 | 80 bit
* (b) >= 347 | >= 694 | 7 | 80 bit
* (b) >= 308 | >= 616 | 8 | 80 bit
* (b) >= 55 | >= 110 | 27 | 64 bit
* (b) >= 6 | >= 12 | 34 | 64 bit
*/
# define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ? 2 : \
(b) >= 850 ? 3 : \
(b) >= 650 ? 4 : \
(b) >= 550 ? 5 : \
(b) >= 450 ? 6 : \
(b) >= 400 ? 7 : \
(b) >= 350 ? 8 : \
(b) >= 300 ? 9 : \
(b) >= 250 ? 12 : \
(b) >= 200 ? 15 : \
(b) >= 150 ? 18 : \
/* b >= 100 */ 27)
# define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 3747 ? 3 : \
(b) >= 1345 ? 4 : \
(b) >= 476 ? 5 : \
(b) >= 400 ? 6 : \
(b) >= 347 ? 7 : \
(b) >= 308 ? 8 : \
(b) >= 55 ? 27 : \
/* b >= 6 */ 34)
# define BN_num_bytes(a) ((BN_num_bits(a)+7)/8)
@@ -773,6 +824,16 @@ BIGNUM *bn_dup_expand(const BIGNUM *a, int words); /* unused */
/* We only need assert() when debugging */
# include <assert.h>
/*
* The new BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP flag marks vectors that were not treated with
* bn_correct_top, in other words such vectors are permitted to have zeros
* in most significant limbs. Such vectors are used internally to achieve
* execution time invariance for critical operations with private keys.
* It's BN_DEBUG-only flag, because user application is not supposed to
* observe it anyway. Moreover, optimizing compiler would actually remove
* all operations manipulating the bit in question in non-BN_DEBUG build.
*/
# define BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP 0x10000
# ifdef BN_DEBUG_RAND
/* To avoid "make update" cvs wars due to BN_DEBUG, use some tricks */
# ifndef RAND_pseudo_bytes
@@ -805,8 +866,10 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
do { \
const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (a); \
if (_bnum2 != NULL) { \
assert((_bnum2->top == 0) || \
(_bnum2->d[_bnum2->top - 1] != 0)); \
int _top = _bnum2->top; \
assert((_top == 0) || \
(_bnum2->flags & BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP) || \
(_bnum2->d[_top - 1] != 0)); \
bn_pollute(_bnum2); \
} \
} while(0)
@@ -824,6 +887,7 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
# else /* !BN_DEBUG */
# define BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP 0
# define bn_pollute(a)
# define bn_check_top(a)
# define bn_fix_top(a) bn_correct_top(a)

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@@ -249,10 +249,12 @@ int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x);
int DSA_print_fp(FILE *bp, const DSA *x, int off);
# endif
# define DSS_prime_checks 50
# define DSS_prime_checks 64
/*
* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
* Rabin-Miller
* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix C.3. Since we only
* have one value here we set the number of checks to 64 which is the 128 bit
* security level that is the highest level and valid for creating a 3072 bit
* DSA key.
*/
# define DSA_is_prime(n, callback, cb_arg) \
BN_is_prime(n, DSS_prime_checks, callback, NULL, cb_arg)
@@ -307,6 +309,7 @@ void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void);
# define DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG 111
# define DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE 122
# define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL 120
# define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR 127
# define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN 121
# define DSA_F_SIG_CB 114

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@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100020ffL
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000210fL
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2o-fips 27 Mar 2018"
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2p-fips 14 Aug 2018"
# else
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2o 27 Mar 2018"
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2p 14 Aug 2018"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT

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@@ -442,7 +442,8 @@ void PEM_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, unsigned int cnt);
int PEM_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key);
/* The default pem_password_cb that's used internally */
int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int rwflag, void *userdata);
void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type);
void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str);

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@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st {
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used
* to load the 'cipher' structure */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* ciphers offered by the client */
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */
/*
* These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to
@@ -2149,7 +2149,7 @@ int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s);
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s);
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n);
char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len);
char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size);
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s);
int SSL_pending(const SSL *s);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
@@ -2954,6 +2954,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV 294
# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW 295
# define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159
# define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 404
# define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160
# define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274
# define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 161