Import OpenSSL 1.1.0i

CHANGES

@@ -7,6 +7,81 @@
  https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
  release branch.
 
+ Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [14 Aug 2018]
+
+  *) Client DoS due to large DH parameter
+
+     During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
+     malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
+     cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
+     key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
+     could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
+     (CVE-2018-0732)
+     [Guido Vranken]
+
+  *) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
+
+     The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
+     a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
+     mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
+     recover the private key.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
+     Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
+     (CVE-2018-0737)
+     [Billy Brumley]
+
+  *) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input.  A NULL pem_str
+     parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table.  NULL
+     pem_str is reserved for alias entries only.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition
+     length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not
+     being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input.
+     For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin.
+     The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered
+     to 2^-128.
+     [Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar]
+
+  *) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
+     attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
+     now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
+     compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
+     are no longer allowed.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Fixed a text canonicalisation bug in CMS
+
+     Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes
+     through a canonicalisation process first prior to signing or verifying a
+     signature. This process strips trailing space at the end of lines, converts
+     line terminators to CRLF and removes additional trailing line terminators
+     at the end of a file. A bug in the canonicalisation process meant that
+     some characters, such as form-feed, were incorrectly treated as whitespace
+     and removed. This is contrary to the specification (RFC5485). This fix
+     could mean that detached text data signed with an earlier version of
+     OpenSSL 1.1.0 may fail to verify using the fixed version, or text data
+     signed with a fixed OpenSSL may fail to verify with an earlier version of
+     OpenSSL 1.1.0. A workaround is to only verify the canonicalised text data
+     and use the "-binary" flag (for the "cms" command line application) or set
+     the SMIME_BINARY/PKCS7_BINARY/CMS_BINARY flags (if using CMS_verify()).
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
  Changes between 1.1.0g and 1.1.0h [27 Mar 2018]
 
   *) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack