Imported OpenSSL 1.1.1d
This commit is contained in:
@@ -169,34 +169,21 @@ static void felem_to_bin66(u8 out[66], const felem in)
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(*((limb *) & out[58])) = in[8];
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}
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/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */
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static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len)
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{
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unsigned i;
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for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
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out[i] = in[len - 1 - i];
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}
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/* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem */
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static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
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{
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felem_bytearray b_in;
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felem_bytearray b_out;
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unsigned num_bytes;
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int num_bytes;
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/* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
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memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
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num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
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if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
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ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
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ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
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return 0;
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}
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num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in);
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flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes);
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num_bytes = BN_bn2lebinpad(bn, b_out, sizeof(b_out));
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if (num_bytes < 0) {
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ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
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return 0;
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}
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bin66_to_felem(out, b_out);
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return 1;
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}
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@@ -204,10 +191,9 @@ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
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/* felem_to_BN converts an felem into an OpenSSL BIGNUM */
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static BIGNUM *felem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const felem in)
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{
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felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
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felem_to_bin66(b_in, in);
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flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
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return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
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felem_bytearray b_out;
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felem_to_bin66(b_out, in);
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return BN_lebin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
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}
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/*-
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@@ -1269,7 +1255,7 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
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* ffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb
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* 71e913863f7, in that case the penultimate intermediate is -9G and
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* the final digit is also -9G. Since this only happens for a single
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* scalar, the timing leak is irrelevent. (Any attacker who wanted to
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* scalar, the timing leak is irrelevant. (Any attacker who wanted to
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* check whether a secret scalar was that exact value, can already do
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* so.)
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*/
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@@ -1866,8 +1852,8 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
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felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
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felem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
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felem *tmp_felems = NULL;
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felem_bytearray tmp;
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unsigned i, num_bytes;
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unsigned i;
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int num_bytes;
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int have_pre_comp = 0;
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size_t num_points = num;
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felem x_in, y_in, z_in, x_out, y_out, z_out;
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@@ -1942,17 +1928,15 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
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* i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
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if (i == num)
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if (i == num) {
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/*
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* we didn't have a valid precomputation, so we pick the
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* generator
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*/
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{
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p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
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p_scalar = scalar;
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} else
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} else {
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/* the i^th point */
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{
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p = points[i];
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p_scalar = scalars[i];
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}
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@@ -1968,10 +1952,16 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
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ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
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} else
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num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
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flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
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num_bytes = BN_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar,
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secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
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} else {
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num_bytes = BN_bn2lebinpad(p_scalar,
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secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
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}
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if (num_bytes < 0) {
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ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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/* precompute multiples */
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if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, p->X)) ||
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(!BN_to_felem(y_out, p->Y)) ||
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@@ -2014,21 +2004,22 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
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ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
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} else
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num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp);
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flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes);
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num_bytes = BN_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
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} else {
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num_bytes = BN_bn2lebinpad(scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
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}
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/* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */
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batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
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(const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
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g_secret,
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mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp,
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(const felem(*)[3])g_pre_comp);
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} else
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} else {
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/* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */
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batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
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(const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
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NULL, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL);
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}
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/* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */
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felem_contract(x_in, x_out);
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felem_contract(y_in, y_out);
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