Imported OpenSSL 1.1.1d
This commit is contained in:
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
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# define HWAES_xts_decrypt aes_p8_xts_decrypt
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#endif
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#if defined(AES_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY) && ( \
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && ( \
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((defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \
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defined(_M_IX86)) && defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2))|| \
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defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
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@@ -383,10 +383,25 @@ static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
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{
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EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
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if (!iv && !key)
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return 1;
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if (key) {
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/* The key is two half length keys in reality */
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const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
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/*
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* Verify that the two keys are different.
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*
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* This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
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* See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
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*/
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if (enc && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
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return 0;
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}
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/* key_len is two AES keys */
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if (enc) {
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aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
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@@ -787,11 +802,26 @@ static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
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{
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EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
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if (!iv && !key)
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return 1;
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if (key) {
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int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4;
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/* The key is two half length keys in reality */
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const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
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const int bits = bytes * 8;
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/*
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* Verify that the two keys are different.
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*
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* This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
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* See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
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*/
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if (enc && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_T4_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
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return 0;
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}
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xctx->stream = NULL;
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/* key_len is two AES keys */
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if (enc) {
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@@ -1578,7 +1608,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
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switch (type) {
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case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
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ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
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ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->cipher);
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iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
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gctx->key_set = 0;
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gctx->iv_set = 0;
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@@ -1589,6 +1619,10 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
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gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
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*(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
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if (arg <= 0)
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return 0;
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@@ -2299,6 +2333,10 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
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cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = -1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
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*(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
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if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
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return 0;
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@@ -2817,13 +2855,17 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
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case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
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gctx->key_set = 0;
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gctx->iv_set = 0;
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gctx->ivlen = c->cipher->iv_len;
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gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->cipher);
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gctx->iv = c->iv;
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gctx->taglen = -1;
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gctx->iv_gen = 0;
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gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
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*(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
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if (arg <= 0)
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return 0;
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@@ -3273,7 +3315,7 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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#define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
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| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
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| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
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| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
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| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV_LENGTH)
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BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
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EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
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@@ -3284,10 +3326,12 @@ BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
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static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
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{
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EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,c);
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EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, c);
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if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) {
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
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EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,out);
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if (xctx->xts.key1) {
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if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1)
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return 0;
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@@ -3311,11 +3355,36 @@ static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
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{
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EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
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if (!iv && !key)
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return 1;
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if (key)
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do {
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/* The key is two half length keys in reality */
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const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
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/*
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* Verify that the two keys are different.
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*
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* This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's
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* September 2004 paper:
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*
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* "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and
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* Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC".
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* (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf)
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*
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* FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states
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* that:
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* "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place
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* BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process
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* data with them."
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*/
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if (enc && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
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return 0;
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}
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#ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
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xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt;
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#else
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@@ -3448,7 +3517,9 @@ static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
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cctx->len_set = 0;
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cctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
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*(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->L;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
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/* Save the AAD for later use */
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if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
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@@ -3897,13 +3968,17 @@ static int aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
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case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
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octx->key_set = 0;
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octx->iv_set = 0;
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octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
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octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->cipher);
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octx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
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octx->taglen = 16;
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octx->data_buf_len = 0;
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octx->aad_buf_len = 0;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
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*(int *)ptr = octx->ivlen;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
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/* IV len must be 1 to 15 */
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if (arg <= 0 || arg > 15)
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