Import OpenSSL 1.1.0h
This commit is contained in:
@@ -41,6 +41,18 @@ static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
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NULL
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};
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static const DSA_METHOD *default_DSA_method = &openssl_dsa_meth;
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void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth)
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{
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default_DSA_method = meth;
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}
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const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void)
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{
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return default_DSA_method;
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}
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const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
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{
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return &openssl_dsa_meth;
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@@ -136,7 +148,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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{
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp;
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BIGNUM *l, *m;
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int ret = 0;
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int q_bits;
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if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
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DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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@@ -144,7 +158,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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}
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k = BN_new();
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if (k == NULL)
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l = BN_new();
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m = BN_new();
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if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (ctx_in == NULL) {
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@@ -153,6 +169,13 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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} else
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ctx = ctx_in;
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/* Preallocate space */
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q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
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if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits)
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|| !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits)
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|| !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits))
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goto err;
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/* Get random k */
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do {
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if (dgst != NULL) {
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@@ -179,17 +202,19 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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/*
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* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
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* compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
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* is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont() does not
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* let us specify the desired timing behaviour.)
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* compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
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*
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* We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
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* small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is
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* one bit longer than the modulus.
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*
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* TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
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* conditional copy.
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*/
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if (!BN_add(k, k, dsa->q))
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if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q)
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|| !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q)
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|| !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m))
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goto err;
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if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) {
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if (!BN_add(k, k, dsa->q))
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goto err;
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}
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if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
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if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx,
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@@ -217,6 +242,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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if (ctx != ctx_in)
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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BN_clear_free(k);
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BN_clear_free(l);
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BN_clear_free(m);
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return ret;
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}
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