Import OpenSSL 1.0.2s

CHANGES

@@ -7,6 +7,50 @@
  https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
  release branch.
 
+ Changes between 1.0.2r and 1.0.2s [28 May 2019]
+
+  *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
+     This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
+     fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
+     generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Add FIPS support for Android Arm 64-bit
+
+     Support for Android Arm 64-bit was added to the OpenSSL FIPS Object
+     Module in Version 2.0.10. For some reason, the corresponding target
+     'android64-aarch64' was missing OpenSSL 1.0.2, whence it could not be
+     built with FIPS support on Android Arm 64-bit. This omission has been
+     fixed.
+     [Matthias St. Pierre]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2q and 1.0.2r [26 Feb 2019]
+
+  *) 0-byte record padding oracle
+
+     If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
+     SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one)
+     then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte
+     record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is
+     received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently
+     based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this
+     amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.
+
+     In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in
+     use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain
+     commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown()
+     twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do
+     this but some do anyway).
+
+     This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod
+     Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew
+     Hourselt. It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.
+     (CVE-2019-1559)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
  Changes between 1.0.2p and 1.0.2q [20 Nov 2018]
 
   *) Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication

Configure

@@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ my %table=(
 "android-x86","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:".eval{my $asm=${x86_elf_asm};$asm=~s/:elf/:android/;$asm}.":dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "android-armv7","gcc:-march=armv7-a -mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "android-mips","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"android64-aarch64","gcc:-mandroid -fPIC -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-pie%-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 
 #### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!]
 "BSD-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",

MINFO

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ MANSUFFIX=
 MD5_ASM_OBJ=md5-586.o
 MINOR=0.2
 MODES_ASM_OBJ=ghash-x86.o
-NAME=openssl-1.0.2q
+NAME=openssl-1.0.2s
 NM=nm
 ONEDIRS=out tmp
 OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
@@ -85,12 +85,12 @@ SHLIB_TARGET=
 SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
 TAR=tar
-TARFILE=../openssl-1.0.2q.tar
+TARFILE=../openssl-1.0.2s.tar
 TARFLAGS=--no-recursion
-TAR_COMMAND=tar --no-recursion --files-from ../openssl-1.0.2q.tar.list --owner 0 --group 0 --transform 's|^|openssl-1.0.2q/|' -cvf -
+TAR_COMMAND=tar --no-recursion --files-from ../openssl-1.0.2s.tar.list --owner 0 --group 0 --transform 's|^|openssl-1.0.2s/|' -cvf -
 TESTS=alltests
 TOP=.
-VERSION=1.0.2q
+VERSION=1.0.2s
 WDIRS=windows
 WP_ASM_OBJ=wp_block.o wp-mmx.o
 ZLIB_INCLUDE=

Makefile

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.2q
+VERSION=1.0.2s
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.2
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ $(TARFILE).list:
 	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
 	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
 	       \( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \
-	       \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
+	       \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*.bak' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
 	    | sort > $(TARFILE).list
 
 tar: $(TARFILE).list

Makefile.bak

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.2q
+VERSION=1.0.2s
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.2
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ $(TARFILE).list:
 	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
 	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
 	       \( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \
-	       \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
+	       \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*.bak' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
 	    | sort > $(TARFILE).list
 
 tar: $(TARFILE).list

Makefile.org

@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ $(TARFILE).list:
 	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
 	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
 	       \( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \
-	       \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
+	       \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*.bak' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
 	    | sort > $(TARFILE).list
 
 tar: $(TARFILE).list

NEWS

@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2q and OpenSSL 1.0.2r [26 Feb 2019]
+
+      o 0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559)
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2p and OpenSSL 1.0.2q [20 Nov 2018]
 
       o Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication (CVE-2018-5407)

README

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.2q 20 Nov 2018
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2s 28 May 2019
 
- Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
  All rights reserved.
 

apps/CA.pl

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
+#!/usr/local/bin/perl
 #
 # CA - wrapper around ca to make it easier to use ... basically ca requires
 #      some setup stuff to be done before you can use it and this makes

apps/CA.pl.bak

@@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
-#
-# CA - wrapper around ca to make it easier to use ... basically ca requires
-#      some setup stuff to be done before you can use it and this makes
-#      things easier between now and when Eric is convinced to fix it :-)
-#
-# CA -newca ... will setup the right stuff
-# CA -newreq[-nodes] ... will generate a certificate request 
-# CA -sign ... will sign the generated request and output 
-#
-# At the end of that grab newreq.pem and newcert.pem (one has the key 
-# and the other the certificate) and cat them together and that is what
-# you want/need ... I'll make even this a little cleaner later.
-#
-#
-# 12-Jan-96 tjh    Added more things ... including CA -signcert which
-#                  converts a certificate to a request and then signs it.
-# 10-Jan-96 eay    Fixed a few more bugs and added the SSLEAY_CONFIG
-#		   environment variable so this can be driven from
-#		   a script.
-# 25-Jul-96 eay    Cleaned up filenames some more.
-# 11-Jun-96 eay    Fixed a few filename missmatches.
-# 03-May-96 eay    Modified to use 'ssleay cmd' instead of 'cmd'.
-# 18-Apr-96 tjh    Original hacking
-#
-# Tim Hudson
-# tjh@cryptsoft.com
-#
-
-# 27-Apr-98 snh    Translation into perl, fix existing CA bug.
-#
-#
-# Steve Henson
-# shenson@bigfoot.com
-
-# default openssl.cnf file has setup as per the following
-# demoCA ... where everything is stored
-
-my $openssl;
-if(defined $ENV{OPENSSL}) {
-	$openssl = $ENV{OPENSSL};
-} else {
-	$openssl = "openssl";
-	$ENV{OPENSSL} = $openssl;
-}
-
-$SSLEAY_CONFIG=$ENV{"SSLEAY_CONFIG"};
-$DAYS="-days 365";	# 1 year
-$CADAYS="-days 1095";	# 3 years
-$REQ="$openssl req $SSLEAY_CONFIG";
-$CA="$openssl ca $SSLEAY_CONFIG";
-$VERIFY="$openssl verify";
-$X509="$openssl x509";
-$PKCS12="$openssl pkcs12";
-
-$CATOP="./demoCA";
-$CAKEY="cakey.pem";
-$CAREQ="careq.pem";
-$CACERT="cacert.pem";
-
-$DIRMODE = 0777;
-
-$RET = 0;
-
-foreach (@ARGV) {
-	if ( /^(-\?|-h|-help)$/ ) {
-	    print STDERR "usage: CA -newcert|-newreq|-newreq-nodes|-newca|-sign|-signcert|-verify\n";
-	    exit 0;
-	} elsif (/^-newcert$/) {
-	    # create a certificate
-	    system ("$REQ -new -x509 -keyout newkey.pem -out newcert.pem $DAYS");
-	    $RET=$?;
-	    print "Certificate is in newcert.pem, private key is in newkey.pem\n"
-	} elsif (/^-newreq$/) {
-	    # create a certificate request
-	    system ("$REQ -new -keyout newkey.pem -out newreq.pem $DAYS");
-	    $RET=$?;
-	    print "Request is in newreq.pem, private key is in newkey.pem\n";
-	} elsif (/^-newreq-nodes$/) {
-	    # create a certificate request
-	    system ("$REQ -new -nodes -keyout newkey.pem -out newreq.pem $DAYS");
-	    $RET=$?;
-	    print "Request is in newreq.pem, private key is in newkey.pem\n";
-	} elsif (/^-newca$/) {
-		# if explicitly asked for or it doesn't exist then setup the
-		# directory structure that Eric likes to manage things 
-	    $NEW="1";
-	    if ( "$NEW" || ! -f "${CATOP}/serial" ) {
-		# create the directory hierarchy
-		mkdir $CATOP, $DIRMODE;
-		mkdir "${CATOP}/certs", $DIRMODE;
-		mkdir "${CATOP}/crl", $DIRMODE ;
-		mkdir "${CATOP}/newcerts", $DIRMODE;
-		mkdir "${CATOP}/private", $DIRMODE;
-		open OUT, ">${CATOP}/index.txt";
-		close OUT;
-		open OUT, ">${CATOP}/crlnumber";
-		print OUT "01\n";
-		close OUT;
-	    }
-	    if ( ! -f "${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY" ) {
-		print "CA certificate filename (or enter to create)\n";
-		$FILE = <STDIN>;
-
-		chop $FILE;
-
-		# ask user for existing CA certificate
-		if ($FILE) {
-		    cp_pem($FILE,"${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY", "PRIVATE");
-		    cp_pem($FILE,"${CATOP}/$CACERT", "CERTIFICATE");
-		    $RET=$?;
-		} else {
-		    print "Making CA certificate ...\n";
-		    system ("$REQ -new -keyout " .
-			"${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY -out ${CATOP}/$CAREQ");
-		    system ("$CA -create_serial " .
-			"-out ${CATOP}/$CACERT $CADAYS -batch " . 
-			"-keyfile ${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY -selfsign " .
-			"-extensions v3_ca " .
-			"-infiles ${CATOP}/$CAREQ ");
-		    $RET=$?;
-		}
-	    }
-	} elsif (/^-pkcs12$/) {
-	    my $cname = $ARGV[1];
-	    $cname = "My Certificate" unless defined $cname;
-	    system ("$PKCS12 -in newcert.pem -inkey newkey.pem " .
-			"-certfile ${CATOP}/$CACERT -out newcert.p12 " .
-			"-export -name \"$cname\"");
-	    $RET=$?;
-	    print "PKCS #12 file is in newcert.p12\n";
-	    exit $RET;
-	} elsif (/^-xsign$/) {
-	    system ("$CA -policy policy_anything -infiles newreq.pem");
-	    $RET=$?;
-	} elsif (/^(-sign|-signreq)$/) {
-	    system ("$CA -policy policy_anything -out newcert.pem " .
-							"-infiles newreq.pem");
-	    $RET=$?;
-	    print "Signed certificate is in newcert.pem\n";
-	} elsif (/^(-signCA)$/) {
-	    system ("$CA -policy policy_anything -out newcert.pem " .
-					"-extensions v3_ca -infiles newreq.pem");
-	    $RET=$?;
-	    print "Signed CA certificate is in newcert.pem\n";
-	} elsif (/^-signcert$/) {
-	    system ("$X509 -x509toreq -in newreq.pem -signkey newreq.pem " .
-								"-out tmp.pem");
-	    system ("$CA -policy policy_anything -out newcert.pem " .
-							"-infiles tmp.pem");
-	    $RET = $?;
-	    print "Signed certificate is in newcert.pem\n";
-	} elsif (/^-verify$/) {
-	    if (shift) {
-		foreach $j (@ARGV) {
-		    system ("$VERIFY -CAfile $CATOP/$CACERT $j");
-		    $RET=$? if ($? != 0);
-		}
-		exit $RET;
-	    } else {
-		    system ("$VERIFY -CAfile $CATOP/$CACERT newcert.pem");
-		    $RET=$?;
-	    	    exit 0;
-	    }
-	} else {
-	    print STDERR "Unknown arg $_\n";
-	    print STDERR "usage: CA -newcert|-newreq|-newreq-nodes|-newca|-sign|-verify\n";
-	    exit 1;
-	}
-}
-
-exit $RET;
-
-sub cp_pem {
-my ($infile, $outfile, $bound) = @_;
-open IN, $infile;
-open OUT, ">$outfile";
-my $flag = 0;
-while (<IN>) {
-	$flag = 1 if (/^-----BEGIN.*$bound/) ;
-	print OUT $_ if ($flag);
-	if (/^-----END.*$bound/) {
-		close IN;
-		close OUT;
-		return;
-	}
-}
-}

config

@@ -871,6 +871,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
   *-*-qnx6) OUT="QNX6" ;;
   x86-*-android|i?86-*-android) OUT="android-x86" ;;
   armv[7-9]*-*-android) OUT="android-armv7" ;;
+  aarch64-*-android) OUT="android64-aarch64" ;;
   *) OUT=`echo $GUESSOS | awk -F- '{print $3}'`;;
 esac
 

crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c

@@ -234,6 +234,21 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe,
 
 int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth)
 {
+    /*
+     * One of the following must be true:
+     *
+     * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set
+     * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear
+     *
+     * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table
+     */
+    if (!((ameth->pem_str == NULL
+           && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0)
+          || (ameth->pem_str != NULL
+              && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0))) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (app_methods == NULL) {
         app_methods = sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_new(ameth_cmp);
         if (!app_methods)
@@ -305,18 +320,6 @@ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags,
     } else
         ameth->info = NULL;
 
-    /*
-     * One of the following must be true:
-     *
-     * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set
-     * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear
-     *
-     * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table
-     */
-    if (!((pem_str == NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0)
-          || (pem_str != NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0)))
-        goto err;
-
     if (pem_str) {
         ameth->pem_str = BUF_strdup(pem_str);
         if (!ameth->pem_str)

crypto/bio/bss_file.c

@@ -361,12 +361,16 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
                 } else
                     _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
             }
-#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2)
             int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
             if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
                 setmode(fd, O_TEXT);
             else
                 setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+            int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
+            if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
+                setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
 #  endif
         }
         break;
@@ -389,11 +393,14 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
             ret = 0;
             break;
         }
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2)
         if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
             strcat(p, "b");
         else
             strcat(p, "t");
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+        if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
+            strcat(p, "b");
 #  endif
 #  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
         if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))

crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /* crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c */
 /* Written by Ulf Moeller for the OpenSSL project. */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx)
     }
     /* OK, make sure the returned bignum is "zero" */
     BN_zero(ret);
+    /* clear BN_FLG_CONSTTIME if leaked from previous frames */
+    ret->flags &= (~BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
     ctx->used++;
     CTXDBG_RET(ctx, ret);
     return ret;

crypto/bn/bn_lib.c

@@ -836,6 +836,9 @@ int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
     int i;
     BN_ULONG aa, bb;
 
+    if (n == 0)
+        return 0;
+
     aa = a[n - 1];
     bb = b[n - 1];
     if (aa != bb)

crypto/bn/bntest.c

@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 
+#ifndef OSSL_NELEM
+# define OSSL_NELEM(x)    (sizeof(x)/sizeof(x[0]))
+#endif
+
 const int num0 = 100;           /* number of tests */
 const int num1 = 50;            /* additional tests for some functions */
 const int num2 = 5;             /* number of tests for slow functions */
@@ -123,6 +127,7 @@ int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
 int test_kron(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
 int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
 int rand_neg(void);
+static int test_ctx_consttime_flag(void);
 static int results = 0;
 
 static unsigned char lst[] =
@@ -330,6 +335,15 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
         goto err;
     (void)BIO_flush(out);
 #endif
+
+    /* silently flush any pre-existing error on the stack */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    message(out, "BN_CTX_get BN_FLG_CONSTTIME");
+    if (!test_ctx_consttime_flag())
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
     BIO_free(out);
 
@@ -2158,3 +2172,90 @@ int rand_neg(void)
 
     return (sign[(neg++) % 8]);
 }
+
+static int test_ctx_set_ct_flag(BN_CTX *c)
+{
+    int st = 0;
+    size_t i;
+    BIGNUM *b[15];
+
+    BN_CTX_start(c);
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(b); i++) {
+        if (NULL == (b[i] = BN_CTX_get(c))) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BN_CTX_get() failed.\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (i % 2 == 1)
+            BN_set_flags(b[i], BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    }
+
+    st = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(c);
+    return st;
+}
+
+static int test_ctx_check_ct_flag(BN_CTX *c)
+{
+    int st = 0;
+    size_t i;
+    BIGNUM *b[30];
+
+    BN_CTX_start(c);
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(b); i++) {
+        if (NULL == (b[i] = BN_CTX_get(c))) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BN_CTX_get() failed.\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_get_flags(b[i], BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BN_FLG_CONSTTIME should not be set.\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    st = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(c);
+    return st;
+}
+
+static int test_ctx_consttime_flag(void)
+{
+    /*-
+     * The constant-time flag should not "leak" among BN_CTX frames:
+     *
+     * - test_ctx_set_ct_flag() starts a frame in the given BN_CTX and
+     *   sets the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on some of the BIGNUMs obtained
+     *   from the frame before ending it.
+     * - test_ctx_check_ct_flag() then starts a new frame and gets a
+     *   number of BIGNUMs from it. In absence of leaks, none of the
+     *   BIGNUMs in the new frame should have BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set.
+     *
+     * In actual BN_CTX usage inside libcrypto the leak could happen at
+     * any depth level in the BN_CTX stack, with varying results
+     * depending on the patterns of sibling trees of nested function
+     * calls sharing the same BN_CTX object, and the effect of
+     * unintended BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on the called BN_* functions.
+     *
+     * This simple unit test abstracts away this complexity and verifies
+     * that the leak does not happen between two sibling functions
+     * sharing the same BN_CTX object at the same level of nesting.
+     *
+     */
+    BN_CTX *c = NULL;
+    int st = 0;
+
+    if (NULL == (c = BN_CTX_new())) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BN_CTX_new() failed.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_ctx_set_ct_flag(c)
+            || !test_ctx_check_ct_flag(c))
+        goto err;
+
+    st = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(c);
+    return st;
+}

crypto/buildinf.h

@@ -9,11 +9,11 @@
   /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
   #define CFLAGS "compiler: cl  /MD /Ox /O2 /Ob2 -DOPENSSL_THREADS  -DDSO_WIN32 -W3 -WX -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE -D_WINSOCK_DEPRECATED_NO_WARNINGS -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -DRC4_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DRMD160_ASM -DAES_ASM -DVPAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM -DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK -I. -DOPENSSL_NO_IDEA -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_MDC2 -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS -DOPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE    "
   #define PLATFORM "VC-WIN32"
-  #define DATE "Fri Dec  7 19:08:23 2018"
+  #define DATE "Mon Jun 17 15:40:00 2019"
 #endif
 #ifdef MK1MF_PLATFORM_BC_NT
   /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
   #define CFLAGS "compiler: bcc32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -q -w-ccc -w-rch -w-pia -w-aus -w-par -w-inl  -c -tWC -tWM -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -D_stricmp=stricmp -D_strnicmp=strnicmp -O2 -ff -fp -DBN_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DRMD160_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_IDEA -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_MDC2 -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS -DOPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE    "
   #define PLATFORM "BC-NT"
-  #define DATE "Fri Dec  7 19:08:23 2018"
+  #define DATE "Mon Jun 17 15:40:00 2019"
 #endif

crypto/constant_time_locl.h

@@ -204,6 +204,12 @@ static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b)
     return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)));
 }
 
+/*
+ * Expected usage pattern is to unconditionally set error and then
+ * wipe it if there was no actual error. |clear| is 1 or 0.
+ */
+void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear);
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif

crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * 2006.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
     dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH_PKEY_CTX));
     if (!dctx)
         return 0;
-    dctx->prime_len = 1024;
+    dctx->prime_len = 2048;
     dctx->subprime_len = -1;
     dctx->generator = 2;
     dctx->use_dsa = 0;

crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * 2006.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@
 
 typedef struct {
     /* Parameter gen parameters */
-    int nbits;                  /* size of p in bits (default: 1024) */
+    int nbits;                  /* size of p in bits (default: 2048) */
-    int qbits;                  /* size of q in bits (default: 160) */
+    int qbits;                  /* size of q in bits (default: 224) */
     const EVP_MD *pmd;          /* MD for parameter generation */
     /* Keygen callback info */
     int gentmp[2];
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ static int pkey_dsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
     dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA_PKEY_CTX));
     if (!dctx)
         return 0;
-    dctx->nbits = 1024;
+    dctx->nbits = 2048;
-    dctx->qbits = 160;
+    dctx->qbits = 224;
     dctx->pmd = NULL;
     dctx->md = NULL;
 

crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  *
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
                              BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
     point_conversion_form_t form;
-    int y_bit;
+    int y_bit, m;
     BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *x, *y, *yxi;
     size_t field_len, enc_len;
@@ -332,7 +332,8 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
         return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, point);
     }
 
-    field_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+    m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+    field_len = (m + 7) / 8;
     enc_len =
         (form ==
          POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len;
@@ -357,7 +358,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
 
     if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1, field_len, x))
         goto err;
-    if (BN_ucmp(x, &group->field) >= 0) {
+    if (BN_num_bits(x) > m) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -369,7 +370,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
     } else {
         if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1 + field_len, field_len, y))
             goto err;
-        if (BN_ucmp(y, &group->field) >= 0) {
+        if (BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
             ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
             goto err;
         }
@@ -382,16 +383,14 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
             }
         }
 
+        /*
+         * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m is responsible for checking that
+         * the point is on the curve.
+         */
         if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx))
             goto err;
     }
 
-    /* test required by X9.62 */
-    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
     ret = 1;
 
  err:

crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c

@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static int ec_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
 
     case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
         *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
-        return 2;
+        return 1;
 
     default:
         return -2;

crypto/ec/ec_lib.c

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -872,7 +872,15 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
-    return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+    if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
@@ -890,7 +898,15 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
-    return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+    if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
+              EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
 }
 #endif
 

crypto/ec/ec_mult.c

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller and Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
     ret = 1;
 
  err:
-    EC_POINT_free(s);
+    EC_POINT_clear_free(s);
     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
     BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
 

crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c

@@ -356,10 +356,15 @@ static void felem_diff64(felem out, const felem in)
 static void felem_diff_128_64(largefelem out, const felem in)
 {
     /*
-     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting.
+     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 64p mod p (which is equivalent
+     * to 0 mod p) before subtracting. p is 2^521 - 1, i.e. in binary a 521
+     * digit number with all bits set to 1. See "The representation of field
+     * elements" comment above for a description of how limbs are used to
+     * represent a number. 64p is represented with 8 limbs containing a number
+     * with 58 bits set and one limb with a number with 57 bits set.
      */
-    static const limb two63m6 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 5);
+    static const limb two63m6 = (((limb) 1) << 63) - (((limb) 1) << 6);
-    static const limb two63m5 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 4);
+    static const limb two63m5 = (((limb) 1) << 63) - (((limb) 1) << 5);
 
     out[0] += two63m6 - in[0];
     out[1] += two63m5 - in[1];

crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -408,16 +408,14 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
             }
         }
 
+        /*
+         * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp is responsible for checking that
+         * the point is on the curve.
+         */
         if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx))
             goto err;
     }
 
-    /* test required by X9.62 */
-    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
     ret = 1;
 
  err:

crypto/ec/ectest.c

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     EC_GROUP *P_160 = NULL, *P_192 = NULL, *P_224 = NULL, *P_256 =
         NULL, *P_384 = NULL, *P_521 = NULL;
     EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R;
-    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *yplusone;
     unsigned char buf[100];
     size_t i, len;
     int k;
@@ -405,7 +405,8 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     x = BN_new();
     y = BN_new();
     z = BN_new();
-    if (!x || !y || !z)
+    yplusone = BN_new();
+    if (x == NULL || y == NULL || z == NULL || yplusone == NULL)
         ABORT;
 
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "D"))
@@ -542,6 +543,14 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, "23a628553168947d59dcc912042351377ac5fb32"))
         ABORT;
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
         ABORT;
     if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
@@ -613,6 +622,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
         ABORT;
 
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
     if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 192)
         ABORT;
@@ -668,6 +686,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
         ABORT;
 
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
     if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 224)
         ABORT;
@@ -728,6 +755,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
         ABORT;
 
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
     if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 256)
         ABORT;
@@ -783,6 +819,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
         ABORT;
 
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
     if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 384)
         ABORT;
@@ -844,6 +889,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
         ABORT;
 
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
     if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 521)
         ABORT;
@@ -858,6 +912,10 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
 
     /* more tests using the last curve */
 
+    /* Restore the point that got mangled in the (x, y + 1) test. */
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     if (!EC_POINT_copy(Q, P))
         ABORT;
     if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q))
@@ -987,6 +1045,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     BN_free(x);
     BN_free(y);
     BN_free(z);
+    BN_free(yplusone);
 
     if (P_160)
         EC_GROUP_free(P_160);
@@ -1007,6 +1066,13 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
 # ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
 #  define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT;        \
+        /* \
+         * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, \
+         * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. \
+         */ \
+        if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; \
         if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, _y_bit, ctx)) ABORT; \
         if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
@@ -1025,6 +1091,12 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
 #  define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT;        \
+        /* \
+         * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, \
+         * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. \
+         */ \
+        if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; \
         if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \
         if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
@@ -1062,7 +1134,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
     EC_GROUP *C2_B163 = NULL, *C2_B233 = NULL, *C2_B283 = NULL, *C2_B409 =
         NULL, *C2_B571 = NULL;
     EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R;
-    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *cof;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *cof, *yplusone;
     unsigned char buf[100];
     size_t i, len;
     int k;
@@ -1076,7 +1148,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
     p = BN_new();
     a = BN_new();
     b = BN_new();
-    if (!p || !a || !b)
+    if (p == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL)
         ABORT;
 
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "13"))
@@ -1142,7 +1214,8 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
     y = BN_new();
     z = BN_new();
     cof = BN_new();
-    if (!x || !y || !z || !cof)
+    yplusone = BN_new();
+    if (x == NULL || y == NULL || z == NULL || cof == NULL || yplusone == NULL)
         ABORT;
 
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "6"))
@@ -1504,6 +1577,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
     BN_free(y);
     BN_free(z);
     BN_free(cof);
+    BN_free(yplusone);
 
     if (C2_K163)
         EC_GROUP_free(C2_K163);
@@ -1672,7 +1746,7 @@ static const struct nistp_test_params nistp_tests_params[] = {
 static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
 {
     BN_CTX *ctx;
-    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *x, *y, *n, *m, *order;
+    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *x, *y, *n, *m, *order, *yplusone;
     EC_GROUP *NISTP;
     EC_POINT *G, *P, *Q, *Q_CHECK;
 
@@ -1687,6 +1761,7 @@ static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
     m = BN_new();
     n = BN_new();
     order = BN_new();
+    yplusone = BN_new();
 
     NISTP = EC_GROUP_new(test->meth());
     if (!NISTP)
@@ -1709,6 +1784,14 @@ static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, test->Qy))
         ABORT;
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, y, ctx))
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, test->Gx))
@@ -1811,6 +1894,7 @@ static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
     BN_free(x);
     BN_free(y);
     BN_free(order);
+    BN_free(yplusone);
     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 }
 

crypto/ecdh/ech_ossl.c

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  *
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int ecdh_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
 
  err:
     if (tmp)
-        EC_POINT_free(tmp);
+        EC_POINT_clear_free(tmp);
     if (ctx)
         BN_CTX_end(ctx);
     if (ctx)

crypto/err/Makefile

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
 err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
 err.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
 err.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-err.o: ../cryptlib.h err.c
+err.o: ../constant_time_locl.h ../cryptlib.h err.c
 err_all.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 err_all.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
 err_all.o: ../../include/openssl/cms.h ../../include/openssl/comp.h

crypto/err/err.c

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 
 DECLARE_LHASH_OF(ERR_STRING_DATA);
 DECLARE_LHASH_OF(ERR_STATE);
@@ -826,8 +827,24 @@ static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file,
         return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     }
 
+    while (es->bottom != es->top) {
+        if (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_CLEAR) {
+            err_clear(es, es->top);
+            es->top = es->top > 0 ? es->top - 1 : ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        i = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
+        if (es->err_flags[i] & ERR_FLAG_CLEAR) {
+            es->bottom = i;
+            err_clear(es, es->bottom);
+            continue;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
     if (es->bottom == es->top)
         return 0;
+
     if (top)
         i = es->top;            /* last error */
     else
@@ -1156,3 +1173,23 @@ int ERR_pop_to_mark(void)
     es->err_flags[es->top] &= ~ERR_FLAG_MARK;
     return 1;
 }
+
+void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear)
+{
+    ERR_STATE *es;
+    int top;
+
+    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    top = es->top;
+
+    /*
+     * Flag error as cleared but remove it elsewhere to avoid two errors
+     * accessing the same error stack location, revealing timing information.
+     */
+    clear = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(clear, 0),
+                                     0, ERR_FLAG_CLEAR);
+    es->err_flags[top] |= clear;
+}

crypto/err/err.h

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ extern "C" {
 # define ERR_TXT_STRING          0x02
 
 # define ERR_FLAG_MARK           0x01
+# define ERR_FLAG_CLEAR          0x02
 
 # define ERR_NUM_ERRORS  16
 typedef struct err_state_st {

crypto/evp/evp.h

@@ -1489,8 +1489,10 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL                        124
 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH              122
 # define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX                        101
+# define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE                          181
 # define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX                          128
 # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX                        127
+# define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE                          180
 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX                         110
 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE                                162
 # define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT                               102

crypto/evp/evp_enc.c

@@ -317,8 +317,9 @@ int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
     return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 0);
 }
 
-int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+static int evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-                      const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+                                    unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                                    const unsigned char *in, int inl)
 {
     int i, j, bl;
 
@@ -380,6 +381,18 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
     return 1;
 }
 
+int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                      const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+    /* Prevent accidental use of decryption context when encrypting */
+    if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+}
+
 int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 {
     int ret;
@@ -392,6 +405,12 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
     int n, ret;
     unsigned int i, b, bl;
 
+    /* Prevent accidental use of decryption context when encrypting */
+    if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
         ret = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
         if (ret < 0)
@@ -435,6 +454,12 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
     int fix_len;
     unsigned int b;
 
+    /* Prevent accidental use of encryption context when decrypting */
+    if (ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
         fix_len = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
         if (fix_len < 0) {
@@ -451,7 +476,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
     }
 
     if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING)
-        return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+        return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
 
     b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
     OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
@@ -463,7 +488,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
     } else
         fix_len = 0;
 
-    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl))
+    if (!evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl))
         return 0;
 
     /*
@@ -494,6 +519,13 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 {
     int i, n;
     unsigned int b;
+
+    /* Prevent accidental use of encryption context when decrypting */
+    if (ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     *outl = 0;
 
     if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {

crypto/evp/evp_err.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/evp/evp_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -92,8 +92,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH),
      "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_DecryptFinal_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_DecryptUpdate"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX), "EVP_DigestInit_ex"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_EncryptUpdate"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX), "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE), "EVP_MD_size"},
     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT), "EVP_OpenInit"},

crypto/evp/evp_test.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* Written by Ben Laurie, 2001 */
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ static void test1(const EVP_CIPHER *c, const unsigned char *key, int kn,
                 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
                 test1_exit(12);
             }
-            if (an && !EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, NULL, &outl, aad, an)) {
+            if (an && !EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, NULL, &outl, aad, an)) {
                 fprintf(stderr, "AAD set failed\n");
                 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
                 test1_exit(13);

crypto/opensslv.h

@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000211fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000213fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2q-fips  20 Nov 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2s-fips  28 May 2019"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2q  20 Nov 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2s  28 May 2019"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

crypto/rsa/Makefile

@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
 rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_eay.c
+rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+rsa_eay.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_eay.c
 rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
@@ -299,7 +300,8 @@ rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
 rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_ssl.c
+rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+rsa_ssl.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_ssl.c
 rsa_x931.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
 rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
 rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h

crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "bn_int.h"
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 
 #ifndef RSA_NULL
 
@@ -397,6 +398,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         goto err;
     }
 
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
     if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
         blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
         if (blinding == NULL) {
@@ -431,11 +437,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         } else
             d = rsa->d;
 
-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
-                                        rsa->n, ctx))
-                goto err;
-
         if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
                                    rsa->_method_mod_n))
             goto err;
@@ -587,8 +588,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
         goto err;
     }
-    if (r < 0)
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & ~constant_time_msb(r));
 
  err:
     if (ctx != NULL) {

crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                       const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
 {
     int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
-    unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
+    unsigned int good = 0, found_one_byte, mask;
     const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
     /*
      * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
@@ -144,12 +144,15 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
      * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
      * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
-     * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
+     * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
      * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
      * This does not leak any side-channel information.
      */
-    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2)
+    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) {
-        goto decoding_err;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
 
     dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
     db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
@@ -158,25 +161,24 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if (flen != num) {
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-        em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
-        if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                   ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto cleanup;
-            goto cleanup;
+    }
-        }
 
-        /*
+    /*
-         * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
-         * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
-         * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
-         * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
-         * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
+     */
-         * |from|.
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
-         */
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
-        memset(em, 0, num);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
-        memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+        from -= 1 & mask;
-        from = em;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
     }
 
     /*
@@ -184,10 +186,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA
      * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
      */
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
 
-    maskedseed = from + 1;
+    maskedseed = em + 1;
-    maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen;
+    maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
 
     if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
         goto cleanup;
@@ -224,37 +226,51 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
      * concern.
      */
-    if (!good)
-        goto decoding_err;
-
     msg_index = one_index + 1;
     mlen = dblen - msg_index;
 
-    if (tlen < mlen) {
+    /*
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
-        mlen = -1;
+     */
-    } else {
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
-        memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
+
-        goto cleanup;
+    /*
+     * Move the result in-place by |dblen|-|mdlen|-1-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+     * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |db|+|mdlen|+1 to |to|.
+     * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
+     * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+     * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+     * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+     * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+     * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
+     */
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen),
+                                    dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen);
+    for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < dblen - mdlen - 1; msg_index <<= 1) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (dblen - mdlen - 1 - mlen), 0);
+        for (i = mdlen + 1; i < dblen - msg_index; i++)
+            db[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + msg_index], db[i]);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + mdlen + 1], to[i]);
     }
 
- decoding_err:
     /*
      * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
      * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
      */
     RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
            RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
  cleanup:
-    if (db != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(seed, sizeof(seed));
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen);
-        OPENSSL_free(db);
+    OPENSSL_free(db);
-    }
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
-    if (em != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_free(em);
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
+
-        OPENSSL_free(em);
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
-    }
-    return mlen;
 }
 
 int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,

crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     int i;
     /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
     unsigned char *em = NULL;
-    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask;
     int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
 
     if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
@@ -218,49 +218,49 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * section 7.2.2.
      */
 
-    if (flen > num)
+    if (flen > num || num < 11) {
-        goto err;
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
-
+               RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
-    if (num < 11)
+        return -1;
-        goto err;
-
-    if (flen != num) {
-        em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-        if (em == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return -1;
-        }
-        /*
-         * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
-         * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
-         * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
-         * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
-         * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
-         * |from|.
-         */
-        memset(em, 0, num);
-        memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
-        from = em;
     }
 
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
+    }
 
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+
+    /* scan over padding data */
     found_zero_byte = 0;
     for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
-        zero_index =
+
-            constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
+        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
-                                     zero_index);
+                                              i, zero_index);
         found_zero_byte |= equals0;
     }
 
     /*
-     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
      * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
      * also fails.
      */
-    good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
+    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
 
     /*
      * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
@@ -270,30 +270,36 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     mlen = num - msg_index;
 
     /*
-     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
-     * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.
      */
-    good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
 
     /*
-     * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
+     * Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left.
-     * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
+     * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|.
-     * information at the API boundary.
+     * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
+     * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+     * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+     * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+     * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+     * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
      */
-    if (!good) {
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
-        mlen = -1;
+                                    num - 11, tlen);
-        goto err;
+    for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0);
+        for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++)
+            em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]);
     }
 
-    memcpy(to, from + msg_index, mlen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
+    OPENSSL_free(em);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
 
- err:
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
-    if (em != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
-        OPENSSL_free(em);
-    }
-    if (mlen == -1)
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
-               RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
-    return mlen;
 }

crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 2006.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
     rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
     if (!rctx)
         return 0;
-    rctx->nbits = 1024;
+    rctx->nbits = 2048;
     rctx->pub_exp = NULL;
     rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
     rctx->md = NULL;

crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 
 int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                            const unsigned char *from, int flen)
@@ -101,57 +102,119 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     return (1);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
+ * if nul delimiter is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
+ * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
+ */
 int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                              const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
 {
-    int i, j, k;
+    int i;
-    const unsigned char *p;
+    /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+    unsigned char *em = NULL;
+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
+    int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
 
-    p = from;
+    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
-    if (flen < 10) {
+        return -1;
+
+    if (flen > num || num < 11) {
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
         return (-1);
     }
-    /* Accept even zero-padded input */
+
-    if (flen == num) {
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-        if (*(p++) != 0) {
+    if (em == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return -1;
+        return -1;
-        }
-        flen--;
     }
-    if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
+    /*
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
-        return (-1);
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
     }
 
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+    mask = ~good;
+
     /* scan over padding data */
-    j = flen - 1;               /* one for type */
+    found_zero_byte = 0;
-    for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
+    threes_in_row = 0;
-        if (*(p++) == 0)
+    for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
-            break;
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
 
-    if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) {
+        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,
+                                              i, zero_index);
-               RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
-        return (-1);
+
-    }
+        threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
-    for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) {
+        threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3);
-        if (p[k] != 0x03)
-            break;
-    }
-    if (k == -1) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
-        return (-1);
     }
 
-    i++;                        /* Skip over the '\0' */
+    /*
-    j -= i;
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
-    if (j > tlen) {
+     * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+     * also fails.
-        return (-1);
+     */
-    }
+    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
-    memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+                                   RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+    mask = ~good;
 
-    return (j);
+    good &= constant_time_ge(threes_in_row, 8);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+                                   RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
+    mask = ~good;
+
+    /*
+     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+     */
+    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+    /*
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+
+    /*
+     * Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+     * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|.
+     * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
+     * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+     * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+     * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+     * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+     * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
+     */
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
+                                    num - 11, tlen);
+    for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0);
+        for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++)
+            em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
+    OPENSSL_free(em);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, err);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
+
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
 }

doc/apps/ca.pod

@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ the section of the configuration file containing certificate extensions
 to be added when a certificate is issued (defaults to B<x509_extensions>
 unless the B<-extfile> option is used). If no extension section is
 present then, a V1 certificate is created. If the extension section
-is present (even if it is empty), then a V3 certificate is created. See the:w
+is present (even if it is empty), then a V3 certificate is created. See the
 L<x509v3_config(5)|x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
 extension section format.
 

doc/apps/genpkey.pod

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ below.
 
 =item B<rsa_keygen_bits:numbits>
 
-The number of bits in the generated key. If not specified 1024 is used.
+The number of bits in the generated key. If not specified 2048 is used.
 
 =item B<rsa_keygen_pubexp:value>
 
@@ -149,12 +149,12 @@ below.
 
 =item B<dsa_paramgen_bits:numbits>
 
-The number of bits in the generated prime. If not specified 1024 is used.
+The number of bits in the generated prime. If not specified 2048 is used.
 
 =item B<dsa_paramgen_q_bits:numbits>
 
 The number of bits in the q parameter. Must be one of 160, 224 or 256. If not
-specified 160 is used.
+specified 224 is used.
 
 =item B<dsa_paramgen_md:digest>
 
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ or B<sha256> if it is 256.
 
 =item B<dh_paramgen_prime_len:numbits>
 
-The number of bits in the prime parameter B<p>. The default is 1024.
+The number of bits in the prime parameter B<p>. The default is 2048.
 
 =item B<dh_paramgen_subprime_len:numbits>
 

doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ PKCS12_parse - parse a PKCS#12 structure
 
  #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
 
-int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
+ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+                  STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 

doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod

@@ -109,7 +109,12 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
 The RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() padding check leaks timing
 information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher
 padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1
-v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding.
+v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. Otherwise it can
+be recommended to pass zero-padded B<f>, so that B<fl> equals to
+B<rsa_len>, and if fixed by protocol, B<tlen> being set to the
+expected length. In such case leakage would be minimal, it would
+take attacker's ability to observe memory access pattern with byte
+granilarity as it occurs, post-factum timing analysis won't do.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 

doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod

@@ -44,9 +44,6 @@ X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data() can be
 used to examine an B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> function as returned by 
 X509_NAME_get_entry() for example.
 
-X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(),
-and X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ() create and return an 
-
 X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(),
 X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data()
 are seldom used in practice because B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structures

doc/crypto/X509_cmp_time.pod

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ B<cmp_time>, and 1 otherwise. It returns 0 on error.
 
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 
-Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 
 Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
 this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy

doc/ssl/SSL_get_error.pod

@@ -90,14 +90,17 @@ Details depend on the application.
 
 =item SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
 
-Some non-recoverable I/O error occurred.
+Some non-recoverable, fatal I/O error occurred. The OpenSSL error queue may
-The OpenSSL error queue may contain more information on the error.
+contain more information on the error. For socket I/O on Unix systems, consult
-For socket I/O on Unix systems, consult B<errno> for details.
+B<errno> for details. If this error occurs then no further I/O operations should
+be performed on the connection and SSL_shutdown() must not be called.
 
 =item SSL_ERROR_SSL
 
-A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error.  The
+A non-recoverable, fatal error in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol
-OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error.
+error.  The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. If this
+error occurs then no further I/O operations should be performed on the
+connection and SSL_shutdown() must not be called.
 
 =back
 

doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod

@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ Whether the operation succeeds or not, the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag is set and
 a currently open session is considered closed and good and will be kept in the
 session cache for further reuse.
 
+Note that SSL_shutdown() must not be called if a previous fatal error has
+occurred on a connection i.e. if SSL_get_error() has returned SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+or SSL_ERROR_SSL.
+
 The shutdown procedure consists of 2 steps: the sending of the "close notify"
 shutdown alert and the reception of the peer's "close notify" shutdown
 alert. According to the TLS standard, it is acceptable for an application

include32/openssl/err.h

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ extern "C" {
 # define ERR_TXT_STRING          0x02
 
 # define ERR_FLAG_MARK           0x01
+# define ERR_FLAG_CLEAR          0x02
 
 # define ERR_NUM_ERRORS  16
 typedef struct err_state_st {

include32/openssl/evp.h

@@ -1489,8 +1489,10 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL                        124
 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH              122
 # define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX                        101
+# define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE                          181
 # define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX                          128
 # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX                        127
+# define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE                          180
 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX                         110
 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE                                162
 # define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT                               102

include32/openssl/opensslv.h

@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000211fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000213fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2q-fips  20 Nov 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2s-fips  28 May 2019"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2q  20 Nov 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2s  28 May 2019"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

include64/openssl/err.h

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ extern "C" {
 # define ERR_TXT_STRING          0x02
 
 # define ERR_FLAG_MARK           0x01
+# define ERR_FLAG_CLEAR          0x02
 
 # define ERR_NUM_ERRORS  16
 typedef struct err_state_st {

include64/openssl/evp.h

@@ -1489,8 +1489,10 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL                        124
 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH              122
 # define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX                        101
+# define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE                          181
 # define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX                          128
 # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX                        127
+# define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE                          180
 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX                         110
 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE                                162
 # define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT                               102

include64/openssl/opensslv.h

@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000211fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000213fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2q-fips  20 Nov 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2s-fips  28 May 2019"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2q  20 Nov 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2s  28 May 2019"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

ms/bcb.mak

@@ -197,6 +197,25 @@ E_OBJ=$(OBJ_D)\verify.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\ocsp.obj $(OBJ_D)\prime.obj $(OBJ_D)\ts.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\srp.obj $(OBJ_D)\openssl.obj 
 
+SSLOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj $(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj $(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj 
+
 CRYPTOOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\cryptlib.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\mem.obj $(OBJ_D)\mem_dbg.obj $(OBJ_D)\cversion.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\ex_data.obj $(OBJ_D)\cpt_err.obj $(OBJ_D)\ebcdic.obj \
@@ -404,25 +423,6 @@ CRYPTOOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\cryptlib.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\gost_keywrap.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_md.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_params.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\gost_pmeth.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_sign.obj 
 
-SSLOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj $(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj $(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj 
-
 T_EXE=$(TEST_D)\constant_time_test.exe \
 	$(TEST_D)\md4test.exe $(TEST_D)\md5test.exe $(TEST_D)\shatest.exe \
 	$(TEST_D)\sha1test.exe $(TEST_D)\sha256t.exe $(TEST_D)\sha512t.exe \
@@ -1218,6 +1218,156 @@ $(OBJ_D)\srp.obj: $(SRC_D)\apps\srp.c
 $(OBJ_D)\openssl.obj: $(SRC_D)\apps\openssl.c
 	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\openssl.obj -DMONOLITH $(APP_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\apps\openssl.c
 
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_meth.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_meth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_srvr.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_srvr.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_clnt.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_clnt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_lib.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_enc.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_enc.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_pkt.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_pkt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_meth.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_meth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_srvr.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_srvr.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_clnt.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_clnt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_lib.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_enc.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_enc.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_pkt.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_pkt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_both.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_both.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_cbc.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_cbc.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_meth.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_meth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_srvr.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_srvr.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_clnt.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_clnt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_lib.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_pkt.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_pkt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_meth.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_meth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_srvr.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_srvr.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_clnt.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_clnt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_lib.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_enc.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_enc.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_ext.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_ext.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_meth.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_meth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srvr.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srvr.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_clnt.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_clnt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_lib.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_pkt.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_pkt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_both.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_both.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srtp.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srtp.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_lib.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err2.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err2.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_cert.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_cert.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_sess.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_sess.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_ciph.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_ciph.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_stat.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_stat.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_rsa.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_rsa.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_asn1.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_asn1.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_txt.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_txt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_algs.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_algs.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_conf.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_conf.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\bio_ssl.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\bio_ssl.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\kssl.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\kssl.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_reneg.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_reneg.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\tls_srp.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\tls_srp.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_trce.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_trce.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_utst.c
+	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_utst.c
+
 $(OBJ_D)\cryptlib.obj: $(SRC_D)\crypto\cryptlib.c
 	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\cryptlib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\crypto\cryptlib.c
 
@@ -3126,156 +3276,6 @@ $(OBJ_D)\gost_pmeth.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_pmeth.c
 $(OBJ_D)\gost_sign.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_sign.c
 	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\gost_sign.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_sign.c
 
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_meth.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_meth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_srvr.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_srvr.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_clnt.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_clnt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_lib.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_enc.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_enc.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_pkt.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_pkt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_meth.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_meth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_srvr.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_srvr.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_clnt.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_clnt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_lib.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_enc.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_enc.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_pkt.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_pkt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_both.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_both.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_cbc.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_cbc.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_meth.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_meth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_srvr.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_srvr.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_clnt.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_clnt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_lib.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_pkt.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_pkt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_meth.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_meth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_srvr.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_srvr.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_clnt.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_clnt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_lib.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_enc.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_enc.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_ext.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_ext.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_meth.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_meth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srvr.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srvr.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_clnt.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_clnt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_lib.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_pkt.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_pkt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_both.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_both.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srtp.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srtp.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_lib.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err2.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err2.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_cert.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_cert.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_sess.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_sess.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_ciph.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_ciph.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_stat.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_stat.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_rsa.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_rsa.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_asn1.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_asn1.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_txt.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_txt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_algs.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_algs.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_conf.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_conf.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\bio_ssl.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\bio_ssl.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\kssl.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\kssl.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_reneg.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_reneg.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\tls_srp.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\tls_srp.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_trce.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_trce.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_utst.c
-	$(CC) -o$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj  $(LIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_utst.c
-
 $(TEST_D)\constant_time_test.exe: $(OBJ_D)\constant_time_test.obj $(LIBS_DEP)
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(LFLAGS) $(OBJ_D)\constant_time_test.obj $(APP_EX_OBJ), $(TEST_D)\constant_time_test.exe,, $(L_LIBS) $(EX_LIBS)
 

ms/ntdll.mak

@@ -197,6 +197,32 @@ E_OBJ=$(OBJ_D)\verify.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\ocsp.obj $(OBJ_D)\prime.obj $(OBJ_D)\ts.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\srp.obj $(OBJ_D)\openssl.obj 
 
+SSLOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj $(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj $(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj $(OBJ_D)\$(SSL).res 
+
+GOSTOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\e_gost_err.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\gost2001_keyx.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost2001.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost89.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\gost94_keyx.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_ameth.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_asn1.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\gost_crypt.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_ctl.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_eng.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\gosthash.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_keywrap.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_md.obj \
+	$(OBJ_D)\gost_params.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_pmeth.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_sign.obj 
+
 CRYPTOOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\cryptlib.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\mem.obj $(OBJ_D)\mem_dbg.obj $(OBJ_D)\cversion.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\ex_data.obj $(OBJ_D)\cpt_err.obj $(OBJ_D)\ebcdic.obj \
@@ -395,32 +421,6 @@ CRYPTOOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\cryptlib.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\ts_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\ts_conf.obj $(OBJ_D)\ts_asn1.obj \
 	$(OBJ_D)\srp_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\srp_vfy.obj $(OBJ_D)\$(CRYPTO).res 
 
-SSLOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj $(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj $(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj $(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj $(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj $(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj $(OBJ_D)\$(SSL).res 
-
-GOSTOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\e_gost_err.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\gost2001_keyx.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost2001.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost89.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\gost94_keyx.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_ameth.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_asn1.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\gost_crypt.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_ctl.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_eng.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\gosthash.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_keywrap.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_md.obj \
-	$(OBJ_D)\gost_params.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_pmeth.obj $(OBJ_D)\gost_sign.obj 
-
 T_EXE=$(TEST_D)\constant_time_test.exe \
 	$(TEST_D)\md4test.exe $(TEST_D)\md5test.exe $(TEST_D)\shatest.exe \
 	$(TEST_D)\sha1test.exe $(TEST_D)\sha256t.exe $(TEST_D)\sha512t.exe \
@@ -1237,6 +1237,204 @@ $(OBJ_D)\srp.obj: $(SRC_D)\apps\srp.c
 $(OBJ_D)\openssl.obj: $(SRC_D)\apps\openssl.c
 	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\openssl.obj -DMONOLITH $(APP_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\apps\openssl.c
 
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_meth.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_meth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_srvr.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_srvr.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_clnt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_clnt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_lib.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_enc.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_enc.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_pkt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_pkt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_meth.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_meth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_srvr.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_srvr.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_clnt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_clnt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_lib.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_enc.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_enc.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_pkt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_pkt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_both.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_both.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_cbc.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_cbc.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_meth.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_meth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_srvr.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_srvr.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_clnt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_clnt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_lib.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_pkt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_pkt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_meth.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_meth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_srvr.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_srvr.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_clnt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_clnt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_lib.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_enc.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_enc.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_ext.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_ext.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_meth.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_meth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srvr.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srvr.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_clnt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_clnt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_lib.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_pkt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_pkt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_both.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_both.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srtp.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srtp.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_lib.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_lib.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err2.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err2.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_cert.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_cert.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_sess.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_sess.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_ciph.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_ciph.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_stat.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_stat.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_rsa.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_rsa.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_asn1.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_asn1.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_txt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_txt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_algs.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_algs.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_conf.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_conf.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\bio_ssl.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\bio_ssl.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\kssl.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\kssl.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_reneg.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_reneg.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\tls_srp.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\tls_srp.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_trce.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_trce.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_utst.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_utst.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\e_gost_err.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\e_gost_err.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_gost_err.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\e_gost_err.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost2001_keyx.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost2001_keyx.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost2001_keyx.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost2001_keyx.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost2001.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost2001.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost2001.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost2001.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost89.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost89.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost89.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost89.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost94_keyx.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost94_keyx.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost94_keyx.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost94_keyx.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost_ameth.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_ameth.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_ameth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_ameth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost_asn1.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_asn1.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_asn1.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_asn1.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost_crypt.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_crypt.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_crypt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_crypt.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost_ctl.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_ctl.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_ctl.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_ctl.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost_eng.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_eng.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_eng.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_eng.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gosthash.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gosthash.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gosthash.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gosthash.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost_keywrap.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_keywrap.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_keywrap.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_keywrap.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost_md.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_md.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_md.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_md.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost_params.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_params.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_params.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_params.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost_pmeth.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_pmeth.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_pmeth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_pmeth.c
+
+$(OBJ_D)\gost_sign.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_sign.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_sign.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_sign.c
+
 $(OBJ_D)\cryptlib.obj: $(SRC_D)\crypto\cryptlib.c
 	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\cryptlib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\crypto\cryptlib.c
 
@@ -3064,204 +3262,6 @@ $(OBJ_D)\srp_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\crypto\srp\srp_lib.c
 $(OBJ_D)\srp_vfy.obj: $(SRC_D)\crypto\srp\srp_vfy.c
 	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\srp_vfy.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\crypto\srp\srp_vfy.c
 
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_meth.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_meth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_meth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_srvr.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_srvr.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_srvr.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_clnt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_clnt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_clnt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_lib.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_enc.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_enc.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_enc.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_pkt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s2_pkt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s2_pkt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_meth.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_meth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_meth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_srvr.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_srvr.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_srvr.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_clnt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_clnt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_clnt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_lib.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_enc.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_enc.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_enc.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_pkt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_pkt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_pkt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_both.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_both.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_both.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_cbc.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s3_cbc.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s3_cbc.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_meth.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s23_meth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_meth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_srvr.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s23_srvr.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_srvr.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_clnt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s23_clnt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_clnt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_lib.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s23_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_pkt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\s23_pkt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\s23_pkt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_meth.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_meth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_meth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_srvr.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_srvr.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_srvr.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_clnt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_clnt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_clnt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_lib.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_enc.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_enc.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_enc.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_ext.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_ext.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_ext.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_meth.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_meth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_meth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srvr.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_srvr.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srvr.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_clnt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_clnt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_clnt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_lib.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_pkt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_pkt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_pkt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_both.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_both.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_both.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srtp.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\d1_srtp.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\d1_srtp.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_lib.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_lib.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_lib.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err2.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err2.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err2.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_cert.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_cert.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_cert.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_sess.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_sess.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_sess.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_ciph.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_ciph.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_ciph.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_stat.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_stat.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_stat.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_rsa.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_rsa.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_rsa.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_asn1.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_asn1.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_asn1.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_txt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_txt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_txt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_algs.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_algs.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_algs.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_conf.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_conf.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_conf.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\bio_ssl.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\bio_ssl.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\bio_ssl.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_err.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_err.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\kssl.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\kssl.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\kssl.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_reneg.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_reneg.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_reneg.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\tls_srp.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\tls_srp.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\tls_srp.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_trce.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\t1_trce.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\t1_trce.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj: $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_utst.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\ssl_utst.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL -c $(SRC_D)\ssl\ssl_utst.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\e_gost_err.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\e_gost_err.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_gost_err.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\e_gost_err.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost2001_keyx.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost2001_keyx.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost2001_keyx.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost2001_keyx.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost2001.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost2001.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost2001.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost2001.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost89.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost89.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost89.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost89.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost94_keyx.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost94_keyx.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost94_keyx.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost94_keyx.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost_ameth.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_ameth.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_ameth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_ameth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost_asn1.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_asn1.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_asn1.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_asn1.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost_crypt.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_crypt.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_crypt.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_crypt.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost_ctl.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_ctl.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_ctl.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_ctl.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost_eng.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_eng.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_eng.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_eng.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gosthash.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gosthash.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gosthash.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gosthash.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost_keywrap.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_keywrap.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_keywrap.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_keywrap.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost_md.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_md.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_md.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_md.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost_params.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_params.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_params.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_params.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost_pmeth.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_pmeth.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_pmeth.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_pmeth.c
-
-$(OBJ_D)\gost_sign.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_sign.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\gost_sign.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\ccgost\gost_sign.c
-
 $(OBJ_D)\$(CRYPTO).res: ms\version32.rc
 	$(RSC) /fo"$(OBJ_D)\$(CRYPTO).res" /d CRYPTO ms\version32.rc
 
@@ -3497,7 +3497,7 @@ $(TEST_D)\igetest.exe: $(OBJ_D)\igetest.obj $(LIBS_DEP)
 	IF EXIST $@.manifest mt -nologo -manifest $@.manifest -outputresource:$@;1
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_4758cca.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_4758cca.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_4758cca.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_4758cca.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_4758cca.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_4758cca.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\4758cca.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_4758cca.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\4758cca.dll  @<<
@@ -3507,7 +3507,7 @@ $(ENG_D)\4758cca.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_4758cca.obj
 
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_aep.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_aep.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_aep.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_aep.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_aep.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_aep.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\aep.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_aep.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\aep.dll  @<<
@@ -3517,7 +3517,7 @@ $(ENG_D)\aep.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_aep.obj
 
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_atalla.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_atalla.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_atalla.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_atalla.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_atalla.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_atalla.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\atalla.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_atalla.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\atalla.dll  @<<
@@ -3527,7 +3527,7 @@ $(ENG_D)\atalla.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_atalla.obj
 
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_cswift.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_cswift.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_cswift.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_cswift.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_cswift.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_cswift.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\cswift.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_cswift.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\cswift.dll  @<<
@@ -3537,7 +3537,7 @@ $(ENG_D)\cswift.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_cswift.obj
 
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_gmp.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_gmp.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_gmp.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_gmp.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_gmp.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_gmp.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\gmp.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_gmp.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\gmp.dll  @<<
@@ -3547,7 +3547,7 @@ $(ENG_D)\gmp.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_gmp.obj
 
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_chil.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_chil.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_chil.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_chil.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_chil.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_chil.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\chil.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_chil.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\chil.dll  @<<
@@ -3557,7 +3557,7 @@ $(ENG_D)\chil.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_chil.obj
 
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_nuron.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_nuron.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_nuron.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_nuron.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_nuron.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_nuron.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\nuron.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_nuron.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\nuron.dll  @<<
@@ -3567,7 +3567,7 @@ $(ENG_D)\nuron.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_nuron.obj
 
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_sureware.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_sureware.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_sureware.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_sureware.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_sureware.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_sureware.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\sureware.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_sureware.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\sureware.dll  @<<
@@ -3577,7 +3577,7 @@ $(ENG_D)\sureware.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_sureware.obj
 
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_ubsec.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_ubsec.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_ubsec.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_ubsec.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_ubsec.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_ubsec.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\ubsec.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_ubsec.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\ubsec.dll  @<<
@@ -3587,7 +3587,7 @@ $(ENG_D)\ubsec.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_ubsec.obj
 
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_padlock.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_padlock.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_padlock.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_padlock.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_padlock.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_padlock.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\padlock.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_padlock.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\padlock.dll  @<<
@@ -3597,7 +3597,7 @@ $(ENG_D)\padlock.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_padlock.obj
 
 
 $(OBJ_D)\e_capi.obj: $(SRC_D)\engines\e_capi.c
-	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_capi.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_capi.c
+	$(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\e_capi.obj  $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO -c $(SRC_D)\engines\e_capi.c
 
 $(ENG_D)\capi.dll: $(OBJ_D)\e_capi.obj
 	$(LINK_CMD) $(MLFLAGS) /out:$(ENG_D)\capi.dll  @<<

ms/version32.rc

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 LANGUAGE 0x09,0x01
 
 1 VERSIONINFO
-  FILEVERSION 1,0,2,17
+  FILEVERSION 1,0,2,19
-  PRODUCTVERSION 1,0,2,17
+  PRODUCTVERSION 1,0,2,19
   FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
 #ifdef _DEBUG
   FILEFLAGS 0x01L
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ BEGIN
 	    // Required:	    
 	    VALUE "CompanyName", "The OpenSSL Project, http://www.openssl.org/\0"
 	    VALUE "FileDescription", "OpenSSL Shared Library\0"
-	    VALUE "FileVersion", "1.0.2q\0"
+	    VALUE "FileVersion", "1.0.2s\0"
 #if defined(CRYPTO)
 	    VALUE "InternalName", "libeay32\0"
 	    VALUE "OriginalFilename", "libeay32.dll\0"
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ BEGIN
 	    VALUE "OriginalFilename", "ssleay32.dll\0"
 #endif
 	    VALUE "ProductName", "The OpenSSL Toolkit\0"
-	    VALUE "ProductVersion", "1.0.2q\0"
+	    VALUE "ProductVersion", "1.0.2s\0"
 	    // Optional:
 	    //VALUE "Comments", "\0"
 	    VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright  <20> 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright <20> 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\0"

openssl.spec

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Release: 1
 
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
-Version: 1.0.2q
+Version: 1.0.2s
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries

ssl/d1_pkt.c

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -1309,6 +1309,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
             ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
             s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
             SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return (0);
         } else {
             al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

ssl/s3_pkt.c

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -1500,6 +1500,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
             ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
             s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
             SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return (0);
         } else {
             al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
@@ -1719,9 +1720,12 @@ int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
                                           * protocol_version alerts */
     if (desc < 0)
         return -1;
-    /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
+    /* If a fatal one, remove from cache and go into the error state */
-    if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
+    if (level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
-        SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+        if (s->session != NULL)
+            SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    }
 
     s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
     s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;

ssl/t1_lib.c

@@ -3697,6 +3697,12 @@ int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
                          sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
 }
 
+static int tls12_get_hash_nid(unsigned char hash_alg)
+{
+    return tls12_find_nid(hash_alg, tls12_md,
+                          sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+}
+
 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
 {
     switch (hash_alg) {
@@ -3887,6 +3893,8 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
     const EVP_MD *md;
     CERT *c = s->cert;
     TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
+    int mandatory_mdnid;
+
     if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
         return 0;
 
@@ -3918,6 +3926,18 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
     for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
          i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
         idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
+        if (s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey) {
+            ERR_set_mark();
+            if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
+                                                &mandatory_mdnid) == 2 &&
+                mandatory_mdnid != tls12_get_hash_nid(sigptr->rhash))
+                continue;
+            /*
+             * If EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() failed, don't pollute
+             * the error stack.
+             */
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        }
         if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
             md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
             c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;

test/maketests.com

@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ $ T_D_BAD_DTLS_TEST   := [-.ssl]
 $ T_D_SSLV2CONFTEST := [-.ssl]
 $ T_D_DTLSTEST   := [-.ssl]
 $ T_D_FATALERRTEST := [-.ssl]
+$ T_D_X509_TIME_TEST := []
 $
 $ EXOBJ_DTLSTEST := SSLTESTLIB
 $ EXOBJ_FATALERRTEST := SSLTESTLIB

tools/c_rehash

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
+#!/usr/local/bin/perl
 
 # Perl c_rehash script, scan all files in a directory
 # and add symbolic links to their hash values.

tools/c_rehash.bak

@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
-
-# Perl c_rehash script, scan all files in a directory
-# and add symbolic links to their hash values.
-
-my $dir = "/usr/local/ssl";
-my $prefix = "/usr/local/ssl";
-
-my $openssl = $ENV{OPENSSL} || "openssl";
-my $pwd;
-my $x509hash = "-subject_hash";
-my $crlhash = "-hash";
-my $verbose = 0;
-my $symlink_exists=eval {symlink("",""); 1};
-my $removelinks = 1;
-
-##  Parse flags.
-while ( $ARGV[0] =~ /^-/ ) {
-    my $flag = shift @ARGV;
-    last if ( $flag eq '--');
-    if ( $flag eq '-old') {
-	    $x509hash = "-subject_hash_old";
-	    $crlhash = "-hash_old";
-    } elsif ( $flag eq '-h') {
-	    help();
-    } elsif ( $flag eq '-n' ) {
-	    $removelinks = 0;
-    } elsif ( $flag eq '-v' ) {
-	    $verbose++;
-    }
-    else {
-	    print STDERR "Usage error; try -help.\n";
-	    exit 1;
-    }
-}
-
-sub help {
-	print "Usage: c_rehash [-old] [-h] [-v] [dirs...]\n";
-	print "   -old use old-style digest\n";
-	print "   -h print this help text\n";
-	print "   -v print files removed and linked\n";
-	exit 0;
-}
-
-eval "require Cwd";
-if (defined(&Cwd::getcwd)) {
-	$pwd=Cwd::getcwd();
-} else {
-	$pwd=`pwd`;
-	chomp($pwd);
-}
-
-# DOS/Win32 or Unix delimiter?  Prefix our installdir, then search.
-my $path_delim = ($pwd =~ /^[a-z]\:/i) ? ';' : ':';
-$ENV{PATH} = "$prefix/bin" . ($ENV{PATH} ? $path_delim . $ENV{PATH} : "");
-
-if(! -x $openssl) {
-	my $found = 0;
-	foreach (split /$path_delim/, $ENV{PATH}) {
-		if(-x "$_/$openssl") {
-			$found = 1;
-			$openssl = "$_/$openssl";
-			last;
-		}	
-	}
-	if($found == 0) {
-		print STDERR "c_rehash: rehashing skipped ('openssl' program not available)\n";
-		exit 0;
-	}
-}
-
-if(@ARGV) {
-	@dirlist = @ARGV;
-} elsif($ENV{SSL_CERT_DIR}) {
-	@dirlist = split /$path_delim/, $ENV{SSL_CERT_DIR};
-} else {
-	$dirlist[0] = "$dir/certs";
-}
-
-if (-d $dirlist[0]) {
-	chdir $dirlist[0];
-	$openssl="$pwd/$openssl" if (!-x $openssl);
-	chdir $pwd;
-}
-
-foreach (@dirlist) {
-	if(-d $_ and -w $_) {
-		hash_dir($_);
-	}
-}
-
-sub hash_dir {
-	my %hashlist;
-	print "Doing $_[0]\n";
-	chdir $_[0];
-	opendir(DIR, ".");
-	my @flist = readdir(DIR);
-	closedir DIR;
-	if ( $removelinks ) {
-		# Delete any existing symbolic links
-		foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
-			if(-l $_) {
-				unlink $_;
-				print "unlink $_" if $verbose;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
-		# Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
-		my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
-		if(!$cert && !$crl) {
-			print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
-			next;
-		}
-		link_hash_cert($fname) if($cert);
-		link_hash_crl($fname) if($crl);
-	}
-}
-
-sub check_file {
-	my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
-	my $fname = $_[0];
-	open IN, $fname;
-	while(<IN>) {
-		if(/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
-			my $hdr = $1;
-			if($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
-				$is_cert = 1;
-				last if($is_crl);
-			} elsif($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
-				$is_crl = 1;
-				last if($is_cert);
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	close IN;
-	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
-}
-
-
-# Link a certificate to its subject name hash value, each hash is of
-# the form <hash>.<n> where n is an integer. If the hash value already exists
-# then we need to up the value of n, unless its a duplicate in which
-# case we skip the link. We check for duplicates by comparing the
-# certificate fingerprints
-
-sub link_hash_cert {
-		my $fname = $_[0];
-		$fname =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
-		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" x509 $x509hash -fingerprint -noout -in "$fname"`;
-		chomp $hash;
-		chomp $fprint;
-		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
-		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
-		my $suffix = 0;
-		# Search for an unused hash filename
-		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"}) {
-			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
-			if($hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
-				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate certificate $fname\n";
-				return;
-			}
-			$suffix++;
-		}
-		$hash .= ".$suffix";
-		if ($symlink_exists) {
-			symlink $fname, $hash;
-			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
-		} else {
-			open IN,"<$fname" or die "can't open $fname for read";
-			open OUT,">$hash" or die "can't open $hash for write";
-			print OUT <IN>;	# does the job for small text files
-			close OUT;
-			close IN;
-			print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
-		}
-		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
-}
-
-# Same as above except for a CRL. CRL links are of the form <hash>.r<n>
-
-sub link_hash_crl {
-		my $fname = $_[0];
-		$fname =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
-		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" crl $crlhash -fingerprint -noout -in '$fname'`;
-		chomp $hash;
-		chomp $fprint;
-		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
-		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
-		my $suffix = 0;
-		# Search for an unused hash filename
-		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"}) {
-			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
-			if($hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
-				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate CRL $fname\n";
-				return;
-			}
-			$suffix++;
-		}
-		$hash .= ".r$suffix";
-		if ($symlink_exists) {
-			symlink $fname, $hash;
-			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
-		} else {
-			system ("cp", $fname, $hash);
-			print "cp $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
-		}
-		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
-}
-