Import OpenSSL 1.0.2t

Import OpenSSL 1.0.2s
Import OpenSSL 1.0.2q
2019-09-16 11:28:31 +01:00 · 2019-06-17 08:41:08 -07:00 · 2018-12-07 11:08:57 -08:00
190 changed files with 138164 additions and 136357 deletions
--- a/116
+++ b/116
@@ -7,6 +7,122 @@
 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
 release branch.

+ Changes between 1.0.2s and 1.0.2t [10 Sep 2019]
+
+   *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+      used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
+      or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
+      `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`.
+      This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains,
+      especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs.
+      By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later
+      serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if
+      internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation.
+      [Nicola Tuveri]
+
+  *) Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before
+     this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
+     NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
+     does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
+     (CVE-2019-1547)
+     [Billy Bob Brumley]
+
+  *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.
+     An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
+     second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
+     recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
+     encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
+     decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
+     used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
+     As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
+     key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
+     certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
+     The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+     (CVE-2019-1563)
+     [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+  *) Document issue with installation paths in diverse Windows builds
+
+     '/usr/local/ssl' is an unsafe prefix for location to install OpenSSL
+     binaries and run-time config file.
+     (CVE-2019-1552)
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2r and 1.0.2s [28 May 2019]
+
+  *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
+     This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
+     fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
+     generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Add FIPS support for Android Arm 64-bit
+
+     Support for Android Arm 64-bit was added to the OpenSSL FIPS Object
+     Module in Version 2.0.10. For some reason, the corresponding target
+     'android64-aarch64' was missing OpenSSL 1.0.2, whence it could not be
+     built with FIPS support on Android Arm 64-bit. This omission has been
+     fixed.
+     [Matthias St. Pierre]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2q and 1.0.2r [26 Feb 2019]
+
+  *) 0-byte record padding oracle
+
+     If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
+     SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one)
+     then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte
+     record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is
+     received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently
+     based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this
+     amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.
+
+     In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in
+     use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain
+     commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown()
+     twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do
+     this but some do anyway).
+
+     This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod
+     Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew
+     Hourselt. It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.
+     (CVE-2019-1559)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2p and 1.0.2q [20 Nov 2018]
+
+  *) Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication
+
+     OpenSSL ECC scalar multiplication, used in e.g. ECDSA and ECDH, has been
+     shown to be vulnerable to a microarchitecture timing side channel attack.
+     An attacker with sufficient access to mount local timing attacks during
+     ECDSA signature generation could recover the private key.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th October 2018 by Alejandro
+     Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Cesar Pereida Garcia and
+     Nicola Tuveri.
+     (CVE-2018-5407)
+     [Billy Brumley]
+
+  *) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
+
+     The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
+     timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
+     algorithm to recover the private key.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
+     (CVE-2018-0734)
+     [Paul Dale]
+
+  *) Resolve a compatibility issue in EC_GROUP handling with the FIPS Object
+     Module, accidentally introduced while backporting security fixes from the
+     development branch and hindering the use of ECC in FIPS mode.
+     [Nicola Tuveri]
+
 Changes between 1.0.2o and 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018]

  *) Client DoS due to large DH parameter
--- a/5
+++ b/5
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare
 # -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align,
 # -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token
 # -Wextended-offsetof
-my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token  -Wno-extended-offsetof";
+my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unknown-warning-option -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token  -Wno-extended-offsetof";

 # These are used in addition to $gcc_devteam_warn when the compiler is clang.
 # TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initiali
 # -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align,
 # -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token
 # -Wextended-offsetof
-my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
+my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unknown-warning-option -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";

 # Warn that "make depend" should be run?
 my $warn_make_depend = 0;
@@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ my %table=(
 "android-x86","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:".eval{my $asm=${x86_elf_asm};$asm=~s/:elf/:android/;$asm}.":dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "android-armv7","gcc:-march=armv7-a -mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "android-mips","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"android64-aarch64","gcc:-mandroid -fPIC -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-pie%-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",

 #### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!]
 "BSD-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--- a/INSTALL.DJGPP
+++ b/INSTALL.DJGPP
@@ -33,8 +33,18 @@
 running in a DOS box under Windows. If so, just close the BASH
 shell, go back to Windows, and restart BASH. Then run "make" again.

- RUN-TIME CAVEAT LECTOR
- --------------
+ CAVEAT LECTOR
+ -------------
+
+ ### Default install and config paths
+
+ ./Configure defaults to '/usr/local/ssl' as installation top.  This is
+ suitable for Unix, but not for Windows, where this usually is a world
+ writable directory and therefore accessible for change by untrusted users.
+ It is therefore recommended to set your own --prefix or --openssldir to
+ some location that is not world writeable (see the example above)
+
+ ### Entropy

 Quoting FAQ:

--- a/INSTALL.W32
+++ b/INSTALL.W32
@@ -34,6 +34,17 @@
 get it all to work. See the trouble shooting section later on for if (when?)
 it goes wrong.

+ CAVEAT LECTOR
+ -------------
+
+ ### Default install and config paths
+
+ ./Configure defaults to '/usr/local/ssl' as installation top.  This is
+ suitable for Unix, but not for Windows, where this usually is a world
+ writable directory and therefore accessible for change by untrusted users.
+ It is therefore recommended to set your own --prefix or --openssldir to
+ some location that is not world writeable (see the example above)
+
 Visual C++
 ----------

@@ -104,7 +115,7 @@
 ---------------------

 * Configure for building with Borland Builder:
-   > perl Configure BC-32
+   > perl Configure BC-32 --prefix=c:\some\openssl\dir

 * Create the appropriate makefile
   > ms\do_nasm
@@ -196,7 +207,7 @@

 * Compile OpenSSL:

-   $ ./config
+   $ ./config --prefix=c:/some/openssl/dir
   [...]
   $ make
   [...]
@@ -206,7 +217,11 @@
   and openssl.exe application in apps directory.

   It is also possible to cross-compile it on Linux by configuring
-   with './Configure --cross-compile-prefix=i386-mingw32- mingw ...'.
+   like this:
+
+   $ ./Configure --cross-compile-prefix=i386-mingw32- \
+     --prefix=c:/some/openssl/dir mingw ...
+
   'make test' is naturally not applicable then.

   libcrypto.a and libssl.a are the static libraries. To use the DLLs,
@@ -240,6 +255,9 @@
 	$ copy /b out32dll\libeay32.dll c:\openssl\bin
 	$ copy /b out32dll\openssl.exe  c:\openssl\bin

+      ("c:\openssl" should be whatever you specified to --prefix when
+      configuring the build)
+
      Of course, you can choose another device than c:.  C: is used here
      because that's usually the first (and often only) harddisk device.
      Note: in the modssl INSTALL.Win32, p: is used rather than c:.
--- a/INSTALL.W64
+++ b/INSTALL.W64
@@ -30,6 +30,14 @@
   Neither of these is actually big deal and hardly encountered
   in real-life applications.

+ ### Default install and config paths
+
+ ./Configure defaults to '/usr/local/ssl' as installation top.  This is
+ suitable for Unix, but not for Windows, where this usually is a world
+ writable directory and therefore accessible for change by untrusted users.
+ It is therefore recommended to set your own --prefix or --openssldir to
+ some location that is not world writeable (see the example above)
+
 Compiling procedure
 -------------------

@@ -43,7 +51,7 @@

 To build for Win64/x64:

- > perl Configure VC-WIN64A
+ > perl Configure VC-WIN64A --prefix=c:\some\openssl\dir
 > ms\do_win64a
 > nmake -f ms\ntdll.mak
 > cd out32dll
@@ -51,7 +59,7 @@

 To build for Win64/IA64:

- > perl Configure VC-WIN64I
+ > perl Configure VC-WIN64I --prefix=c:\some\openssl\dir
 > ms\do_win64i
 > nmake -f ms\ntdll.mak
 > cd out32dll
--- a/INSTALL.WCE
+++ b/INSTALL.WCE
@@ -35,6 +35,17 @@
 redirects IO to active sync link, while PortSDK - to NT-like console
 driver on the handheld itself.

+ CAVEAT LECTOR
+ -------------
+
+ ### Default install and config paths
+
+ ./Configure defaults to '/usr/local/ssl' as installation top.  This is
+ suitable for Unix, but not for Windows, where this usually is a world
+ writable directory and therefore accessible for change by untrusted users.
+ It is therefore recommended to set your own --prefix or --openssldir to
+ some location that is not world writeable (see the example above)
+
 Building
 --------

@@ -61,7 +72,7 @@

 Next you should run Configure:

- > perl Configure VC-CE
+ > perl Configure VC-CE --prefix=c:\some\openssl\dir

 Next you need to build the Makefiles:

--- a/2920
+++ b/2920
--- a/1384
+++ b/1384
--- a/Makefile.bak
+++ b/Makefile.bak
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ $(TARFILE).list:
 	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
 	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
 	       \( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \
-	       \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
+	       \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*.bak' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
 	    | sort > $(TARFILE).list

 tar: $(TARFILE).list
--- a/24
+++ b/24
@@ -5,6 +5,30 @@
  This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
  release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.

+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2s and OpenSSL 1.0.2t [10 Sep 2019]
+
+      o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
+        (CVE-2019-1563)
+      o For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+        used even when parsing explicit parameters
+      o Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction
+        (CVE-2019-1547)
+      o Document issue with installation paths in diverse Windows builds
+        (CVE-2019-1552)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2r and OpenSSL 1.0.2s [28 May 2019]
+
+      o None
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2q and OpenSSL 1.0.2r [26 Feb 2019]
+
+      o 0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2p and OpenSSL 1.0.2q [20 Nov 2018]
+
+      o Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication (CVE-2018-5407)
+      o Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0734)
+
  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2o and OpenSSL 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018]

      o Client DoS due to large DH parameter (CVE-2018-0732)
--- a/4
+++ b/4
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@

- OpenSSL 1.0.2p 14 Aug 2018
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2t 10 Sep 2019

- Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project
 Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
 All rights reserved.

--- a/apps/req.c
+++ b/apps/req.c
@@ -659,8 +659,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
            }
        }

-        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating a %ld bit %s private key\n",
-                   newkey, keyalgstr);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating a %s private key\n", keyalgstr);

        EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(genctx, genpkey_cb);
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(genctx, bio_err);
--- a/2
+++ b/2
@@ -871,6 +871,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
  *-*-qnx6) OUT="QNX6" ;;
  x86-*-android|i?86-*-android) OUT="android-x86" ;;
  armv[7-9]*-*-android) OUT="android-armv7" ;;
+  aarch64-*-android) OUT="android64-aarch64" ;;
  *) OUT=`echo $GUESSOS | awk -F- '{print $3}'`;;
 esac

@@ -992,5 +993,6 @@ if [ $? = "0" ]; then
  fi
 else
  echo "This system ($OUT) is not supported. See file INSTALL for details."
+  exit 1
 fi
 )
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -36,9 +36,11 @@ TEST=constant_time_test.c
 LIB= $(TOP)/libcrypto.a
 SHARED_LIB= libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
 LIBSRC=	cryptlib.c mem.c mem_clr.c mem_dbg.c cversion.c ex_data.c cpt_err.c \
-	ebcdic.c uid.c o_time.c o_str.c o_dir.c o_fips.c o_init.c fips_ers.c
+	ebcdic.c uid.c o_time.c o_str.c o_dir.c o_fips.c o_init.c fips_ers.c \
+	getenv.c
 LIBOBJ= cryptlib.o mem.o mem_dbg.o cversion.o ex_data.o cpt_err.o ebcdic.o \
-	uid.o o_time.o o_str.o o_dir.o o_fips.o o_init.o fips_ers.o $(CPUID_OBJ)
+	uid.o o_time.o o_str.o o_dir.o o_fips.o o_init.o fips_ers.o getenv.o \
+	$(CPUID_OBJ)

 SRC= $(LIBSRC)

@@ -178,6 +180,13 @@ ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
 ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h
 ex_data.o: ex_data.c
 fips_ers.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h fips_ers.c
+getenv.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+getenv.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+getenv.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+getenv.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+getenv.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+getenv.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h
+getenv.o: getenv.c
 mem.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
 mem.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 mem.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
--- a/crypto/arm_arch.h
+++ b/crypto/arm_arch.h
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
 #  endif
 # endif

-# if !__ASSEMBLER__
+# ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
 extern unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P;
 # endif

--- a/crypto/armcap.c
+++ b/crypto/armcap.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <crypto.h>

+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #include "arm_arch.h"

 unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0;
--- a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
@@ -234,6 +234,21 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe,

 int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth)
 {
+    /*
+     * One of the following must be true:
+     *
+     * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set
+     * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear
+     *
+     * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table
+     */
+    if (!((ameth->pem_str == NULL
+           && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0)
+          || (ameth->pem_str != NULL
+              && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0))) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    if (app_methods == NULL) {
        app_methods = sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_new(ameth_cmp);
        if (!app_methods)
@@ -305,18 +320,6 @@ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags,
    } else
        ameth->info = NULL;

-    /*
-     * One of the following must be true:
-     *
-     * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set
-     * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear
-     *
-     * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table
-     */
-    if (!((pem_str == NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0)
-          || (pem_str != NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0)))
-        goto err;
-
    if (pem_str) {
        ameth->pem_str = BUF_strdup(pem_str);
        if (!ameth->pem_str)
--- a/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */

+#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+#define _BSD_SOURCE
+
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -83,6 +86,11 @@ NETDB_DEFINE_CONTEXT
 static int wsa_init_done = 0;
 # endif

+# if defined(__GLIBC__)
+#  define HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R
+#  define GETHOSTNAME_R_BUF     (2 * 1024)
+# endif
+
 /*
 * WSAAPI specifier is required to make indirect calls to run-time
 * linked WinSock 2 functions used in this module, to be specific
@@ -116,7 +124,12 @@ int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip)
    int i;
    int err = 1;
    int locked = 0;
-    struct hostent *he;
+    struct hostent *he = NULL;
+# ifdef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R
+    char buf[GETHOSTNAME_R_BUF];
+    struct hostent hostent;
+    int h_errnop;
+# endif

    i = get_ip(str, ip);
    if (i < 0) {
@@ -138,10 +151,18 @@ int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip)
    if (i > 0)
        return (1);

+    /* if gethostbyname_r is supported, use it. */
+# ifdef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R
+    memset(&hostent, 0x00, sizeof(hostent));
+    /* gethostbyname_r() sets |he| to NULL on error, we check it further down */
+    gethostbyname_r(str, &hostent, buf, sizeof(buf), &he, &h_errnop);
+# else
    /* do a gethostbyname */
    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME);
    locked = 1;
    he = BIO_gethostbyname(str);
+# endif
+
    if (he == NULL) {
        BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP, BIO_R_BAD_HOSTNAME_LOOKUP);
        goto err;
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
@@ -361,12 +361,16 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
                } else
                    _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
            }
-#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2)
            int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
            if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
                setmode(fd, O_TEXT);
            else
                setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+            int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
+            if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
+                setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
 #  endif
        }
        break;
@@ -389,11 +393,14 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
            ret = 0;
            break;
        }
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2)
        if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
            strcat(p, "b");
        else
            strcat(p, "t");
+#  elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+        if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
+            strcat(p, "b");
 #  endif
 #  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
        if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
--- a/crypto/bn/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/bn/Makefile
@@ -297,8 +297,8 @@ bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
 bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
-bn_lib.o: bn_lib.c
+bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+bn_lib.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_lib.c
 bn_mod.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
 bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
 bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
@@ -55,12 +55,6 @@
 *    machine.
 */

-# if defined(_WIN64) || !defined(__LP64__)
-#  define BN_ULONG unsigned long long
-# else
-#  define BN_ULONG unsigned long
-# endif
-
 # undef mul
 # undef mul_add

--- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/bn/bn_blind.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -206,10 +206,15 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
        if (!BN_BLINDING_create_param(b, NULL, NULL, ctx, NULL, NULL))
            goto err;
    } else if (!(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE)) {
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->mod, ctx))
-            goto err;
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx))
-            goto err;
+        if (b->m_ctx != NULL) {
+            if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->m_ctx, ctx)
+                || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->m_ctx, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!BN_mod_mul(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx)
+                || !BN_mod_mul(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->mod, ctx))
+                goto err;
+        }
    }

    ret = 1;
@@ -241,13 +246,13 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
    else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b, ctx))
        return (0);

-    if (r != NULL) {
-        if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai))
-            ret = 0;
-    }
+    if (r != NULL && (BN_copy(r, b->Ai) == NULL))
+        return 0;

-    if (!BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->A, b->mod, ctx))
-        ret = 0;
+    if (b->m_ctx != NULL)
+        ret = BN_mod_mul_montgomery(n, n, b->A, b->m_ctx, ctx);
+    else
+        ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->A, b->mod, ctx);

    return ret;
 }
@@ -264,14 +269,29 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b,

    bn_check_top(n);

-    if (r != NULL)
-        ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
-    else {
-        if (b->Ai == NULL) {
-            BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-            return (0);
+    if (r == NULL && (r = b->Ai) == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (b->m_ctx != NULL) {
+        /* ensure that BN_mod_mul_montgomery takes pre-defined path */
+        if (n->dmax >= r->top) {
+            size_t i, rtop = r->top, ntop = n->top;
+            BN_ULONG mask;
+
+            for (i = 0; i < rtop; i++) {
+                mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - ntop) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+                n->d[i] &= mask;
+            }
+            mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((rtop - ntop) >> (8 * sizeof(ntop) - 1));
+            /* always true, if (rtop >= ntop) n->top = r->top; */
+            n->top = (int)(rtop & ~mask) | (ntop & mask);
+            n->flags |= (BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP & ~mask);
        }
-        ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
+        ret = BN_mod_mul_montgomery(n, n, r, b->m_ctx, ctx);
+    } else {
+        ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
    }

    bn_check_top(n);
@@ -366,14 +386,19 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b,
    } while (1);

    if (ret->bn_mod_exp != NULL && ret->m_ctx != NULL) {
-        if (!ret->bn_mod_exp
-            (ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx, ret->m_ctx))
+        if (!ret->bn_mod_exp(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx, ret->m_ctx))
            goto err;
    } else {
        if (!BN_mod_exp(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx))
            goto err;
    }

+    if (ret->m_ctx != NULL) {
+        if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(ret->Ai, ret->Ai, ret->m_ctx, ctx)
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(ret->A, ret->A, ret->m_ctx, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
    return ret;
 err:
    if (b == NULL && ret != NULL) {
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /* crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c */
 /* Written by Ulf Moeller for the OpenSSL project. */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx)
    }
    /* OK, make sure the returned bignum is "zero" */
    BN_zero(ret);
+    /* clear BN_FLG_CONSTTIME if leaked from previous frames */
+    ret->flags &= (~BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
    ctx->used++;
    CTXDBG_RET(ctx, ret);
    return ret;
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include "bn_lcl.h"
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"

 const char BN_version[] = "Big Number" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;

@@ -187,13 +188,57 @@ int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l)
    return bits;
 }

+/*
+ * This function still leaks `a->dmax`: it's caller's responsibility to
+ * expand the input `a` in advance to a public length.
+ */
+static inline
+int bn_num_bits_consttime(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    int j, ret;
+    unsigned int mask, past_i;
+    int i = a->top - 1;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    for (j = 0, past_i = 0, ret = 0; j < a->dmax; j++) {
+        mask = constant_time_eq_int(i, j); /* 0xff..ff if i==j, 0x0 otherwise */
+
+        ret += BN_BITS2 & (~mask & ~past_i);
+        ret += BN_num_bits_word(a->d[j]) & mask;
+
+        past_i |= mask; /* past_i will become 0xff..ff after i==j */
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * if BN_is_zero(a) => i is -1 and ret contains garbage, so we mask the
+     * final result.
+     */
+    mask = ~(constant_time_eq_int(i, ((int)-1)));
+
+    return ret & mask;
+}
+
 int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a)
 {
    int i = a->top - 1;
    bn_check_top(a);

+    if (a->flags & BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) {
+        /*
+         * We assume that BIGNUMs flagged as CONSTTIME have also been expanded
+         * so that a->dmax is not leaking secret information.
+         *
+         * In other words, it's the caller's responsibility to ensure `a` has
+         * been preallocated in advance to a public length if we hit this
+         * branch.
+         *
+         */
+        return bn_num_bits_consttime(a);
+    }
+
    if (BN_is_zero(a))
        return 0;
+
    return ((i * BN_BITS2) + BN_num_bits_word(a->d[i]));
 }

@@ -613,30 +658,54 @@ BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
    return (ret);
 }

+typedef enum {big, little} endianess_t;
+
 /* ignore negative */
-static int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+static
+int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen, endianess_t endianess)
 {
    int n;
-    size_t i, inc, lasti, j;
+    size_t i, lasti, j, atop, mask;
    BN_ULONG l;

+    /*
+     * In case |a| is fixed-top, BN_num_bytes can return bogus length,
+     * but it's assumed that fixed-top inputs ought to be "nominated"
+     * even for padded output, so it works out...
+     */
    n = BN_num_bytes(a);
-    if (tolen == -1)
+    if (tolen == -1) {
        tolen = n;
-    else if (tolen < n)
-        return -1;
+    } else if (tolen < n) {     /* uncommon/unlike case */
+        BIGNUM temp = *a;

-    if (n == 0) {
+        bn_correct_top(&temp);
+        n = BN_num_bytes(&temp);
+        if (tolen < n)
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Swipe through whole available data and don't give away padded zero. */
+    atop = a->dmax * BN_BYTES;
+    if (atop == 0) {
        OPENSSL_cleanse(to, tolen);
        return tolen;
    }

-    lasti = n - 1;
-    for (i = 0, inc = 1, j = tolen; j > 0;) {
+    lasti = atop - 1;
+    atop = a->top * BN_BYTES;
+    if (endianess == big)
+        to += tolen; /* start from the end of the buffer */
+    for (i = 0, j = 0; j < (size_t)tolen; j++) {
+        unsigned char val;
        l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES];
-        to[--j] = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES)) & (0 - inc));
-        inc = (i - lasti) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1);
-        i += inc; /* stay on top limb */
+        mask = 0 - ((j - atop) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+        val = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES)) & mask);
+        if (endianess == big)
+            *--to = val;
+        else
+            *to++ = val;
+        i += (i - lasti) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); /* stay on last limb */
    }

    return tolen;
@@ -646,21 +715,66 @@ int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
 {
    if (tolen < 0)
        return -1;
-    return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen);
+    return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen, big);
 }

 int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to)
 {
-    int n, i;
-    BN_ULONG l;
+    return bn2binpad(a, to, -1, big);
+}

-    bn_check_top(a);
-    n = i = BN_num_bytes(a);
-    while (i--) {
-        l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES];
-        *(to++) = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff;
+BIGNUM *bn_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
+{
+    unsigned int i, m;
+    unsigned int n;
+    BN_ULONG l;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        ret = bn = BN_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    s += len;
+    /* Skip trailing zeroes. */
+    for ( ; len > 0 && s[-1] == 0; s--, len--)
+        continue;
+    n = len;
+    if (n == 0) {
+        ret->top = 0;
+        return ret;
    }
-    return (n);
+    i = ((n - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1;
+    m = ((n - 1) % (BN_BYTES));
+    if (bn_wexpand(ret, (int)i) == NULL) {
+        BN_free(bn);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->top = i;
+    ret->neg = 0;
+    l = 0;
+    while (n--) {
+        s--;
+        l = (l << 8L) | *s;
+        if (m-- == 0) {
+            ret->d[--i] = l;
+            l = 0;
+            m = BN_BYTES - 1;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * need to call this due to clear byte at top if avoiding having the top
+     * bit set (-ve number)
+     */
+    bn_correct_top(ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+{
+    if (tolen < 0)
+        return -1;
+    return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen, little);
 }

 int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
@@ -822,6 +936,9 @@ int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
    int i;
    BN_ULONG aa, bb;

+    if (n == 0)
+        return 0;
+
    aa = a[n - 1];
    bb = b[n - 1];
    if (aa != bb)
@@ -889,6 +1006,38 @@ void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
    a->top ^= t;
    b->top ^= t;

+    t = (a->neg ^ b->neg) & condition;
+    a->neg ^= t;
+    b->neg ^= t;
+
+    /*-
+     * BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA: indicates that data may not be written to. Intention
+     * is actually to treat it as it's read-only data, and some (if not most)
+     * of it does reside in read-only segment. In other words observation of
+     * BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA in BN_consttime_swap should be treated as fatal
+     * condition. It would either cause SEGV or effectively cause data
+     * corruption.
+     *
+     * BN_FLG_MALLOCED: refers to BN structure itself, and hence must be
+     * preserved.
+     *
+     * BN_FLG_SECURE: must be preserved, because it determines how x->d was
+     * allocated and hence how to free it.
+     *
+     * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME: sufficient to mask and swap
+     *
+     * BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP: indicates that we haven't called bn_correct_top() on
+     * the data, so the d array may be padded with additional 0 values (i.e.
+     * top could be greater than the minimal value that it could be). We should
+     * be swapping it
+     */
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP_FLAGS (BN_FLG_CONSTTIME | BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP)
+
+    t = ((a->flags ^ b->flags) & BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP_FLAGS) & condition;
+    a->flags ^= t;
+    b->flags ^= t;
+
 #define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
        do { \
                t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,

    if (mtop > sizeof(storage) / sizeof(storage[0])
        && (tp = OPENSSL_malloc(mtop * sizeof(BN_ULONG))) == NULL)
-	return 0;
+        return 0;

    ap = a->d != NULL ? a->d : tp;
    bp = b->d != NULL ? b->d : tp;
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
        ((volatile BN_ULONG *)tp)[i] = 0;
    }
    r->top = mtop;
+    r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
    r->neg = 0;

    if (tp != storage)
@@ -224,6 +225,70 @@ int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
    return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
 }

+/*
+ * BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative,
+ * a is less than m, while b is of same bit width as m. It's implemented
+ * as subtraction followed by two conditional additions.
+ *
+ * 0 <= a < m
+ * 0 <= b < 2^w < 2*m
+ *
+ * after subtraction
+ *
+ * -2*m < r = a - b < m
+ *
+ * Thus it takes up to two conditional additions to make |r| positive.
+ */
+int bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                         const BIGNUM *m)
+{
+    size_t i, ai, bi, mtop = m->top;
+    BN_ULONG borrow, carry, ta, tb, mask, *rp;
+    const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp;
+
+    if (bn_wexpand(r, m->top) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    rp = r->d;
+    ap = a->d != NULL ? a->d : rp;
+    bp = b->d != NULL ? b->d : rp;
+
+    for (i = 0, ai = 0, bi = 0, borrow = 0; i < mtop;) {
+        mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - a->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+        ta = ap[ai] & mask;
+
+        mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - b->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
+        tb = bp[bi] & mask;
+        rp[i] = ta - tb - borrow;
+        if (ta != tb)
+            borrow = (ta < tb);
+
+        i++;
+        ai += (i - a->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1);
+        bi += (i - b->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1);
+    }
+    ap = m->d;
+    for (i = 0, mask = 0 - borrow, carry = 0; i < mtop; i++) {
+        ta = ((ap[i] & mask) + carry) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry = (ta < carry);
+        rp[i] = (rp[i] + ta) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry += (rp[i] < ta);
+    }
+    borrow -= carry;
+    for (i = 0, mask = 0 - borrow, carry = 0; i < mtop; i++) {
+        ta = ((ap[i] & mask) + carry) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry = (ta < carry);
+        rp[i] = (rp[i] + ta) & BN_MASK2;
+        carry += (rp[i] < ta);
+    }
+
+    r->top = mtop;
+    r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
+    r->neg = 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
 /*
 * BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and
 * less than m
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -164,10 +164,10 @@ int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,

    bn_check_top(tmp);
    if (a == b) {
-        if (!BN_sqr(tmp, a, ctx))
+        if (!bn_sqr_fixed_top(tmp, a, ctx))
            goto err;
    } else {
-        if (!BN_mul(tmp, a, b, ctx))
+        if (!bn_mul_fixed_top(tmp, a, b, ctx))
            goto err;
    }
    /* reduce from aRR to aR */
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
    BIGNUM *n;
    BN_ULONG *ap, *np, *rp, n0, v, carry;
    int nl, max, i;
+    unsigned int rtop;

    n = &(mont->N);
    nl = n->top;
@@ -207,12 +208,10 @@ static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
    rp = r->d;

    /* clear the top words of T */
-# if 1
-    for (i = r->top; i < max; i++) /* memset? XXX */
-        rp[i] = 0;
-# else
-    memset(&(rp[r->top]), 0, (max - r->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-# endif
+    for (rtop = r->top, i = 0; i < max; i++) {
+        v = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - rtop) >> (8 * sizeof(rtop) - 1));
+        rp[i] &= v;
+    }

    r->top = max;
    r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
@@ -262,6 +261,18 @@ static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)

 int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
                       BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int retn;
+
+    retn = bn_from_mont_fixed_top(ret, a, mont, ctx);
+    bn_correct_top(ret);
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+
+    return retn;
+}
+
+int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
    int retn = 0;
 #ifdef MONT_WORD
@@ -270,8 +281,6 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a)) {
        retn = bn_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont);
-        bn_correct_top(ret);
-        bn_check_top(ret);
    }
    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
 #else                           /* !MONT_WORD */
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
@@ -935,6 +935,16 @@ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2,
 #endif                          /* BN_RECURSION */

 int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = bn_mul_fixed_top(r, a, b, ctx);
+
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_mul_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
    int ret = 0;
    int top, al, bl;
@@ -1042,7 +1052,7 @@ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 #if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION)
 end:
 #endif
-    bn_correct_top(rr);
+    rr->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
    if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL)
        goto err;

--- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
@@ -65,6 +65,16 @@
 * I've just gone over this and it is now %20 faster on x86 - eay - 27 Jun 96
 */
 int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = bn_sqr_fixed_top(r, a, ctx);
+
+    bn_correct_top(r);
+    bn_check_top(r);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_sqr_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
    int max, al;
    int ret = 0;
@@ -136,7 +146,7 @@ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)

    rr->neg = 0;
    rr->top = max;
-    bn_correct_top(rr);
+    rr->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
    if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL)
        goto err;

--- a/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 * 2005.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -223,8 +223,10 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
    for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
        if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
            goto err;
+
        /* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
-        BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
+        if (!BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq))
+            goto err;
        if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
            break;
    }
--- a/crypto/bn/bntest.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bntest.c
@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>

+#ifndef OSSL_NELEM
+# define OSSL_NELEM(x)    (sizeof(x)/sizeof(x[0]))
+#endif
+
 const int num0 = 100;           /* number of tests */
 const int num1 = 50;            /* additional tests for some functions */
 const int num2 = 5;             /* number of tests for slow functions */
@@ -123,6 +127,7 @@ int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
 int test_kron(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
 int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
 int rand_neg(void);
+static int test_ctx_consttime_flag(void);
 static int results = 0;

 static unsigned char lst[] =
@@ -330,6 +335,15 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
        goto err;
    (void)BIO_flush(out);
 #endif
+
+    /* silently flush any pre-existing error on the stack */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    message(out, "BN_CTX_get BN_FLG_CONSTTIME");
+    if (!test_ctx_consttime_flag())
+        goto err;
+    (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    BIO_free(out);

@@ -2158,3 +2172,90 @@ int rand_neg(void)

    return (sign[(neg++) % 8]);
 }
+
+static int test_ctx_set_ct_flag(BN_CTX *c)
+{
+    int st = 0;
+    size_t i;
+    BIGNUM *b[15];
+
+    BN_CTX_start(c);
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(b); i++) {
+        if (NULL == (b[i] = BN_CTX_get(c))) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BN_CTX_get() failed.\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (i % 2 == 1)
+            BN_set_flags(b[i], BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    }
+
+    st = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(c);
+    return st;
+}
+
+static int test_ctx_check_ct_flag(BN_CTX *c)
+{
+    int st = 0;
+    size_t i;
+    BIGNUM *b[30];
+
+    BN_CTX_start(c);
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(b); i++) {
+        if (NULL == (b[i] = BN_CTX_get(c))) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BN_CTX_get() failed.\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (BN_get_flags(b[i], BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BN_FLG_CONSTTIME should not be set.\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    st = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(c);
+    return st;
+}
+
+static int test_ctx_consttime_flag(void)
+{
+    /*-
+     * The constant-time flag should not "leak" among BN_CTX frames:
+     *
+     * - test_ctx_set_ct_flag() starts a frame in the given BN_CTX and
+     *   sets the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on some of the BIGNUMs obtained
+     *   from the frame before ending it.
+     * - test_ctx_check_ct_flag() then starts a new frame and gets a
+     *   number of BIGNUMs from it. In absence of leaks, none of the
+     *   BIGNUMs in the new frame should have BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set.
+     *
+     * In actual BN_CTX usage inside libcrypto the leak could happen at
+     * any depth level in the BN_CTX stack, with varying results
+     * depending on the patterns of sibling trees of nested function
+     * calls sharing the same BN_CTX object, and the effect of
+     * unintended BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on the called BN_* functions.
+     *
+     * This simple unit test abstracts away this complexity and verifies
+     * that the leak does not happen between two sibling functions
+     * sharing the same BN_CTX object at the same level of nesting.
+     *
+     */
+    BN_CTX *c = NULL;
+    int st = 0;
+
+    if (NULL == (c = BN_CTX_new())) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BN_CTX_new() failed.\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_ctx_set_ct_flag(c)
+            || !test_ctx_check_ct_flag(c))
+        goto err;
+
+    st = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_free(c);
+    return st;
+}
--- a/crypto/bn_int.h
+++ b/crypto/bn_int.h
@@ -7,9 +7,18 @@
 */
 int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
                          BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                           BN_CTX *ctx);
 int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
                         BN_CTX *ctx);
 int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
                         const BIGNUM *m);
+int bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                         const BIGNUM *m);
+int bn_mul_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_sqr_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);

 int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen);
+
+BIGNUM *bn_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);
+int bn_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen);
--- a/crypto/buildinf.h
+++ b/crypto/buildinf.h
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
-#ifndef MK1MF_BUILD
-  /* auto-generated by Configure for crypto/cversion.c:
-   * for Unix builds, crypto/Makefile.ssl generates functional definitions;
-   * Windows builds (and other mk1mf builds) compile cversion.c with
-   * -DMK1MF_BUILD and use definitions added to this file by util/mk1mf.pl. */
-  #error "Windows builds (PLATFORM=VC-WIN32) use mk1mf.pl-created Makefiles"
-#endif
-#ifdef MK1MF_PLATFORM_VC_WIN32
-  /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
-  #define CFLAGS "compiler: cl  /MD /Ox /O2 /Ob2 -DOPENSSL_THREADS  -DDSO_WIN32 -W3 -WX -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE -D_WINSOCK_DEPRECATED_NO_WARNINGS -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -DRC4_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DRMD160_ASM -DAES_ASM -DVPAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM -DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK -I. -DOPENSSL_NO_IDEA -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_MDC2 -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS -DOPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE    "
-  #define PLATFORM "VC-WIN32"
-  #define DATE "Tue Aug 14 16:04:24 2018"
-#endif
-#ifdef MK1MF_PLATFORM_BC_NT
-  /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
-  #define CFLAGS "compiler: bcc32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -q -w-ccc -w-rch -w-pia -w-aus -w-par -w-inl  -c -tWC -tWM -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -D_stricmp=stricmp -D_strnicmp=strnicmp -O2 -ff -fp -DBN_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DRMD160_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_IDEA -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_MDC2 -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS -DOPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE    "
-  #define PLATFORM "BC-NT"
-  #define DATE "Tue Aug 14 16:04:24 2018"
-#endif
+#ifndef MK1MF_BUILD
+  /* auto-generated by Configure for crypto/cversion.c:
+   * for Unix builds, crypto/Makefile.ssl generates functional definitions;
+   * Windows builds (and other mk1mf builds) compile cversion.c with
+   * -DMK1MF_BUILD and use definitions added to this file by util/mk1mf.pl. */
+  #error "Windows builds (PLATFORM=VC-WIN32) use mk1mf.pl-created Makefiles"
+#endif
+#ifdef MK1MF_PLATFORM_VC_WIN32
+  /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
+  #define CFLAGS "compiler: cl  /MD /Ox /O2 /Ob2 -DOPENSSL_THREADS  -DDSO_WIN32 -W3 -WX -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE -D_WINSOCK_DEPRECATED_NO_WARNINGS -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -DRC4_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DRMD160_ASM -DAES_ASM -DVPAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM -DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK -I. -DOPENSSL_NO_IDEA -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_MDC2 -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS -DOPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE    "
+  #define PLATFORM "VC-WIN32"
+  #define DATE "Mon Sep 16 10:27:05 2019"
+#endif
+#ifdef MK1MF_PLATFORM_BC_NT
+  /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
+  #define CFLAGS "compiler: bcc32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -q -w-ccc -w-rch -w-pia -w-aus -w-par -w-inl  -c -tWC -tWM -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -D_stricmp=stricmp -D_strnicmp=strnicmp -O2 -ff -fp -DBN_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DRMD160_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_IDEA -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_MDC2 -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS -DOPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE    "
+  #define PLATFORM "BC-NT"
+  #define DATE "Mon Sep 16 10:27:05 2019"
+#endif
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 * project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
    unsigned char *ek = NULL;
    size_t eklen;
    int ret = 0;
+    size_t fixlen = 0;
    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;

@@ -430,6 +431,19 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
        return 0;
    }

+    if (cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->havenocert
+            && !cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug) {
+        X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
+        const EVP_CIPHER *ciph = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(calg->algorithm);
+
+        if (ciph == NULL) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        fixlen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph);
+    }
+
    ktri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
    if (!ktri->pctx)
        return 0;
@@ -460,7 +474,9 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,

    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, ek, &eklen,
                         ktri->encryptedKey->data,
-                         ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0) {
+                         ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0
+            || eklen == 0
+            || (fixlen != 0 && eklen != fixlen)) {
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 * project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st {
    size_t keylen;
    /* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
    int debug;
+    /* Set to 1 if we have no cert and need extra safety measures for MMA */
+    int havenocert;
 };

 struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st {
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 * project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -737,6 +737,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
        cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
    else
        cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+    if (!cert)
+        cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->havenocert = 1;
+    else
+        cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->havenocert = 0;
    if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
        return 1;
    if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
--- a/crypto/conf/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/conf/Makefile
@@ -80,12 +80,13 @@ clean:
 # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.

 conf_api.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/conf_api.h
-conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/conf.h
+conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/conf_api.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
 conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h conf_api.c
+conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h conf_api.c
 conf_def.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 conf_def.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/conf.h
 conf_def.o: ../../include/openssl/conf_api.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/conf_api.h>
 #include "e_os.h"
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
            if (v != NULL)
                return (v->value);
            if (strcmp(section, "ENV") == 0) {
-                p = getenv(name);
+                p = ossl_safe_getenv(name);
                if (p != NULL)
                    return (p);
            }
@@ -154,7 +155,7 @@ char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
        else
            return (NULL);
    } else
-        return (getenv(name));
+        return (ossl_safe_getenv(name));
 }

 #if 0                           /* There's no way to provide error checking
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 * 2001.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ char *CONF_get1_default_config_file(void)
    char *file;
    int len;

-    file = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF");
+    file = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_CONF");
    if (file)
        return BUF_strdup(file);

--- a/crypto/constant_time_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/constant_time_locl.h
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 * Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
 * (Google).
 * ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2014-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -185,11 +185,29 @@ static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
    return constant_time_eq_8((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
 }

+/*
+ * Returns the value unmodified, but avoids optimizations.
+ * The barriers prevent the compiler from narrowing down the
+ * possible value range of the mask and ~mask in the select
+ * statements, which avoids the recognition of the select
+ * and turning it into a conditional load or branch.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int value_barrier(unsigned int a)
+{
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__)
+    unsigned int r;
+    __asm__("" : "=r"(r) : "0"(a));
+#else
+    volatile unsigned int r = a;
+#endif
+    return r;
+}
+
 static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
                                                unsigned int a,
                                                unsigned int b)
 {
-    return (mask & a) | (~mask & b);
+    return (value_barrier(mask) & a) | (value_barrier(~mask) & b);
 }

 static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
@@ -204,6 +222,12 @@ static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b)
    return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)));
 }

+/*
+ * Expected usage pattern is to unconditionally set error and then
+ * wipe it if there was no actual error. |clear| is 1 or 0.
+ */
+void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear);
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
--- a/crypto/cryptlib.h
+++ b/crypto/cryptlib.h
@@ -104,6 +104,10 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...);
 void *OPENSSL_stderr(void);
 extern int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated;

+char *ossl_safe_getenv(const char *);
+
+unsigned long OPENSSL_rdtsc(void);
+
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
--- a/crypto/crypto-lib.com
+++ b/crypto/crypto-lib.com
@@ -214,7 +214,8 @@ $! The contents of these variables are copied from the LIBOBJ variable in the
 $! corresponding Makefile from each corresponding subdirectory, with .o stripped
 $! and spaces replaced with commas.
 $ LIB_ = "cryptlib,mem,mem_dbg,cversion,ex_data,cpt_err,ebcdic,"+ -
-	"uid,o_time,o_str,o_dir,o_fips,o_init,fips_ers,mem_clr"
+	"uid,o_time,o_str,o_dir,o_fips,o_init,fips_ers,mem_clr,"+ -
+	"getenv"
 $ LIB_OBJECTS = "o_names,obj_dat,obj_lib,obj_err,obj_xref"
 $ LIB_MD2 = "md2_dgst,md2_one"
 $ LIB_MD4 = "md4_dgst,md4_one"
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 * 2006.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
    dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH_PKEY_CTX));
    if (!dctx)
        return 0;
-    dctx->prime_len = 1024;
+    dctx->prime_len = 2048;
    dctx->subprime_len = -1;
    dctx->generator = 2;
    dctx->use_dsa = 0;
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -435,6 +435,12 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,

    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);

+    /* make sure L > N, otherwise we'll get trapped in an infinite loop */
+    if (L <= N) {
+        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
    if (evpmd == NULL) {
        if (N == 160)
            evpmd = EVP_sha1();
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                         DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
 static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
 static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa);
+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
+                                      BN_CTX *ctx);

 static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
    "OpenSSL DSA method",
@@ -279,7 +281,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
        goto err;

    /* Preallocate space */
-    q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q) + sizeof(dsa->q->d[0]) * 16;
    if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits)
        || !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits)
        || !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits))
@@ -293,9 +295,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,

    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        BN_set_flags(&l, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
    }

-
    if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
                                    CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx))
@@ -333,8 +335,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
    if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
        goto err;

-    /* Compute  part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
-    if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
+    /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
+    if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(&k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
        goto err;

    if (*kinvp != NULL)
@@ -468,3 +470,31 @@ static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
        BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
    return (1);
 }
+
+/*
+ * Compute the inverse of k modulo q.
+ * Since q is prime, Fermat's Little Theorem applies, which reduces this to
+ * mod-exp operation.  Both the exponent and modulus are public information
+ * so a mod-exp that doesn't leak the base is sufficient.  A newly allocated
+ * BIGNUM is returned which the caller must free.
+ */
+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
+                                      BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    BIGNUM *res = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *r, e;
+
+    if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    BN_init(&e);
+
+    if (BN_set_word(r, 2)
+            && BN_sub(&e, q, r)
+            && BN_mod_exp_mont(r, k, &e, q, ctx, NULL))
+        res = r;
+    else
+        BN_free(r);
+    BN_free(&e);
+    return res;
+}
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 * 2006.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@

 typedef struct {
    /* Parameter gen parameters */
-    int nbits;                  /* size of p in bits (default: 1024) */
-    int qbits;                  /* size of q in bits (default: 160) */
+    int nbits;                  /* size of p in bits (default: 2048) */
+    int qbits;                  /* size of q in bits (default: 224) */
    const EVP_MD *pmd;          /* MD for parameter generation */
    /* Keygen callback info */
    int gentmp[2];
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ static int pkey_dsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
    dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA_PKEY_CTX));
    if (!dctx)
        return 0;
-    dctx->nbits = 1024;
-    dctx->qbits = 160;
+    dctx->nbits = 2048;
+    dctx->qbits = 224;
    dctx->pmd = NULL;
    dctx->md = NULL;

--- a/crypto/ec/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/ec/Makefile
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
 ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ec_curve.c ec_lcl.h
+ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ec_curve.c ec_lcl.h
 ec_cvt.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 ec_cvt.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
 ec_cvt.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
--- a/crypto/ec/ec.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec.h
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 * \author Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -1073,6 +1073,7 @@ int EC_KEY_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key, int off);
 * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
 * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
 */
+
 void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);

 /* Error codes for the EC functions. */
@@ -1270,13 +1271,14 @@ void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
 # define EC_R_SLOT_FULL                                   108
 # define EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR                         113
 # define EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER                             128
+# define EC_R_UNKNOWN_COFACTOR                            152
 # define EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP                               129
 # define EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER                               114
 # define EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD                           131
 # define EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS                      145
 # define EC_R_WRONG_ORDER                                 130

-#ifdef  __cplusplus
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
-#endif
+# endif
 #endif
--- a/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 *
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
                             BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
    point_conversion_form_t form;
-    int y_bit;
+    int y_bit, m;
    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
    BIGNUM *x, *y, *yxi;
    size_t field_len, enc_len;
@@ -332,7 +332,8 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
        return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, point);
    }

-    field_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+    m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+    field_len = (m + 7) / 8;
    enc_len =
        (form ==
         POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len;
@@ -357,7 +358,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,

    if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1, field_len, x))
        goto err;
-    if (BN_ucmp(x, &group->field) >= 0) {
+    if (BN_num_bits(x) > m) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
        goto err;
    }
@@ -369,7 +370,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
    } else {
        if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1 + field_len, field_len, y))
            goto err;
-        if (BN_ucmp(y, &group->field) >= 0) {
+        if (BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
            goto err;
        }
@@ -382,16 +383,14 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
            }
        }

+        /*
+         * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m is responsible for checking that
+         * the point is on the curve.
+         */
        if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx))
            goto err;
    }

-    /* test required by X9.62 */
-    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
    ret = 1;

 err:
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static int ec_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)

    case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
        *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
-        return 2;
+        return 1;

    default:
        return -2;
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2003 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -695,10 +695,12 @@ ECPKPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
 static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
 {
    int ok = 0, tmp;
-    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
+    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL, *dup = NULL;
    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
    EC_POINT *point = NULL;
    long field_bits;
+    int curve_name = NID_undef;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

    if (!params->fieldID || !params->fieldID->fieldType ||
        !params->fieldID->p.ptr) {
@@ -914,13 +916,75 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
        goto err;
    }

+    /*
+     * Check if the explicit parameters group just created matches one of the
+     * built-in curves.
+     *
+     * We create a copy of the group just built, so that we can remove optional
+     * fields for the lookup: we do this to avoid the possibility that one of
+     * the optional parameters is used to force the library into using a less
+     * performant and less secure EC_METHOD instead of the specialized one.
+     * In any case, `seed` is not really used in any computation, while a
+     * cofactor different from the one in the built-in table is just
+     * mathematically wrong anyway and should not be used.
+     */
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((dup = EC_GROUP_dup(ret)) == NULL
+            || EC_GROUP_set_seed(dup, NULL, 0) != 1
+            || !EC_GROUP_set_generator(dup, point, a, NULL)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((curve_name = ec_curve_nid_from_params(dup, ctx)) != NID_undef) {
+        /*
+         * The input explicit parameters successfully matched one of the
+         * built-in curves: often for built-in curves we have specialized
+         * methods with better performance and hardening.
+         *
+         * In this case we replace the `EC_GROUP` created through explicit
+         * parameters with one created from a named group.
+         */
+        EC_GROUP *named_group = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+        /*
+         * NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 and NID_secp224r1 are both aliases for
+         * the same curve, we prefer the SECP nid when matching explicit
+         * parameters as that is associated with a specialized EC_METHOD.
+         */
+        if (curve_name == NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12)
+            curve_name = NID_secp224r1;
+#endif /* !def(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) */
+
+        if ((named_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_name)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        EC_GROUP_free(ret);
+        ret = named_group;
+
+        /*
+         * Set the flag so that EC_GROUPs created from explicit parameters are
+         * serialized using explicit parameters by default.
+         *
+         * 0x0 = OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE
+         */
+        EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, 0x0);
+    }
+
    ok = 1;

- err:if (!ok) {
+ err:
+    if (!ok) {
        if (ret)
-            EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
+            EC_GROUP_free(ret);
        ret = NULL;
    }
+    if (dup)
+        EC_GROUP_free(dup);

    if (p)
        BN_free(p);
@@ -930,6 +994,8 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
        BN_free(b);
    if (point)
        EC_POINT_free(point);
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    return (ret);
 }

@@ -990,7 +1056,7 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
    }

    if (a && *a)
-        EC_GROUP_clear_free(*a);
+        EC_GROUP_free(*a);
    if (a)
        *a = group;

@@ -1040,7 +1106,7 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)

    if (priv_key->parameters) {
        if (ret->group)
-            EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret->group);
+            EC_GROUP_free(ret->group);
        ret->group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(priv_key->parameters);
    }

--- a/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2010 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>

+#include "bn_int.h"
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 # include <openssl/fips.h>
 #endif
@@ -3246,3 +3248,115 @@ int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name)
    }
    return NID_undef;
 }
+
+#define NUM_BN_FIELDS 6
+/*
+ * Validates EC domain parameter data for known named curves.
+ * This can be used when a curve is loaded explicitly (without a curve
+ * name) or to validate that domain parameters have not been modified.
+ *
+ * Returns: The nid associated with the found named curve, or NID_undef
+ *          if not found. If there was an error it returns -1.
+ */
+int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = -1, nid, len, field_type, param_len;
+    size_t i, seed_len;
+    const unsigned char *seed, *params_seed, *params;
+    unsigned char *param_bytes = NULL;
+    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
+    const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+    const EC_METHOD *meth;
+    const BIGNUM *cofactor = NULL;
+    /* An array of BIGNUMs for (p, a, b, x, y, order) */
+    BIGNUM *bn[NUM_BN_FIELDS] = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+    meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group);
+    if (meth == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    /* Use the optional named curve nid as a search field */
+    nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
+    field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth);
+    seed_len = EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(group);
+    seed = EC_GROUP_get0_seed(group);
+    cofactor = &group->cofactor;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    /*
+     * The built-in curves contains data fields (p, a, b, x, y, order) that are
+     * all zero-padded to be the same size. The size of the padding is
+     * determined by either the number of bytes in the field modulus (p) or the
+     * EC group order, whichever is larger.
+     */
+    param_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->order);
+    len = BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
+    if (len > param_len)
+        param_len = len;
+
+    /* Allocate space to store the padded data for (p, a, b, x, y, order)  */
+    param_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS);
+    if (param_bytes == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Create the bignums */
+    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
+        if ((bn[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Fill in the bn array with the same values as the internal curves
+     * i.e. the values are p, a, b, x, y, order.
+     */
+    /* Get p, a & b */
+    if (!(ec_group_get_curve(group, bn[0], bn[1], bn[2], ctx)
+        && ((generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) != NULL)
+        /* Get x & y */
+        && ec_point_get_affine_coordinates(group, generator, bn[3], bn[4], ctx)
+        /* Get order */
+        && EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bn[5], ctx)))
+        goto end;
+
+   /*
+     * Convert the bignum array to bytes that are joined together to form
+     * a single buffer that contains data for all fields.
+     * (p, a, b, x, y, order) are all zero padded to be the same size.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
+        if (bn_bn2binpad(bn[i], &param_bytes[i*param_len], param_len) <= 0)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
+        const ec_list_element curve = curve_list[i];
+
+        data = curve.data;
+        /* Get the raw order byte data */
+        params_seed = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
+        params = params_seed + data->seed_len;
+
+        /* Look for unique fields in the fixed curve data */
+        if (data->field_type == field_type
+            && param_len == data->param_len
+            && (nid <= 0 || nid == curve.nid)
+            /* check the optional cofactor (ignore if its zero) */
+            && (BN_is_zero(cofactor)
+                || BN_is_word(cofactor, (const BN_ULONG)curve.data->cofactor))
+            /* Check the optional seed (ignore if its not set) */
+            && (data->seed_len == 0 || seed_len == 0
+                || ((size_t)data->seed_len == seed_len
+                     && memcmp(params_seed, seed, seed_len) == 0))
+            /* Check that the groups params match the built-in curve params */
+            && memcmp(param_bytes, params, param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS)
+                             == 0) {
+            ret = curve.nid;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Gets here if the group was not found */
+    ret = NID_undef;
+end:
+    OPENSSL_free(param_bytes);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/ec/ec_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_reasons[] = {
    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_SLOT_FULL), "slot full"},
    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR), "undefined generator"},
    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER), "undefined order"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNKNOWN_COFACTOR), "unknown cofactor"},
    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP), "unknown group"},
    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER), "unknown order"},
    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD), "unsupported field"},
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2010 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ struct ec_group_st {
    int asn1_flag;              /* flag to control the asn1 encoding */
    /*
     * Kludge: upper bit of ans1_flag is used to denote structure
-     * version. Is set, then last field is present. This is done
+     * version. If set, then last field is present. This is done
     * for interoperation with FIPS code.
     */
 #define EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK 0x7fffffff
@@ -549,7 +549,6 @@ void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array,
 void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(unsigned char *sign,
                                     unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in);
 #endif
-int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *);

 #ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
 /** Returns GFp methods using montgomery multiplication, with x86-64 optimized
@@ -566,3 +565,18 @@ EC_GROUP *FIPS_ec_group_new_curve_gf2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
                                       const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
 EC_GROUP *FIPS_ec_group_new_by_curve_name(int nid);
 #endif
+
+int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * The next 2 functions are just internal wrappers around the omonimous
+ * functions with either the `_GFp` or the `_GF2m` suffix.
+ *
+ * They are meant to facilitate backporting of code from newer branches, where
+ * the public API includes a "field agnostic" version of these 2 functions.
+ */
+int ec_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                       BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                    const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x,
+                                    BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx);
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@

 const char EC_version[] = "EC" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;

+/* local function prototypes */
+
+static int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group);
+
 /* functions for EC_GROUP objects */

 EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth)
@@ -290,6 +294,67 @@ int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth)
    return meth->field_type;
 }

+/*-
+ * Try computing cofactor from the generator order (n) and field cardinality (q).
+ * This works for all curves of cryptographic interest.
+ *
+ * Hasse thm: q + 1 - 2*sqrt(q) <= n*h <= q + 1 + 2*sqrt(q)
+ * h_min = (q + 1 - 2*sqrt(q))/n
+ * h_max = (q + 1 + 2*sqrt(q))/n
+ * h_max - h_min = 4*sqrt(q)/n
+ * So if n > 4*sqrt(q) holds, there is only one possible value for h:
+ * h = \lfloor (h_min + h_max)/2 \rceil = \lfloor (q + 1)/n \rceil
+ *
+ * Otherwise, zero cofactor and return success.
+ */
+static int ec_guess_cofactor(EC_GROUP *group) {
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *q = NULL;
+
+    /*-
+     * If the cofactor is too large, we cannot guess it.
+     * The RHS of below is a strict overestimate of lg(4 * sqrt(q))
+     */
+    if (BN_num_bits(&group->order) <= (BN_num_bits(&group->field) + 1) / 2 + 3) {
+        /* default to 0 */
+        BN_zero(&group->cofactor);
+        /* return success */
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((q = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* set q = 2**m for binary fields; q = p otherwise */
+    if (group->meth->field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
+        BN_zero(q);
+        if (!BN_set_bit(q, BN_num_bits(&group->field) - 1))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_copy(q, &group->field))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* compute h = \lfloor (q + 1)/n \rceil = \lfloor (q + 1 + n/2)/n \rfloor */
+    if (!BN_rshift1(&group->cofactor, &group->order) /* n/2 */
+        || !BN_add(&group->cofactor, &group->cofactor, q) /* q + n/2 */
+        /* q + 1 + n/2 */
+        || !BN_add(&group->cofactor, &group->cofactor, BN_value_one())
+        /* (q + 1 + n/2)/n */
+        || !BN_div(&group->cofactor, NULL, &group->cofactor, &group->order, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
 int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
                           const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor)
 {
@@ -298,6 +363,33 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
        return 0;
    }

+    /* require group->field >= 1 */
+    if (BN_is_zero(&group->field) || BN_is_negative(&group->field)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * - require order >= 1
+     * - enforce upper bound due to Hasse thm: order can be no more than one bit
+     *   longer than field cardinality
+     */
+    if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order) || BN_is_negative(order)
+        || BN_num_bits(order) > BN_num_bits(&group->field) + 1) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * Unfortunately the cofactor is an optional field in many standards.
+     * Internally, the lib uses 0 cofactor as a marker for "unknown cofactor".
+     * So accept cofactor == NULL or cofactor >= 0.
+     */
+    if (cofactor != NULL && BN_is_negative(cofactor)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, EC_R_UNKNOWN_COFACTOR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    if (group->generator == NULL) {
        group->generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
        if (group->generator == NULL)
@@ -306,29 +398,37 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
    if (!EC_POINT_copy(group->generator, generator))
        return 0;

-    if (order != NULL) {
-        if (!BN_copy(&group->order, order))
-            return 0;
-    } else
-        BN_zero(&group->order);
+    if (!BN_copy(&group->order, order))
+        return 0;

-    if (cofactor != NULL) {
+    /* Either take the provided positive cofactor, or try to compute it */
+    if (cofactor != NULL && !BN_is_zero(cofactor)) {
        if (!BN_copy(&group->cofactor, cofactor))
            return 0;
-    } else
+    } else if (!ec_guess_cofactor(group)) {
        BN_zero(&group->cofactor);
-
-    /*
-     * Some groups have an order with
-     * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
-     * |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case.
-     */
-    if (BN_is_odd(&group->order)) {
-        return ec_precompute_mont_data(group);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * Access to the `mont_data` field of an EC_GROUP struct should always be
+     * guarded by an EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) check to avoid OOB accesses, as the
+     * group might come from the FIPS module, which does not define the
+     * `mont_data` field inside the EC_GROUP structure.
+     */
+    if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(group)) {
+        /*-
+         * Some groups have an order with
+         * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
+         * |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case.
+         */
+        if (BN_is_odd(&group->order))
+            return ec_precompute_mont_data(group);
+
+        BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
+        group->mont_data = NULL;
    }

-    BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
-    group->mont_data = NULL;
    return 1;
 }

@@ -860,7 +960,15 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
              EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
        return 0;
    }
-    return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+    if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
 }

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
@@ -878,7 +986,15 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
              EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
        return 0;
    }
-    return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+    if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
+              EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
 }
 #endif

@@ -1098,18 +1214,23 @@ int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
                                 * been performed */
 }

-/*
+/*-
 * ec_precompute_mont_data sets |group->mont_data| from |group->order| and
 * returns one on success. On error it returns zero.
+ *
+ * Note: this function must be called only after verifying that
+ * EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) returns true.
+ * The reason for this is that access to the `mont_data` field of an EC_GROUP
+ * struct should always be guarded by an EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) check to avoid
+ * OOB accesses, as the group might come from the FIPS module, which does not
+ * define the `mont_data` field inside the EC_GROUP structure.
 */
+static
 int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group)
 {
    BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
    int ret = 0;

-    if (!EC_GROUP_VERSION(group))
-        goto err;
-
    if (group->mont_data) {
        BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
        group->mont_data = NULL;
@@ -1136,3 +1257,60 @@ int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group)
        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    return ret;
 }
+
+/*
+ * This is just a wrapper around the public functions
+ *  - EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m
+ *  - EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp
+ *
+ * It is meant to facilitate backporting of code from newer branches, where
+ * the public API includes a "field agnostic" version of it.
+ */
+int ec_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                       BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int field_nid;
+
+    field_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    if (field_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
+        return EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+    } else
+#endif /* !def(OPENSSL_NO_EC2M) */
+    if (field_nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+        return EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+    } else {
+        /* this should never happen */
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is just a wrapper around the public functions
+ *   - EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m
+ *   - EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp
+ *
+ * It is meant to facilitate backporting of code from newer branches, where
+ * the public API includes a "field agnostic" version of it.
+ */
+int ec_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                    const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x,
+                                    BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int field_nid;
+
+    field_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    if (field_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
+        return EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+    } else
+#endif /* !def(OPENSSL_NO_EC2M) */
+    if (field_nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+        return EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+    } else {
+        /* this should never happen */
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 * Originally written by Bodo Moeller and Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -310,6 +310,224 @@ static signed char *compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len)
    return r;
 }

+#define EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(P, flags) do { \
+    BN_set_flags(&(P)->X, (flags)); \
+    BN_set_flags(&(P)->Y, (flags)); \
+    BN_set_flags(&(P)->Z, (flags)); \
+} while(0)
+
+/*-
+ * This functions computes (in constant time) a point multiplication over the
+ * EC group.
+ *
+ * At a high level, it is Montgomery ladder with conditional swaps.
+ *
+ * It performs either a fixed scalar point multiplication
+ *          (scalar * generator)
+ * when point is NULL, or a generic scalar point multiplication
+ *          (scalar * point)
+ * when point is not NULL.
+ *
+ * scalar should be in the range [0,n) otherwise all constant time bets are off.
+ *
+ * NB: This says nothing about EC_POINT_add and EC_POINT_dbl,
+ * which of course are not constant time themselves.
+ *
+ * The product is stored in r.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                            const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point,
+                            BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, cardinality_bits, group_top, kbit, pbit, Z_is_one;
+    EC_POINT *s = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *k = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *lambda = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *cardinality = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    s = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    if (s == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (point == NULL) {
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(s, group->generator))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!EC_POINT_copy(s, point))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(s, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    cardinality = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    lambda = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    k = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (k == NULL || !BN_mul(cardinality, &group->order, &group->cofactor, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Group cardinalities are often on a word boundary.
+     * So when we pad the scalar, some timing diff might
+     * pop if it needs to be expanded due to carries.
+     * So expand ahead of time.
+     */
+    cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
+    group_top = cardinality->top;
+    if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!BN_copy(k, scalar))
+        goto err;
+
+    BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if ((BN_num_bits(k) > cardinality_bits) || (BN_is_negative(k))) {
+        /*-
+         * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
+         * constant-timeness
+         */
+        if (!BN_nnmod(k, k, cardinality, ctx))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_add(lambda, k, cardinality))
+        goto err;
+    BN_set_flags(lambda, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    if (!BN_add(k, lambda, cardinality))
+        goto err;
+    /*
+     * lambda := scalar + cardinality
+     * k := scalar + 2*cardinality
+     */
+    kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
+    BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2);
+
+    group_top = group->field.top;
+    if ((bn_wexpand(&s->X, group_top) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(&s->Y, group_top) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(&s->Z, group_top) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(&r->X, group_top) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(&r->Y, group_top) == NULL)
+        || (bn_wexpand(&r->Z, group_top) == NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* top bit is a 1, in a fixed pos */
+    if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, s))
+        goto err;
+
+    EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, s, s, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    pbit = 0;
+
+#define EC_POINT_CSWAP(c, a, b, w, t) do {         \
+        BN_consttime_swap(c, &(a)->X, &(b)->X, w); \
+        BN_consttime_swap(c, &(a)->Y, &(b)->Y, w); \
+        BN_consttime_swap(c, &(a)->Z, &(b)->Z, w); \
+        t = ((a)->Z_is_one ^ (b)->Z_is_one) & (c); \
+        (a)->Z_is_one ^= (t);                      \
+        (b)->Z_is_one ^= (t);                      \
+} while(0)
+
+    /*-
+     * The ladder step, with branches, is
+     *
+     * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R)
+     * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S)
+     *
+     * Swapping R, S conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state
+     *
+     * k[i] == 0: T, U = R, S
+     * k[i] == 1: T, U = S, R
+     *
+     * Then perform the ECC ops.
+     *
+     * U = add(T, U)
+     * T = dbl(T)
+     *
+     * Which leaves you with state
+     *
+     * k[i] == 0: U = add(R, S), T = dbl(R)
+     * k[i] == 1: U = add(S, R), T = dbl(S)
+     *
+     * Swapping T, U conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state
+     *
+     * k[i] == 0: R, S = T, U
+     * k[i] == 1: R, S = U, T
+     *
+     * Which leaves you with state
+     *
+     * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R)
+     * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S)
+     *
+     * So we get the same logic, but instead of a branch it's a
+     * conditional swap, followed by ECC ops, then another conditional swap.
+     *
+     * Optimization: The end of iteration i and start of i-1 looks like
+     *
+     * ...
+     * CSWAP(k[i], R, S)
+     * ECC
+     * CSWAP(k[i], R, S)
+     * (next iteration)
+     * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S)
+     * ECC
+     * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S)
+     * ...
+     *
+     * So instead of two contiguous swaps, you can merge the condition
+     * bits and do a single swap.
+     *
+     * k[i]   k[i-1]    Outcome
+     * 0      0         No Swap
+     * 0      1         Swap
+     * 1      0         Swap
+     * 1      1         No Swap
+     *
+     * This is XOR. pbit tracks the previous bit of k.
+     */
+
+    for (i = cardinality_bits - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        kbit = BN_is_bit_set(k, i) ^ pbit;
+        EC_POINT_CSWAP(kbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one);
+        if (!EC_POINT_add(group, s, r, s, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        /*
+         * pbit logic merges this cswap with that of the
+         * next iteration
+         */
+        pbit ^= kbit;
+    }
+    /* one final cswap to move the right value into r */
+    EC_POINT_CSWAP(pbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one);
+#undef EC_POINT_CSWAP
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EC_POINT_clear_free(s);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#undef EC_POINT_BN_set_flags
+
 /*
 * TODO: table should be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation,
 * sometimes smaller windows will give better performance (thus the
@@ -369,6 +587,34 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
        return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
    }

+    if (!BN_is_zero(&group->order) && !BN_is_zero(&group->cofactor)) {
+        /*-
+         * Handle the common cases where the scalar is secret, enforcing a constant
+         * time scalar multiplication algorithm.
+         */
+        if ((scalar != NULL) && (num == 0)) {
+            /*-
+             * In this case we want to compute scalar * GeneratorPoint: this
+             * codepath is reached most prominently by (ephemeral) key generation
+             * of EC cryptosystems (i.e. ECDSA keygen and sign setup, ECDH
+             * keygen/first half), where the scalar is always secret. This is why
+             * we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and we always call the
+             * constant time version.
+             */
+            return ec_mul_consttime(group, r, scalar, NULL, ctx);
+        }
+        if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 1)) {
+            /*-
+             * In this case we want to compute scalar * GenericPoint: this codepath
+             * is reached most prominently by the second half of ECDH, where the
+             * secret scalar is multiplied by the peer's public point. To protect
+             * the secret scalar, we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and
+             * we always call the constant time version.
+             */
+            return ec_mul_consttime(group, r, scalars[0], points[0], ctx);
+        }
+    }
+
    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
        if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 # include <string.h>
 # include <openssl/err.h>
 # include "ec_lcl.h"
+# include "bn_int.h" /* bn_bn2lebinpad, bn_lebin2bn */

 # if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1))
  /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */
@@ -334,34 +335,21 @@ static void felem_to_bin28(u8 out[28], const felem in)
    }
 }

-/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */
-static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len)
-{
-    unsigned i;
-    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
-        out[i] = in[len - 1 - i];
-}
-
 /* From OpenSSL BIGNUM to internal representation */
 static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in;
    felem_bytearray b_out;
-    unsigned num_bytes;
+    int num_bytes;

-    /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
-    memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
-    num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-    if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
-        return 0;
-    }
    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
        return 0;
    }
-    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes);
+    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(bn, b_out, sizeof(b_out));
+    if (num_bytes < 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
    bin28_to_felem(out, b_out);
    return 1;
 }
@@ -369,10 +357,9 @@ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 /* From internal representation to OpenSSL BIGNUM */
 static BIGNUM *felem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const felem in)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
-    felem_to_bin28(b_in, in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
-    return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
+    felem_bytearray b_out;
+    felem_to_bin28(b_out, in);
+    return bn_lebin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
 }

 /******************************************************************************/
@@ -1426,8 +1413,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
    felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
    felem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
    felem *tmp_felems = NULL;
-    felem_bytearray tmp;
-    unsigned num_bytes;
+    int num_bytes;
    int have_pre_comp = 0;
    size_t num_points = num;
    felem x_in, y_in, z_in, x_out, y_out, z_out;
@@ -1509,14 +1495,12 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
        memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
        memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem));
        for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
-            if (i == num)
+            if (i == num) {
                /* the generator */
-            {
                p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
                p_scalar = scalar;
-            } else
+            } else {
                /* the i^th point */
-            {
                p = points[i];
                p_scalar = scalars[i];
            }
@@ -1532,10 +1516,16 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                        goto err;
                    }
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-                } else
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
-                flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                } else {
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(p_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                }
+                if (num_bytes < 0) {
+                    ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
                /* precompute multiples */
                if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, &p->X)) ||
                    (!BN_to_felem(y_out, &p->Y)) ||
@@ -1578,20 +1568,21 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                goto err;
            }
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-        } else
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp);
-        flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes);
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        } else {
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        }
        /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */
        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                  g_secret,
                  mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, g_pre_comp);
-    } else
+    } else {
        /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */
        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                  NULL, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL);
+    }
    /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */
    felem_contract(x_in, x_out);
    felem_contract(y_in, y_out);
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 # include <string.h>
 # include <openssl/err.h>
 # include "ec_lcl.h"
+# include "bn_int.h" /* bn_bn2lebinpad, bn_lebin2bn */

 # if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1))
  /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */
@@ -144,34 +145,21 @@ static void smallfelem_to_bin32(u8 out[32], const smallfelem in)
    *((u64 *)&out[24]) = in[3];
 }

-/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */
-static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len)
-{
-    unsigned i;
-    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
-        out[i] = in[len - 1 - i];
-}
-
 /* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem */
 static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in;
    felem_bytearray b_out;
-    unsigned num_bytes;
+    int num_bytes;

-    /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
-    memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
-    num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-    if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
-        return 0;
-    }
    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
        return 0;
    }
-    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes);
+    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(bn, b_out, sizeof(b_out));
+    if (num_bytes < 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
    bin32_to_felem(out, b_out);
    return 1;
 }
@@ -179,10 +167,9 @@ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 /* felem_to_BN converts an felem into an OpenSSL BIGNUM */
 static BIGNUM *smallfelem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const smallfelem in)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
-    smallfelem_to_bin32(b_in, in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
-    return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
+    felem_bytearray b_out;
+    smallfelem_to_bin32(b_out, in);
+    return bn_lebin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
 }

 /*-
@@ -2014,8 +2001,8 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
    felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
    smallfelem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
    smallfelem *tmp_smallfelems = NULL;
-    felem_bytearray tmp;
-    unsigned i, num_bytes;
+    unsigned i;
+    int num_bytes;
    int have_pre_comp = 0;
    size_t num_points = num;
    smallfelem x_in, y_in, z_in;
@@ -2097,17 +2084,15 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
        memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
        memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(smallfelem));
        for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
-            if (i == num)
+            if (i == num) {
                /*
                 * we didn't have a valid precomputation, so we pick the
                 * generator
                 */
-            {
                p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
                p_scalar = scalar;
-            } else
+            } else {
                /* the i^th point */
-            {
                p = points[i];
                p_scalar = scalars[i];
            }
@@ -2123,10 +2108,16 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                        goto err;
                    }
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-                } else
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
-                flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                } else {
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(p_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                }
+                if (num_bytes < 0) {
+                    ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
                /* precompute multiples */
                if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, &p->X)) ||
                    (!BN_to_felem(y_out, &p->Y)) ||
@@ -2171,20 +2162,21 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                goto err;
            }
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-        } else
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp);
-        flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes);
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        } else {
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        }
        /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */
        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                  g_secret,
                  mixed, (const smallfelem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, g_pre_comp);
-    } else
+    } else {
        /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */
        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                  NULL, mixed, (const smallfelem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL);
+    }
    /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */
    felem_contract(x_in, x_out);
    felem_contract(y_in, y_out);
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 # include <string.h>
 # include <openssl/err.h>
 # include "ec_lcl.h"
+# include "bn_int.h" /* bn_bn2lebinpad, bn_lebin2bn */

 # if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1))
  /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */
@@ -168,34 +169,21 @@ static void felem_to_bin66(u8 out[66], const felem in)
    (*((limb *) & out[58])) = in[8];
 }

-/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */
-static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len)
-{
-    unsigned i;
-    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
-        out[i] = in[len - 1 - i];
-}
-
 /* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem */
 static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in;
    felem_bytearray b_out;
-    unsigned num_bytes;
+    int num_bytes;

-    /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
-    memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
-    num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-    if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
-        return 0;
-    }
    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
        return 0;
    }
-    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes);
+    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(bn, b_out, sizeof(b_out));
+    if (num_bytes < 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
    bin66_to_felem(out, b_out);
    return 1;
 }
@@ -203,10 +191,9 @@ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 /* felem_to_BN converts an felem into an OpenSSL BIGNUM */
 static BIGNUM *felem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const felem in)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
-    felem_to_bin66(b_in, in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
-    return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
+    felem_bytearray b_out;
+    felem_to_bin66(b_out, in);
+    return bn_lebin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
 }

 /*-
@@ -356,10 +343,15 @@ static void felem_diff64(felem out, const felem in)
 static void felem_diff_128_64(largefelem out, const felem in)
 {
    /*
-     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting.
+     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 64p mod p (which is equivalent
+     * to 0 mod p) before subtracting. p is 2^521 - 1, i.e. in binary a 521
+     * digit number with all bits set to 1. See "The representation of field
+     * elements" comment above for a description of how limbs are used to
+     * represent a number. 64p is represented with 8 limbs containing a number
+     * with 58 bits set and one limb with a number with 57 bits set.
     */
-    static const limb two63m6 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 5);
-    static const limb two63m5 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 4);
+    static const limb two63m6 = (((limb) 1) << 63) - (((limb) 1) << 6);
+    static const limb two63m5 = (((limb) 1) << 63) - (((limb) 1) << 5);

    out[0] += two63m6 - in[0];
    out[1] += two63m5 - in[1];
@@ -1821,8 +1813,8 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
    felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
    felem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
    felem *tmp_felems = NULL;
-    felem_bytearray tmp;
-    unsigned i, num_bytes;
+    unsigned i;
+    int num_bytes;
    int have_pre_comp = 0;
    size_t num_points = num;
    felem x_in, y_in, z_in, x_out, y_out, z_out;
@@ -1904,17 +1896,15 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
        memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
        memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem));
        for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
-            if (i == num)
+            if (i == num) {
                /*
                 * we didn't have a valid precomputation, so we pick the
                 * generator
                 */
-            {
                p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
                p_scalar = scalar;
-            } else
+            } else {
                /* the i^th point */
-            {
                p = points[i];
                p_scalar = scalars[i];
            }
@@ -1930,10 +1920,16 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                        goto err;
                    }
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-                } else
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
-                flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                } else {
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(p_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                }
+                if (num_bytes < 0) {
+                    ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
                /* precompute multiples */
                if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, &p->X)) ||
                    (!BN_to_felem(y_out, &p->Y)) ||
@@ -1976,21 +1972,22 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                goto err;
            }
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-        } else
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp);
-        flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes);
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        } else {
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        }
        /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */
        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                  g_secret,
                  mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp,
                  (const felem(*)[3])g_pre_comp);
-    } else
+    } else {
        /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */
        batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                  (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                  NULL, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL);
+    }
    /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */
    felem_contract(x_in, x_out);
    felem_contract(y_in, y_out);
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 * OpenSSL project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -408,16 +408,14 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
            }
        }

+        /*
+         * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp is responsible for checking that
+         * the point is on the curve.
+         */
        if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx))
            goto err;
    }

-    /* test required by X9.62 */
-    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
    ret = 1;

 err:
--- a/crypto/ec/ectest.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ectest.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
    EC_GROUP *P_160 = NULL, *P_192 = NULL, *P_224 = NULL, *P_256 =
        NULL, *P_384 = NULL, *P_521 = NULL;
    EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R;
-    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *yplusone;
    unsigned char buf[100];
    size_t i, len;
    int k;
@@ -405,7 +405,8 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
    x = BN_new();
    y = BN_new();
    z = BN_new();
-    if (!x || !y || !z)
+    yplusone = BN_new();
+    if (x == NULL || y == NULL || z == NULL || yplusone == NULL)
        ABORT;

    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "D"))
@@ -542,6 +543,14 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
        ABORT;
    if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, "23a628553168947d59dcc912042351377ac5fb32"))
        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
        ABORT;
    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
@@ -613,6 +622,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
        ABORT;

+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 192)
        ABORT;
@@ -668,6 +686,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
        ABORT;

+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 224)
        ABORT;
@@ -728,6 +755,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
        ABORT;

+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 256)
        ABORT;
@@ -783,6 +819,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
        ABORT;

+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 384)
        ABORT;
@@ -844,6 +889,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
    if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
        ABORT;

+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
    fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
    if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 521)
        ABORT;
@@ -858,6 +912,10 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)

    /* more tests using the last curve */

+    /* Restore the point that got mangled in the (x, y + 1) test. */
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
    if (!EC_POINT_copy(Q, P))
        ABORT;
    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q))
@@ -987,6 +1045,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
    BN_free(x);
    BN_free(y);
    BN_free(z);
+    BN_free(yplusone);

    if (P_160)
        EC_GROUP_free(P_160);
@@ -1007,6 +1066,13 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
 # ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
 #  define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
        if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT;        \
+        /* \
+         * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, \
+         * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. \
+         */ \
+        if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; \
        if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, _y_bit, ctx)) ABORT; \
        if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
        if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
@@ -1025,6 +1091,12 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
 #  define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
        if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
        if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT;        \
+        /* \
+         * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, \
+         * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. \
+         */ \
+        if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; \
        if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \
        if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
        if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
@@ -1062,7 +1134,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
    EC_GROUP *C2_B163 = NULL, *C2_B233 = NULL, *C2_B283 = NULL, *C2_B409 =
        NULL, *C2_B571 = NULL;
    EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R;
-    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *cof;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *cof, *yplusone;
    unsigned char buf[100];
    size_t i, len;
    int k;
@@ -1076,7 +1148,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
    p = BN_new();
    a = BN_new();
    b = BN_new();
-    if (!p || !a || !b)
+    if (p == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL)
        ABORT;

    if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "13"))
@@ -1142,7 +1214,8 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
    y = BN_new();
    z = BN_new();
    cof = BN_new();
-    if (!x || !y || !z || !cof)
+    yplusone = BN_new();
+    if (x == NULL || y == NULL || z == NULL || cof == NULL || yplusone == NULL)
        ABORT;

    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "6"))
@@ -1504,6 +1577,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
    BN_free(y);
    BN_free(z);
    BN_free(cof);
+    BN_free(yplusone);

    if (C2_K163)
        EC_GROUP_free(C2_K163);
@@ -1672,7 +1746,7 @@ static const struct nistp_test_params nistp_tests_params[] = {
 static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
 {
    BN_CTX *ctx;
-    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *x, *y, *n, *m, *order;
+    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *x, *y, *n, *m, *order, *yplusone;
    EC_GROUP *NISTP;
    EC_POINT *G, *P, *Q, *Q_CHECK;

@@ -1687,6 +1761,7 @@ static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
    m = BN_new();
    n = BN_new();
    order = BN_new();
+    yplusone = BN_new();

    NISTP = EC_GROUP_new(test->meth());
    if (!NISTP)
@@ -1709,6 +1784,14 @@ static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
        ABORT;
    if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, test->Qy))
        ABORT;
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, y, ctx))
        ABORT;
    if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, test->Gx))
@@ -1811,6 +1894,7 @@ static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
    BN_free(x);
    BN_free(y);
    BN_free(order);
+    BN_free(yplusone);
    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 }

--- a/crypto/ecdh/ech_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh/ech_ossl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 *
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int ecdh_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key,

 err:
    if (tmp)
-        EC_POINT_free(tmp);
+        EC_POINT_clear_free(tmp);
    if (ctx)
        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
    if (ctx)
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 * 2000.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
 */

+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #include "eng_int.h"

 /*
@@ -369,10 +370,10 @@ ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id)
     */
    if (strcmp(id, "dynamic")) {
 # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-        if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
+        if ((load_dir = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
            load_dir = "SSLROOT:[ENGINES]";
 # else
-        if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
+        if ((load_dir = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
            load_dir = ENGINESDIR;
 # endif
        iterator = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
--- a/crypto/err/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/err/Makefile
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
 err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
 err.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
 err.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-err.o: ../cryptlib.h err.c
+err.o: ../constant_time_locl.h ../cryptlib.h err.c
 err_all.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 err_all.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
 err_all.o: ../../include/openssl/cms.h ../../include/openssl/comp.h
--- a/crypto/err/err.c
+++ b/crypto/err/err.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"

 DECLARE_LHASH_OF(ERR_STRING_DATA);
 DECLARE_LHASH_OF(ERR_STATE);
@@ -826,8 +827,24 @@ static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file,
        return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    }

+    while (es->bottom != es->top) {
+        if (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_CLEAR) {
+            err_clear(es, es->top);
+            es->top = es->top > 0 ? es->top - 1 : ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        i = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
+        if (es->err_flags[i] & ERR_FLAG_CLEAR) {
+            es->bottom = i;
+            err_clear(es, es->bottom);
+            continue;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
    if (es->bottom == es->top)
        return 0;
+
    if (top)
        i = es->top;            /* last error */
    else
@@ -1156,3 +1173,23 @@ int ERR_pop_to_mark(void)
    es->err_flags[es->top] &= ~ERR_FLAG_MARK;
    return 1;
 }
+
+void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear)
+{
+    ERR_STATE *es;
+    int top;
+
+    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    top = es->top;
+
+    /*
+     * Flag error as cleared but remove it elsewhere to avoid two errors
+     * accessing the same error stack location, revealing timing information.
+     */
+    clear = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(clear, 0),
+                                     0, ERR_FLAG_CLEAR);
+    es->err_flags[top] |= clear;
+}
--- a/crypto/err/err.h
+++ b/crypto/err/err.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ extern "C" {
 # define ERR_TXT_STRING          0x02

 # define ERR_FLAG_MARK           0x01
+# define ERR_FLAG_CLEAR          0x02

 # define ERR_NUM_ERRORS  16
 typedef struct err_state_st {
--- a/crypto/evp/evp.h
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp.h
@@ -1489,8 +1489,10 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL                        124
 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH              122
 # define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX                        101
+# define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE                          181
 # define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX                          128
 # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX                        127
+# define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE                          180
 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX                         110
 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE                                162
 # define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT                               102
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -317,8 +317,9 @@ int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
    return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 0);
 }

-int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
-                      const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+static int evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                    unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                                    const unsigned char *in, int inl)
 {
    int i, j, bl;

@@ -380,6 +381,18 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
    return 1;
 }

+int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+                      const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+    /* Prevent accidental use of decryption context when encrypting */
+    if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+}
+
 int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 {
    int ret;
@@ -392,6 +405,12 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
    int n, ret;
    unsigned int i, b, bl;

+    /* Prevent accidental use of decryption context when encrypting */
+    if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
        ret = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
        if (ret < 0)
@@ -435,6 +454,12 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
    int fix_len;
    unsigned int b;

+    /* Prevent accidental use of encryption context when decrypting */
+    if (ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
        fix_len = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
        if (fix_len < 0) {
@@ -451,7 +476,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
    }

    if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING)
-        return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
+        return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);

    b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
    OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
@@ -463,7 +488,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
    } else
        fix_len = 0;

-    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl))
+    if (!evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl))
        return 0;

    /*
@@ -494,6 +519,13 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 {
    int i, n;
    unsigned int b;
+
+    /* Prevent accidental use of encryption context when decrypting */
+    if (ctx->encrypt) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    *outl = 0;

    if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/evp/evp_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -92,8 +92,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH),
     "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length"},
    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_DecryptFinal_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_DecryptUpdate"},
    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX), "EVP_DigestInit_ex"},
    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_EncryptUpdate"},
    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX), "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"},
    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE), "EVP_MD_size"},
    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT), "EVP_OpenInit"},
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_test.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_test.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* Written by Ben Laurie, 2001 */
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ static void test1(const EVP_CIPHER *c, const unsigned char *key, int kn,
                ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
                test1_exit(12);
            }
-            if (an && !EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, NULL, &outl, aad, an)) {
+            if (an && !EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, NULL, &outl, aad, an)) {
                fprintf(stderr, "AAD set failed\n");
                ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
                test1_exit(13);
--- a/crypto/getenv.c
+++ b/crypto/getenv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
+# define _GNU_SOURCE
+#endif
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+
+char *ossl_safe_getenv(const char *name)
+{
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
+#  define SECURE_GETENV
+    return secure_getenv(name);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECURE_GETENV
+    if (OPENSSL_issetugid())
+        return NULL;
+    return getenv(name);
+#endif
+}
--- a/crypto/opensslconf.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslconf.h
@@ -1,283 +1,283 @@
-/* opensslconf.h */
-/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32
-# define OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND
-
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-# define OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP
-# define OPENSSL_NO_GMP
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
-# define OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
-# define OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-# define OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND
-# define OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
-# define OPENSSL_NO_MD2
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
-# define OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
-# define OPENSSL_NO_RC5
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
-# define OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-# define OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
-# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STORE
-# define OPENSSL_NO_STORE
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
-# define OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
-# define OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
-#endif
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
-# define OPENSSL_THREADS
-#endif
-
-/* The OPENSSL_NO_* macros are also defined as NO_* if the application
-   asks for it.  This is a transient feature that is provided for those
-   who haven't had the time to do the appropriate changes in their
-   applications.  */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) && !defined(NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
-#  define NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_GMP) && !defined(NO_GMP)
-#  define NO_GMP
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA) && !defined(NO_IDEA)
-#  define NO_IDEA
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(NO_JPAKE)
-#  define NO_JPAKE
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_KRB5) && !defined(NO_KRB5)
-#  define NO_KRB5
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND) && !defined(NO_LIBUNBOUND)
-#  define NO_LIBUNBOUND
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD2) && !defined(NO_MD2)
-#  define NO_MD2
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2) && !defined(NO_MDC2)
-#  define NO_MDC2
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC5) && !defined(NO_RC5)
-#  define NO_RC5
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779) && !defined(NO_RFC3779)
-#  define NO_RFC3779
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SCTP) && !defined(NO_SCTP)
-#  define NO_SCTP
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE) && !defined(NO_SSL_TRACE)
-#  define NO_SSL_TRACE
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(NO_SSL2)
-#  define NO_SSL2
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STORE) && !defined(NO_STORE)
-#  define NO_STORE
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) && !defined(NO_UNIT_TEST)
-#  define NO_UNIT_TEST
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS) && !defined(NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS)
-#  define NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
-
-/* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
-
-/* Generate 80386 code? */
-#undef I386_ONLY
-
-#if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */
-#if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR)
-#define ENGINESDIR "/usr/local/ssl/lib/engines"
-#define OPENSSLDIR "/usr/local/ssl"
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#undef OPENSSL_UNISTD
-#define OPENSSL_UNISTD <unistd.h>
-
-#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
-#define OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
-
-#if defined(HEADER_IDEA_H) && !defined(IDEA_INT)
-#define IDEA_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_MD2_H) && !defined(MD2_INT)
-#define MD2_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC2_H) && !defined(RC2_INT)
-/* I need to put in a mod for the alpha - eay */
-#define RC2_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC4_H)
-#if !defined(RC4_INT)
-/* using int types make the structure larger but make the code faster
- * on most boxes I have tested - up to %20 faster. */
-/*
- * I don't know what does "most" mean, but declaring "int" is a must on:
- * - Intel P6 because partial register stalls are very expensive;
- * - elder Alpha because it lacks byte load/store instructions;
- */
-#define RC4_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-#if !defined(RC4_CHUNK)
-/*
- * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
- * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
- */
-#undef RC4_CHUNK
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(HEADER_NEW_DES_H) || defined(HEADER_DES_H)) && !defined(DES_LONG)
-/* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
- * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
-#ifndef DES_LONG
-#define DES_LONG unsigned long
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H
-#define BN_LLONG
-
-/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
-
-/* Only one for the following should be defined */
-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
-#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
-/* if this is defined data[i] is used instead of *data, this is a %20
- * speedup on x86 */
-#define RC4_INDEX
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
-#undef BF_PTR
-#endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
-
-#if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H
-#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS
-/* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a
- * protected undef/define */
-#ifndef DES_PTR
-#undef DES_PTR
-#endif
-
-/* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional
- * units.  It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more
- * registers */
-#ifndef DES_RISC1
-#undef DES_RISC1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef DES_RISC2
-#undef DES_RISC2
-#endif
-
-#if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2)
-#error YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
-#endif
-
-/* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
- * Very mucy CPU dependant */
-#ifndef DES_UNROLL
-#undef DES_UNROLL
-#endif
-
-/* These default values were supplied by
- * Peter Gutman <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
- * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */
-#if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL)
-/* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the
-   CPU and OS.  For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find
-   even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for
-   optimization options.  Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
-   there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
- 
-#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun )		/* Newer Sparc's */
-#  define DES_PTR
-#  define DES_RISC1
-#  define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __ultrix )	/* Older MIPS */
-#  define DES_PTR
-#  define DES_RISC2
-#  define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __osf1__ )	/* Alpha */
-#  define DES_PTR
-#  define DES_RISC2
-#elif defined ( _AIX )		/* RS6000 */
-  /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __hpux )		/* HP-PA */
-  /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __aux )		/* 68K */
-  /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __dgux )		/* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */
-#  define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __sgi )		/* Newer MIPS */
-#  define DES_PTR
-#  define DES_RISC2
-#  define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined(i386) || defined(__i386__)	/* x86 boxes, should be gcc */
-#  define DES_PTR
-#  define DES_RISC1
-#  define DES_UNROLL
-#endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */
-#endif
-
-#endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */
-#endif /* HEADER_DES_LOCL_H */
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
+/* opensslconf.h */
+/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32
+# define OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+# define OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP
+# define OPENSSL_NO_GMP
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+# define OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+# define OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+# define OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND
+# define OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+# define OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+# define OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+# define OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+# define OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STORE
+# define OPENSSL_NO_STORE
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+# define OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+# define OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+#endif
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
+# define OPENSSL_THREADS
+#endif
+
+/* The OPENSSL_NO_* macros are also defined as NO_* if the application
+   asks for it.  This is a transient feature that is provided for those
+   who haven't had the time to do the appropriate changes in their
+   applications.  */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) && !defined(NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
+#  define NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_GMP) && !defined(NO_GMP)
+#  define NO_GMP
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA) && !defined(NO_IDEA)
+#  define NO_IDEA
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(NO_JPAKE)
+#  define NO_JPAKE
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_KRB5) && !defined(NO_KRB5)
+#  define NO_KRB5
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND) && !defined(NO_LIBUNBOUND)
+#  define NO_LIBUNBOUND
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD2) && !defined(NO_MD2)
+#  define NO_MD2
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2) && !defined(NO_MDC2)
+#  define NO_MDC2
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC5) && !defined(NO_RC5)
+#  define NO_RC5
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779) && !defined(NO_RFC3779)
+#  define NO_RFC3779
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SCTP) && !defined(NO_SCTP)
+#  define NO_SCTP
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE) && !defined(NO_SSL_TRACE)
+#  define NO_SSL_TRACE
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(NO_SSL2)
+#  define NO_SSL2
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STORE) && !defined(NO_STORE)
+#  define NO_STORE
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) && !defined(NO_UNIT_TEST)
+#  define NO_UNIT_TEST
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS) && !defined(NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS)
+#  define NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
+
+/* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
+
+/* Generate 80386 code? */
+#undef I386_ONLY
+
+#if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */
+#if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR)
+#define ENGINESDIR "/usr/local/ssl/lib/engines"
+#define OPENSSLDIR "/usr/local/ssl"
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#undef OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#define OPENSSL_UNISTD <unistd.h>
+
+#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+#define OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+
+#if defined(HEADER_IDEA_H) && !defined(IDEA_INT)
+#define IDEA_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_MD2_H) && !defined(MD2_INT)
+#define MD2_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC2_H) && !defined(RC2_INT)
+/* I need to put in a mod for the alpha - eay */
+#define RC2_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC4_H)
+#if !defined(RC4_INT)
+/* using int types make the structure larger but make the code faster
+ * on most boxes I have tested - up to %20 faster. */
+/*
+ * I don't know what does "most" mean, but declaring "int" is a must on:
+ * - Intel P6 because partial register stalls are very expensive;
+ * - elder Alpha because it lacks byte load/store instructions;
+ */
+#define RC4_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+#if !defined(RC4_CHUNK)
+/*
+ * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
+ * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
+ */
+#undef RC4_CHUNK
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(HEADER_NEW_DES_H) || defined(HEADER_DES_H)) && !defined(DES_LONG)
+/* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
+ * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
+#ifndef DES_LONG
+#define DES_LONG unsigned long
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H
+#define BN_LLONG
+
+/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
+
+/* Only one for the following should be defined */
+#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
+#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
+/* if this is defined data[i] is used instead of *data, this is a %20
+ * speedup on x86 */
+#define RC4_INDEX
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
+#undef BF_PTR
+#endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
+
+#if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H
+#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS
+/* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a
+ * protected undef/define */
+#ifndef DES_PTR
+#undef DES_PTR
+#endif
+
+/* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional
+ * units.  It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more
+ * registers */
+#ifndef DES_RISC1
+#undef DES_RISC1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DES_RISC2
+#undef DES_RISC2
+#endif
+
+#if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2)
+#error YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
+#endif
+
+/* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
+ * Very mucy CPU dependant */
+#ifndef DES_UNROLL
+#undef DES_UNROLL
+#endif
+
+/* These default values were supplied by
+ * Peter Gutman <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
+ * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */
+#if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL)
+/* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the
+   CPU and OS.  For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find
+   even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for
+   optimization options.  Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
+   there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
+ 
+#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun )		/* Newer Sparc's */
+#  define DES_PTR
+#  define DES_RISC1
+#  define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __ultrix )	/* Older MIPS */
+#  define DES_PTR
+#  define DES_RISC2
+#  define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __osf1__ )	/* Alpha */
+#  define DES_PTR
+#  define DES_RISC2
+#elif defined ( _AIX )		/* RS6000 */
+  /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __hpux )		/* HP-PA */
+  /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __aux )		/* 68K */
+  /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __dgux )		/* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */
+#  define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __sgi )		/* Newer MIPS */
+#  define DES_PTR
+#  define DES_RISC2
+#  define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined(i386) || defined(__i386__)	/* x86 boxes, should be gcc */
+#  define DES_PTR
+#  define DES_RISC1
+#  define DES_UNROLL
+#endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */
+#endif
+
+#endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */
+#endif /* HEADER_DES_LOCL_H */
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
--- a/crypto/opensslconf.h.bak
+++ b/crypto/opensslconf.h.bak
@@ -1,283 +1,283 @@
-/* opensslconf.h */
-/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN64A
-# define OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN64A
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND
-
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-# define OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP
-# define OPENSSL_NO_GMP
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
-# define OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
-# define OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-# define OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND
-# define OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
-# define OPENSSL_NO_MD2
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
-# define OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
-# define OPENSSL_NO_RC5
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
-# define OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-# define OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
-# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STORE
-# define OPENSSL_NO_STORE
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
-# define OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
-# define OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
-#endif
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
-# define OPENSSL_THREADS
-#endif
-
-/* The OPENSSL_NO_* macros are also defined as NO_* if the application
-   asks for it.  This is a transient feature that is provided for those
-   who haven't had the time to do the appropriate changes in their
-   applications.  */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) && !defined(NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
-#  define NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_GMP) && !defined(NO_GMP)
-#  define NO_GMP
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA) && !defined(NO_IDEA)
-#  define NO_IDEA
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(NO_JPAKE)
-#  define NO_JPAKE
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_KRB5) && !defined(NO_KRB5)
-#  define NO_KRB5
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND) && !defined(NO_LIBUNBOUND)
-#  define NO_LIBUNBOUND
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD2) && !defined(NO_MD2)
-#  define NO_MD2
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2) && !defined(NO_MDC2)
-#  define NO_MDC2
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC5) && !defined(NO_RC5)
-#  define NO_RC5
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779) && !defined(NO_RFC3779)
-#  define NO_RFC3779
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SCTP) && !defined(NO_SCTP)
-#  define NO_SCTP
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE) && !defined(NO_SSL_TRACE)
-#  define NO_SSL_TRACE
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(NO_SSL2)
-#  define NO_SSL2
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STORE) && !defined(NO_STORE)
-#  define NO_STORE
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) && !defined(NO_UNIT_TEST)
-#  define NO_UNIT_TEST
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS) && !defined(NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS)
-#  define NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
-
-/* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
-
-/* Generate 80386 code? */
-#undef I386_ONLY
-
-#if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */
-#if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR)
-#define ENGINESDIR "/usr/local/ssl/lib/engines"
-#define OPENSSLDIR "/usr/local/ssl"
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#undef OPENSSL_UNISTD
-#define OPENSSL_UNISTD <unistd.h>
-
-#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
-#define OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
-
-#if defined(HEADER_IDEA_H) && !defined(IDEA_INT)
-#define IDEA_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_MD2_H) && !defined(MD2_INT)
-#define MD2_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC2_H) && !defined(RC2_INT)
-/* I need to put in a mod for the alpha - eay */
-#define RC2_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC4_H)
-#if !defined(RC4_INT)
-/* using int types make the structure larger but make the code faster
- * on most boxes I have tested - up to %20 faster. */
-/*
- * I don't know what does "most" mean, but declaring "int" is a must on:
- * - Intel P6 because partial register stalls are very expensive;
- * - elder Alpha because it lacks byte load/store instructions;
- */
-#define RC4_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-#if !defined(RC4_CHUNK)
-/*
- * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
- * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
- */
-#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long long
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(HEADER_NEW_DES_H) || defined(HEADER_DES_H)) && !defined(DES_LONG)
-/* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
- * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
-#ifndef DES_LONG
-#define DES_LONG unsigned int
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H
-#undef BN_LLONG
-
-/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
-
-/* Only one for the following should be defined */
-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
-#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
-/* if this is defined data[i] is used instead of *data, this is a %20
- * speedup on x86 */
-#undef RC4_INDEX
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
-#undef BF_PTR
-#endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
-
-#if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H
-#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS
-/* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a
- * protected undef/define */
-#ifndef DES_PTR
-#undef DES_PTR
-#endif
-
-/* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional
- * units.  It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more
- * registers */
-#ifndef DES_RISC1
-#undef DES_RISC1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef DES_RISC2
-#undef DES_RISC2
-#endif
-
-#if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2)
-#error YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
-#endif
-
-/* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
- * Very mucy CPU dependant */
-#ifndef DES_UNROLL
-#undef DES_UNROLL
-#endif
-
-/* These default values were supplied by
- * Peter Gutman <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
- * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */
-#if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL)
-/* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the
-   CPU and OS.  For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find
-   even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for
-   optimization options.  Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
-   there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
- 
-#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun )		/* Newer Sparc's */
-#  define DES_PTR
-#  define DES_RISC1
-#  define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __ultrix )	/* Older MIPS */
-#  define DES_PTR
-#  define DES_RISC2
-#  define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __osf1__ )	/* Alpha */
-#  define DES_PTR
-#  define DES_RISC2
-#elif defined ( _AIX )		/* RS6000 */
-  /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __hpux )		/* HP-PA */
-  /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __aux )		/* 68K */
-  /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __dgux )		/* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */
-#  define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __sgi )		/* Newer MIPS */
-#  define DES_PTR
-#  define DES_RISC2
-#  define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined(i386) || defined(__i386__)	/* x86 boxes, should be gcc */
-#  define DES_PTR
-#  define DES_RISC1
-#  define DES_UNROLL
-#endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */
-#endif
-
-#endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */
-#endif /* HEADER_DES_LOCL_H */
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
+/* opensslconf.h */
+/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN64A
+# define OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN64A
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+# define OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP
+# define OPENSSL_NO_GMP
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+# define OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+# define OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+# define OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND
+# define OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+# define OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+# define OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+# define OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+# define OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STORE
+# define OPENSSL_NO_STORE
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+# define OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+# define OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+#endif
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
+# define OPENSSL_THREADS
+#endif
+
+/* The OPENSSL_NO_* macros are also defined as NO_* if the application
+   asks for it.  This is a transient feature that is provided for those
+   who haven't had the time to do the appropriate changes in their
+   applications.  */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) && !defined(NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
+#  define NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_GMP) && !defined(NO_GMP)
+#  define NO_GMP
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_IDEA) && !defined(NO_IDEA)
+#  define NO_IDEA
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(NO_JPAKE)
+#  define NO_JPAKE
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_KRB5) && !defined(NO_KRB5)
+#  define NO_KRB5
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND) && !defined(NO_LIBUNBOUND)
+#  define NO_LIBUNBOUND
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD2) && !defined(NO_MD2)
+#  define NO_MD2
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2) && !defined(NO_MDC2)
+#  define NO_MDC2
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC5) && !defined(NO_RC5)
+#  define NO_RC5
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779) && !defined(NO_RFC3779)
+#  define NO_RFC3779
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SCTP) && !defined(NO_SCTP)
+#  define NO_SCTP
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE) && !defined(NO_SSL_TRACE)
+#  define NO_SSL_TRACE
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(NO_SSL2)
+#  define NO_SSL2
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STORE) && !defined(NO_STORE)
+#  define NO_STORE
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) && !defined(NO_UNIT_TEST)
+#  define NO_UNIT_TEST
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS) && !defined(NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS)
+#  define NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
+
+/* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
+
+/* Generate 80386 code? */
+#undef I386_ONLY
+
+#if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */
+#if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR)
+#define ENGINESDIR "/usr/local/ssl/lib/engines"
+#define OPENSSLDIR "/usr/local/ssl"
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#undef OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#define OPENSSL_UNISTD <unistd.h>
+
+#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+#define OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+
+#if defined(HEADER_IDEA_H) && !defined(IDEA_INT)
+#define IDEA_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_MD2_H) && !defined(MD2_INT)
+#define MD2_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC2_H) && !defined(RC2_INT)
+/* I need to put in a mod for the alpha - eay */
+#define RC2_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC4_H)
+#if !defined(RC4_INT)
+/* using int types make the structure larger but make the code faster
+ * on most boxes I have tested - up to %20 faster. */
+/*
+ * I don't know what does "most" mean, but declaring "int" is a must on:
+ * - Intel P6 because partial register stalls are very expensive;
+ * - elder Alpha because it lacks byte load/store instructions;
+ */
+#define RC4_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+#if !defined(RC4_CHUNK)
+/*
+ * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
+ * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
+ */
+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long long
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(HEADER_NEW_DES_H) || defined(HEADER_DES_H)) && !defined(DES_LONG)
+/* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
+ * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
+#ifndef DES_LONG
+#define DES_LONG unsigned int
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H
+#undef BN_LLONG
+
+/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
+
+/* Only one for the following should be defined */
+#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
+/* if this is defined data[i] is used instead of *data, this is a %20
+ * speedup on x86 */
+#undef RC4_INDEX
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
+#undef BF_PTR
+#endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
+
+#if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H
+#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS
+/* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a
+ * protected undef/define */
+#ifndef DES_PTR
+#undef DES_PTR
+#endif
+
+/* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional
+ * units.  It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more
+ * registers */
+#ifndef DES_RISC1
+#undef DES_RISC1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DES_RISC2
+#undef DES_RISC2
+#endif
+
+#if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2)
+#error YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
+#endif
+
+/* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
+ * Very mucy CPU dependant */
+#ifndef DES_UNROLL
+#undef DES_UNROLL
+#endif
+
+/* These default values were supplied by
+ * Peter Gutman <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
+ * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */
+#if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL)
+/* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the
+   CPU and OS.  For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find
+   even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for
+   optimization options.  Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
+   there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
+ 
+#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun )		/* Newer Sparc's */
+#  define DES_PTR
+#  define DES_RISC1
+#  define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __ultrix )	/* Older MIPS */
+#  define DES_PTR
+#  define DES_RISC2
+#  define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __osf1__ )	/* Alpha */
+#  define DES_PTR
+#  define DES_RISC2
+#elif defined ( _AIX )		/* RS6000 */
+  /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __hpux )		/* HP-PA */
+  /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __aux )		/* 68K */
+  /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __dgux )		/* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */
+#  define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __sgi )		/* Newer MIPS */
+#  define DES_PTR
+#  define DES_RISC2
+#  define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined(i386) || defined(__i386__)	/* x86 boxes, should be gcc */
+#  define DES_PTR
+#  define DES_RISC1
+#  define DES_UNROLL
+#endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */
+#endif
+
+#endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */
+#endif /* HEADER_DES_LOCL_H */
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
 * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
 *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
 */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000210fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000214fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2p-fips  14 Aug 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2t-fips  10 Sep 2019"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2p  14 Aug 2018"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2t  10 Sep 2019"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT

--- a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 * 2005.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -327,6 +327,8 @@ static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
    } else {
        if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &dsa->priv_key))
            goto memerr;
+        /* Set constant time flag before public key calculation */
+        BN_set_flags(dsa->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
        /* Calculate public key */
        if (!(dsa->pub_key = BN_new()))
            goto memerr;
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 * 1999.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ PKCS12 *PKCS12_init(int mode)
        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        return NULL;
    }
-    ASN1_INTEGER_set(pkcs12->version, 3);
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pkcs12->version, 3))
+        goto err;
    pkcs12->authsafes->type = OBJ_nid2obj(mode);
    switch (mode) {
    case NID_pkcs7_data:
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -191,7 +191,8 @@ static int pkcs7_encode_rinfo(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri,
 }

 static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
-                               PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+                               PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                               size_t fixlen)
 {
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
    unsigned char *ek = NULL;
@@ -224,7 +225,9 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
    }

    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen,
-                         ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0) {
+                         ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0
+            || eklen == 0
+            || (fixlen != 0 && eklen != fixlen)) {
        ret = 0;
        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
        goto err;
@@ -571,13 +574,14 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
            for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
                ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);

-                if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
+                if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey,
+                        EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher)) < 0)
                    goto err;
                ERR_clear_error();
            }
        } else {
            /* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */
-            if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
+            if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey, 0) < 0)
                goto err;
            ERR_clear_error();
        }
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
@@ -185,7 +185,6 @@ int PKCS7_set_type(PKCS7 *p7, int type)
        if ((p7->d.signed_and_enveloped = PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_new())
            == NULL)
            goto err;
-        ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->version, 1);
        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->version, 1))
            goto err;
        p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->content_type
--- a/crypto/rand/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/rand/Makefile
@@ -157,10 +157,11 @@ rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
 rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
 rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rand_lcl.h
 rand_win.o: rand_win.c
-randfile.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+randfile.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
 randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-randfile.o: randfile.c
+randfile.o: ../cryptlib.h randfile.c
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -345,7 +345,6 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
    static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
    int i, j, k;
    size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
-    int ok;
    long md_c[2];
    unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
    EVP_MD_CTX m;
@@ -400,14 +399,13 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)

    if (!initialized) {
        RAND_poll();
-        initialized = 1;
+        initialized = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
    }

    if (!stirred_pool)
        do_stir_pool = 1;

-    ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-    if (!ok) {
+    if (!initialized) {
        /*
         * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
         * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
@@ -446,7 +444,7 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
            ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
            n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
        }
-        if (ok)
+        if (initialized)
            stirred_pool = 1;
    }

@@ -539,7 +537,7 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
-    if (ok)
+    if (initialized)
        return (1);
    else if (pseudo)
        return 0;
@@ -555,6 +553,18 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
    return (0);
 }

+/*
+ * Returns ssleay_rand_bytes(), enforcing a reseeding from the
+ * system entropy sources using RAND_poll() before generating
+`* the random bytes.
+ */
+
+int ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    initialized = 0;
+    return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0, 0);
+}
+
 static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 {
    return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0, 1);
@@ -600,10 +610,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)

    if (!initialized) {
        RAND_poll();
-        initialized = 1;
+        initialized = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
    }

-    ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+    ret = initialized;

    if (!do_not_lock) {
        /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -154,5 +154,5 @@
 # endif

 int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock);
-
+int ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 #endif
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -185,11 +185,29 @@ int RAND_status(void)

 /*
 * Entropy gatherer: use standard OpenSSL PRNG to seed (this will gather
- * entropy internally through RAND_poll().
+ * entropy internally through RAND_poll()).
 */

 static size_t drbg_get_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
                               int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+    /* Round up request to multiple of block size */
+    min_len = ((min_len + 19) / 20) * 20;
+    *pout = OPENSSL_malloc(min_len);
+    if (!*pout)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Enforces a reseed of the SSLEAY PRNG before generating random bytes */
+    if (ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system(*pout, min_len) <= 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(*pout);
+        *pout = NULL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return min_len;
+}
+
+static size_t drbg_get_nonce(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
+                               int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
 {
    /* Round up request to multiple of block size */
    min_len = ((min_len + 19) / 20) * 20;
@@ -281,7 +299,7 @@ int RAND_init_fips(void)

    FIPS_drbg_set_callbacks(dctx,
                            drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy, 20,
-                            drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy);
+                            drbg_get_nonce, drbg_free_entropy);
    FIPS_drbg_set_rand_callbacks(dctx, drbg_get_adin, 0,
                                 drbg_rand_seed, drbg_rand_add);
    /* Personalisation string: a string followed by date time vector */
--- a/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>

+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #include "e_os.h"
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
@@ -327,14 +328,12 @@ const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
    struct stat sb;
 #endif

-    if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
-        s = getenv("RANDFILE");
+    s = ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE");
    if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size) {
        if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size)
            return NULL;
    } else {
-        if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
-            s = getenv("HOME");
+        s = ossl_safe_getenv("HOME");
 #ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
        if (s == NULL) {
            s = DEFAULT_HOME;
--- a/crypto/rsa/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/rsa/Makefile
@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
 rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_eay.c
+rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+rsa_eay.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_eay.c
 rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
@@ -299,7 +300,8 @@ rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
 rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_ssl.c
+rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+rsa_ssl.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_ssl.c
 rsa_x931.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
 rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
 rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
        return 0;
    }

+    /* Set consant-time flag on private parameters */
+    BN_set_flags(key->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_set_flags(key->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_set_flags(key->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
    i = BN_new();
    j = BN_new();
    k = BN_new();
@@ -141,6 +145,10 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
    }

    if (key->dmp1 != NULL && key->dmq1 != NULL && key->iqmp != NULL) {
+        /* Set consant-time flag on CRT parameters */
+        BN_set_flags(key->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        BN_set_flags(key->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        BN_set_flags(key->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
        /* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */
        if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
            ret = -1;
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "bn_int.h"
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"

 #ifndef RSA_NULL

@@ -224,8 +225,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
    }

    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
            goto err;

    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
@@ -397,6 +398,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
        goto err;
    }

+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
+            goto err;
+
    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
        blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
        if (blinding == NULL) {
@@ -431,11 +437,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
        } else
            d = rsa->d;

-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
-                goto err;
-
        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
                                   rsa->_method_mod_n))
            goto err;
@@ -554,8 +555,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
            d = rsa->d;

        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                        rsa->n, ctx))
                goto err;
        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
                                   rsa->_method_mod_n))
@@ -587,8 +588,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
        goto err;
    }
-    if (r < 0)
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & ~constant_time_msb(r));

 err:
    if (ctx != NULL) {
@@ -660,8 +661,8 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
    }

    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
            goto err;

    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
@@ -708,7 +709,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
    BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
    BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;
    BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
-    int ret = 0;
+    int ret = 0, smooth = 0;

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -737,20 +738,64 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
        }

        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                        p, ctx))
                goto err;
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
+            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                        q, ctx))
                goto err;
+
+            smooth = (rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp == BN_mod_exp_mont)
+                     && (BN_num_bits(q) == BN_num_bits(p));
        }
    }

    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA,
+                                    rsa->n, ctx))
            goto err;

+    if (smooth) {
+        /*
+         * Conversion from Montgomery domain, a.k.a. Montgomery reduction,
+         * accepts values in [0-m*2^w) range. w is m's bit width rounded up
+         * to limb width. So that at the very least if |I| is fully reduced,
+         * i.e. less than p*q, we can count on from-to round to perform
+         * below modulo operations on |I|. Unlike BN_mod it's constant time.
+         */
+        if (/* m1 = I moq q */
+            !bn_from_mont_fixed_top(m1, I, rsa->_method_mod_q, ctx)
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(m1, m1, rsa->_method_mod_q, ctx)
+            /* m1 = m1^dmq1 mod q */
+            || !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, m1, rsa->dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,
+                                          rsa->_method_mod_q)
+            /* r1 = I mod p */
+            || !bn_from_mont_fixed_top(r1, I, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+            /* r1 = r1^dmp1 mod p */
+            || !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r1, r1, rsa->dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,
+                                          rsa->_method_mod_p)
+            /* r1 = (r1 - m1) mod p */
+            /*
+             * bn_mod_sub_fixed_top is not regular modular subtraction,
+             * it can tolerate subtrahend to be larger than modulus, but
+             * not bit-wise wider. This makes up for uncommon q>p case,
+             * when |m1| can be larger than |rsa->p|.
+             */
+            || !bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(r1, r1, m1, rsa->p)
+
+            /* r1 = r1 * iqmp mod p */
+            || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+            || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->iqmp, rsa->_method_mod_p,
+                                      ctx)
+            /* r0 = r1 * q + m1 */
+            || !bn_mul_fixed_top(r0, r1, rsa->q, ctx)
+            || !bn_mod_add_fixed_top(r0, r0, m1, rsa->n))
+            goto err;
+
+        goto tail;
+    }
+
    /* compute I mod q */
    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
        c = &local_c;
@@ -828,10 +873,18 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
    if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
        goto err;

+ tail:
    if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
-        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                   rsa->_method_mod_n))
-            goto err;
+        if (rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp == BN_mod_exp_mont) {
+            if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                 rsa->_method_mod_n))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            bn_correct_top(r0);
+            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+                                       rsa->_method_mod_n))
+                goto err;
+        }
        /*
         * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
         * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
@@ -840,6 +893,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
         */
        if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
            goto err;
+        if (BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
+            bn_correct_top(r0);
+            ret = 1;
+            goto err;   /* not actually error */
+        }
        if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
            goto err;
        if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
@@ -865,6 +923,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
                goto err;
        }
    }
+    /*
+     * It's unfortunate that we have to bn_correct_top(r0). What hopefully
+     * saves the day is that correction is highly unlike, and private key
+     * operations are customarily performed on blinded message. Which means
+     * that attacker won't observe correlation with chosen plaintext.
+     * Secondly, remaining code would still handle it in same computational
+     * time and even conceal memory access pattern around corrected top.
+     */
+    bn_correct_top(r0);
    ret = 1;
 err:
    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
 {
    int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
-    unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
+    unsigned int good = 0, found_one_byte, mask;
    const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
    /*
     * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
@@ -144,12 +144,15 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
     * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
     * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
-     * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
+     * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
     * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
     * This does not leak any side-channel information.
     */
-    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2)
-        goto decoding_err;
+    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }

    dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
    db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
@@ -158,25 +161,24 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
        goto cleanup;
    }

-    if (flen != num) {
-        em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-        if (em == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
-                   ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }

-        /*
-         * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
-         * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
-         * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
-         * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
-         * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
-         * |from|.
-         */
-        memset(em, 0, num);
-        memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
-        from = em;
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
    }

    /*
@@ -184,10 +186,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA
     * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
     */
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);

-    maskedseed = from + 1;
-    maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen;
+    maskedseed = em + 1;
+    maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;

    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
        goto cleanup;
@@ -224,37 +226,51 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
     * concern.
     */
-    if (!good)
-        goto decoding_err;
-
    msg_index = one_index + 1;
    mlen = dblen - msg_index;

-    if (tlen < mlen) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-        mlen = -1;
-    } else {
-        memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
-        goto cleanup;
+    /*
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+
+    /*
+     * Move the result in-place by |dblen|-|mdlen|-1-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+     * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |db|+|mdlen|+1 to |to|.
+     * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
+     * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+     * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+     * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+     * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+     * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
+     */
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen),
+                                    dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen);
+    for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < dblen - mdlen - 1; msg_index <<= 1) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (dblen - mdlen - 1 - mlen), 0);
+        for (i = mdlen + 1; i < dblen - msg_index; i++)
+            db[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + msg_index], db[i]);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + mdlen + 1], to[i]);
    }

- decoding_err:
    /*
     * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
     * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
     */
    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
           RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
 cleanup:
-    if (db != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen);
-        OPENSSL_free(db);
-    }
-    if (em != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
-        OPENSSL_free(em);
-    }
-    return mlen;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(seed, sizeof(seed));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen);
+    OPENSSL_free(db);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
+    OPENSSL_free(em);
+
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
 }

 int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    int i;
    /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
    unsigned char *em = NULL;
-    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask;
    int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;

    if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
@@ -218,49 +218,49 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     * section 7.2.2.
     */

-    if (flen > num)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (num < 11)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (flen != num) {
-        em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-        if (em == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return -1;
-        }
-        /*
-         * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
-         * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
-         * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
-         * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
-         * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
-         * |from|.
-         */
-        memset(em, 0, num);
-        memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
-        from = em;
+    if (flen > num || num < 11) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+               RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+        return -1;
    }

-    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
-    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
+    }

+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+
+    /* scan over padding data */
    found_zero_byte = 0;
    for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
-        zero_index =
-            constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
-                                     zero_index);
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
+
+        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+                                              i, zero_index);
        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
    }

    /*
-     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
     * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
     * also fails.
     */
-    good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
+    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);

    /*
     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
@@ -270,30 +270,36 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    mlen = num - msg_index;

    /*
-     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
-     * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
     */
-    good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);

    /*
-     * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
-     * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
-     * information at the API boundary.
+     * Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+     * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|.
+     * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
+     * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+     * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+     * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+     * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+     * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
     */
-    if (!good) {
-        mlen = -1;
-        goto err;
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
+                                    num - 11, tlen);
+    for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0);
+        for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++)
+            em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]);
    }

-    memcpy(to, from + msg_index, mlen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
+    OPENSSL_free(em);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);

- err:
-    if (em != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
-        OPENSSL_free(em);
-    }
-    if (mlen == -1)
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
-               RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
-    return mlen;
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
 }
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 * 2006.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
    rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
    if (!rctx)
        return 0;
-    rctx->nbits = 1024;
+    rctx->nbits = 2048;
    rctx->pub_exp = NULL;
    rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
    rctx->md = NULL;
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"

 int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                           const unsigned char *from, int flen)
@@ -101,57 +102,119 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    return (1);
 }

+/*
+ * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
+ * if nul delimiter is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
+ * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
+ */
 int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                             const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
 {
-    int i, j, k;
-    const unsigned char *p;
+    int i;
+    /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+    unsigned char *em = NULL;
+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
+    int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;

-    p = from;
-    if (flen < 10) {
+    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (flen > num || num < 11) {
        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
        return (-1);
    }
-    /* Accept even zero-padded input */
-    if (flen == num) {
-        if (*(p++) != 0) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
-            return -1;
-        }
-        flen--;
+
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
    }
-    if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
-        return (-1);
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
    }

+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+    mask = ~good;
+
    /* scan over padding data */
-    j = flen - 1;               /* one for type */
-    for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
-        if (*(p++) == 0)
-            break;
+    found_zero_byte = 0;
+    threes_in_row = 0;
+    for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);

-    if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,
-               RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
-        return (-1);
-    }
-    for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) {
-        if (p[k] != 0x03)
-            break;
-    }
-    if (k == -1) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
-        return (-1);
+        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+                                              i, zero_index);
+        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+
+        threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
+        threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3);
    }

-    i++;                        /* Skip over the '\0' */
-    j -= i;
-    if (j > tlen) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-        return (-1);
-    }
-    memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+    /*
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
+     * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+     * also fails.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+                                   RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+    mask = ~good;

-    return (j);
+    good &= constant_time_ge(threes_in_row, 8);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+                                   RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
+    mask = ~good;
+
+    /*
+     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+     */
+    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+    /*
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+
+    /*
+     * Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+     * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|.
+     * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
+     * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+     * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+     * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+     * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+     * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
+     */
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
+                                    num - 11, tlen);
+    for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0);
+        for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++)
+            em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
+    OPENSSL_free(em);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, err);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
+
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
 }
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
@@ -509,6 +509,24 @@ static int open_console(UI *ui)
            is_a_tty = 0;
        else
 # endif
+# ifdef ENXIO
+            /*
+             * Solaris can return ENXIO.
+             * This should be ok
+             */
+        if (errno == ENXIO)
+            is_a_tty = 0;
+        else
+# endif
+# ifdef EIO
+            /*
+             * Linux can return EIO.
+             * This should be ok
+             */
+        if (errno == EIO)
+            is_a_tty = 0;
+        else
+# endif
 # ifdef ENODEV
            /*
             * MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device),
--- a/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl,
    switch (cmd) {
    case X509_L_ADD_DIR:
        if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
-            dir = (char *)getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env());
+            dir = (char *)ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env());
            if (dir)
                ret = add_cert_dir(ld, dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
            else
--- a/crypto/x509/by_file.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/by_file.c
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp,
    switch (cmd) {
    case X509_L_FILE_LOAD:
        if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
-            file = getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env());
+            file = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env());
+
            if (file)
                ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, file,
                                              X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -490,6 +490,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
    STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
    int i;
    ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
        CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
         * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
         * happy
         */
-        if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
+        if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
            allow_proxy_certs = 1;
        purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
    }
@@ -694,10 +694,9 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                    goto end;
            }
        }
-        /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
-        if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
-            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
-            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
+        /* Check pathlen */
+        if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
            ctx->error_depth = i;
            ctx->current_cert = x;
@@ -705,8 +704,8 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
            if (!ok)
                goto end;
        }
-        /* Increment path length if not self issued */
-        if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+        /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */
+        if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
            plen++;
        /*
         * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 * project.
 */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -205,15 +205,18 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_print(BIO *out, GENERAL_NAME *gen)
        break;

    case GEN_EMAIL:
-        BIO_printf(out, "email:%s", gen->d.ia5->data);
+        BIO_printf(out, "email:");
+        ASN1_STRING_print(out, gen->d.ia5);
        break;

    case GEN_DNS:
-        BIO_printf(out, "DNS:%s", gen->d.ia5->data);
+        BIO_printf(out, "DNS:");
+        ASN1_STRING_print(out, gen->d.ia5);
        break;

    case GEN_URI:
-        BIO_printf(out, "URI:%s", gen->d.ia5->data);
+        BIO_printf(out, "URI:");
+        ASN1_STRING_print(out, gen->d.ia5);
        break;

    case GEN_DIRNAME:
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -396,12 +396,8 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
    ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
    EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
    X509_EXTENSION *ex;
-
    int i;

-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
-        return;
-
    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
--- a/doc/apps/ca.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/ca.pod
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ the section of the configuration file containing certificate extensions
 to be added when a certificate is issued (defaults to B<x509_extensions>
 unless the B<-extfile> option is used). If no extension section is
 present then, a V1 certificate is created. If the extension section
-is present (even if it is empty), then a V3 certificate is created. See the:w
+is present (even if it is empty), then a V3 certificate is created. See the
 L<x509v3_config(5)|x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
 extension section format.

--- a/doc/apps/crl.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/crl.pod
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ Convert a CRL file from PEM to DER:

 Output the text form of a DER encoded certificate:

- openssl crl -in crl.der -text -noout
+ openssl crl -in crl.der -inform DER -text -noout

 =head1 BUGS

--- a/doc/apps/genpkey.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/genpkey.pod
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ below.

 =item B<rsa_keygen_bits:numbits>

-The number of bits in the generated key. If not specified 1024 is used.
+The number of bits in the generated key. If not specified 2048 is used.

 =item B<rsa_keygen_pubexp:value>

@@ -149,12 +149,12 @@ below.

 =item B<dsa_paramgen_bits:numbits>

-The number of bits in the generated prime. If not specified 1024 is used.
+The number of bits in the generated prime. If not specified 2048 is used.

 =item B<dsa_paramgen_q_bits:numbits>

 The number of bits in the q parameter. Must be one of 160, 224 or 256. If not
-specified 160 is used.
+specified 224 is used.

 =item B<dsa_paramgen_md:digest>

@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ or B<sha256> if it is 256.

 =item B<dh_paramgen_prime_len:numbits>

-The number of bits in the prime parameter B<p>. The default is 1024.
+The number of bits in the prime parameter B<p>. The default is 2048.

 =item B<dh_paramgen_subprime_len:numbits>

--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Steve Dower	2653d15ab4	Import OpenSSL 1.0.2t	2019-09-16 11:28:31 +01:00
Steve Dower	e6c823a7e5	Import OpenSSL 1.0.2s	2019-06-17 08:41:08 -07:00
Steve Dower	4155d3c2bd	Import OpenSSL 1.0.2q	2018-12-07 11:08:57 -08:00